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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the philosophical origins of dualism in Western culture in 
the Classical period in order to examine dualist modes of representation in the history 
of Western portraiture. Dualism – or the separation of soul and body – takes the form 
in portraiture of the representation of the head or head and shoulders at the expense 
of the body, and since its emergence in Classical Greece, has been the major influence 
on portraiture. In this respect the modern portrait’s commonplace attention to the 
face rests on the dualist notion that the soul, and therefore the individuality of the 
subject, rests in the head.  
Art historical literature on portraiture, however, fails to address the pictorial, 
cultural and theoretical complications arising from various forms of dualism and their 
different artistic methodologies, such as that of the physiognomy (the definition of 
personality through facial characteristics) in the 19th century. That is, there is a failure 
to identify the complexities of dualism’s relationship to the traditional honorific 
aspects of the portrait (the fact that historians are inclined to accept at face value the 
fact that portraits historically have tended to honour the achievements and social 
status of the sitter). Indeed, scholars have a propensity to romanticise the humanist 
individualism inherent to this long history of the honorific, particularly in canonic 
portrait practices such as Rembrandt’s and Picasso’s. 
My thesis challenges this conventional history, by drawing on a study of 
Platonic and Cartesian dualist thinking, as well as on a series of anti-dualist positions 
(proposed by Derek Parfit, Gilbert Ryle, W. Teed Rockwell). Hence the thesis has 
three key components: firstly the analysis of production of the honorific in portraiture 
from classical culture to Rembrandt in relation to the changing determinates of 
dualism, then a discussion of the crisis of the honorific and the increasingly conflicted 
nature of dualism in modernism (Picasso and Braque), and then finally the break 
down of dualism, or its radical modification, in art of the 1960s. In this section - 
drawing on recent advances in the theory of the mind and neuroscience – the thesis 
focuses on the way various artists (such as Mary Kelly and Art & Language) have 
questioned dualist portraiture and its humanist emphasis on the honorific and the 
face/self.     
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4 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are a number of factors that must be considered in analysing a portrait 
in order to establish its meaning:  the intentions of the artist, the social identity of the 
artist and the person represented, the conventions of the portrait and the genre the 
work falls into. We are then in a position to ask: has the artist created a reasonable 
likeness, or an idealisation or counterfeit image of the subject? Has the artist 
incorporated a hidden symbolism, or biographical references - such as the subject's 
profession or social class, or for instance, their allegiance to a cause, principle or 
ideology? Knowing these things we can then surmise what the likely function of the 
portrait is, its relationship to other works of a similar kind, and the relationship 
between the artist and the person represented. My research on the place and function 
of the portrait in pre-modernist, modernist, and post-modernist art will apply these 
kind of analyses to a range of works, paying specific attention to the demise of the 
traditional 'monadic' and painted academic portrait and the rise of the multiple and 
allegorical installation-based portrait. In doing so it will attempt to map the 
development of portraiture in relation to the philosophical position of dualism, and its 
subsequent modifications and rejection.  
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The traditional, academic portrait has clearly been subject to various forms of 
denaturalisation over the last 100 years, but it is only with the incorporation of 
photography, and text, into 1960s avant-garde art, and as such its rejection of the 
'expressive' model of representation generally, that the claims of the traditional 
portrait to reflect or mirror the identity of the sitter have been questioned in any 
explicit fashion, producing a widespread critique of the Cartesian Self. These 
transformations have brought into being new forms of portraiture and new kinds of 
working relationship between the artist and the person depicted, and new accounts of 
the representation of subjectivity in art. In this respect, an understanding of the 
history of the dualist portrait format is absolutely crucial in understanding the 
extensive turn to the representation of subjectivity in contemporary practice. Indeed, 
once portraiture is freed from conventional dualist modes of representation in the 
Conceptual art of 1960s, portraiture dissolves itself into a discursive politics of the 
self.    
The first chapter of the thesis offers a historical overview of the origins and 
development of the Western portrait, beginning with the Egyptian and Greek portrait 
and stretching to the Renaissance. In doing so, it focuses initially on a selection of 
Greek and Christian myths of the origins of the portrait, in an effort to underpin the 
role and function of the portrait in these cultures. The emergence of the Western 
portrait is presented through an analysis of the key notions of the ‘honorific’ and 
‘exemplary’ in classical portraiture, which derive from Platonic and Aristotelian 
positions on art. In this respect, the Hellenistic and Roman employment of 
portraiture as forms of self-promotion is reviewed in relation to the Aristotelian 
notion of idealisation. Similarly the abstraction of the figure in Byzantine art is 
examined in relation to the Platonic origins of the Christian prioritisation of the 
spiritual. These two fundamental positions form the basis for the subsequent analysis 
of religious, state, and humanist portraiture during the Renaissance.  
In addition, the first chapter traces the philosophical origins of Cartesian 
dualism in classicism, and presents an overview of anti-dualist positions, spanning 
from classicism to the present day. The central Cartesian notion of an eternal and 
immutable soul is located in Platonic philosophy, while it is discussed in relation to 
the Aristotelian (materialist) position of ‘hylemorphism’. Furthermore, this chapter 
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traces the gradual assimilation of Aristotelian philosophy – particularly the unresolved 
question of the intellect – into the realm of Christian Dogma, which led, through the 
work of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo, to Descartes’ formation of the 
cogito argument. Once this framework is in place, Cartesian dualism is reviewed in 
relation to Locke’s proto-empiricism, Hobbes and Spinoza’s materialism, and Hume’s 
early reductionist view of the self. This section of the chapter ends by focusing on 
various materialist accounts, such as Gilbert Ryle’s ‘behaviourism’, Derek Parfit’s 
version of ‘reductionism’, Daniel Dennett’s ‘functionalism’, and Charles Taylor’s 
notion of the self as a socially and culturally bounded agent.  
In the last part of this chapter I develop an account of the dualist portrait. In 
general, the dualist portrait is characterised by two things: a prioritisation of the head, 
implemented through a compositional reduction of the portrait format from life-size 
to bust, and the direct illumination of the face in contrast to a darker rendering of the 
rest of the body. The immediate outcome of focusing on the head is that the head is 
the prime locus of physiognomy. Yet, the Aristotelian and Platonic employments of 
physiognomy differ radically. For instance, the Platonic (and dualist) model applies a 
physiognomic reading of the subject in order to access his or her inner being, hence 
the demand for a realist rendering of external appearance. The Aristotelian 
employment of physiognomy, on the other hand, is guided by a process of idealisation 
that leads to formal abstraction, in so far as the representation of the sitter’s facial 
characteristics are represented according to the desired outcomes of sitter and artist. 
The second chapter of the thesis addresses the origins of the Western 
European portrait, and the formation of the ‘self’ prior to the Enlightenment. This 
chapter includes an examination of painted portraits and self-portraits by various 
canonic artists of this period, where the construction of the concepts of interiority and 
subjectivity within painting are active. This chapter looks specifically at Dutch 
seventeenth-century portraiture and focuses on the way the emerging middle class 
chose to represent itself in relation to an emerging notion of the autonomous self. In 
addition, it examines the dialectical relationship between popular attempts at 
individual self-definition through portraiture and Rembrandt’s exploration of 
subjectivity and identity through the employment of self-portraiture. The aim of this 
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is to produce a critical reading of these works based on their relationship to classicist 
and/or dualist notions of the self.  
The case studies of this chapter are presented in their historical, political, and 
social context (the early days of the independence of the Dutch Republic) in order to 
understand the nature and characteristics of the new middle class - the emerging 
patron of the new portraiture. In this respect, I question whether this new middle 
class managed to formulate any independent class values, as such, that is, to what 
extent was it influenced by, or opposed itself to, preceding and dominant aristocratic 
values. Furthermore, this chapter also presents a review of Descartes’ impact on the 
Dutch cultural and political scene, and, specifically, how the cultural values of the 
emerging middle class responded to the new Cartesian philosophy, which was 
perceived at the time as an alternative to the ruling Aristotelian classicism. Finally, I 
analyze the influence of religion on the popularisation of the portrait among Dutch 
citizens, the impact of the crisis of Catholicism as a result of the Reformation and the 
rise of Calvinism.  
Once this context is drawn (the pictorial-ideological position), significant 
portraits of esteemed members of Dutch society are analysed in relation to the 
depicted subjects’ social position or ambition. These works were produced in one of 
the three major metropolitan and artistic centres of 17th-century Netherlands: 
Utrecht, Haarlem, and Amsterdam. As such, this comparative overview seeks to 
establish artistic connections between these cities and the preceding Renaissance 
pictorial traditions – especially that of Caravaggio – in order to assess their association 
with classicism and/or dualism. The outcome of this analysis of 17th-century Dutch 
portraits forms the platform for the enquiry into Rembrandt’s self-portraits, (and 
portraits of others), and the role of classicism and/or dualism in his practice. It does 
this by interrelating early and middle 20th century romantic readings of his work with 
recent revisionist positions, especially those following the results of the Rembrandt 
Research Project’s disattribution of a large percentage of his work.  
Regarding Rembrandt’s Leiden period the chapter questions the intention of 
Rembrandt’s intense study of his emotional states in the self-portraits. For this 
purpose, I reflect on Michel de Montaigne’s similar self-explorative quest, in order to 
scrutinise the proto-romanticist Cartesian dualist culture of this period. Moreover, 
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particular attention is paid to Rembrandt’s pictorial employment of light and 
chiaroscuro especially during his middle and late periods. The role of costume and 
performativity, which dominate these periods, is treated as key in defining the realist 
character of these works, which is crucial to Cartesian dualism’s quest for Truth. By 
extension, this chapter questions the recently revealed controversial practices that took 
place in Rembrandt’s studio. Besides the disattribution of many of his paintings, it is 
now well known that Rembrandt encouraged his students to work on, or from, his 
paintings, or straight from nature, rather than from famous paintings and sculptural 
masterpieces of the past.  Furthermore, Rembrandt refused to employ academic, 
scholastic art theories in his practice, such as anatomy and human body proportions 
and perspective exercises, preferring to work directly from nature with no rules 
attached.   
In defining the classicist or dualist character of Dutch and Rembrandt’s 
portraits, my analysis seeks to address the role of portraiture in the creation and 
maintenance of social hierarchies, and in the formation, naturalisation and 
empowerment of social categories of identity, including that of the category of 
individuality itself. The choice and the variety of the works discussed is driven, in this 
sense, to unravel the various complexities surrounding the social function of the 
portrait (the reasons for its employment and development) and the ways in which the 
formation of the ‘self’ is articulated in these works. In this respect, dualism plays a 
central part in the history portraiture, insofar as it allows for the visual construction of a 
subjective, invisible entity.1 That is, dualism is defined by its singular capacity to 
integrate the subjective demands of the client or commissioner into the artist’s powers 
of ‘expressiveness’. The portrait, then, as a product of artistic introjection and client 
negotiation, becomes in its ‘honorific’ function, a complex ideological vehicle.  
Thus, if portraiture is to be treated as a reflection on, and negotiation with, 
the processes involved in construction of self and identity, it is necessary to take 
seriously the relationship between portraiture as a social and cultural practice and the 
exigencies of ideology. This is a problem that is somewhat troubling for writers on 
portraiture. For instance, Harry Berger Jr. argues that: 
                                                
1 However, a rejection of dualism should not imply a rejection of ‘subjectivity’ altogether. Dualism is 
problematic on the grounds that it supports a notion of the soul, self, or subject that can exist separately 
from the body, or object. 
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Whether these correlations are purely associative or reinforced by formal resonances, 
they make it possible to imagine that the aesthetic and ideological values were fused 
together, so that regardless of what motivated painters to make a given set of aesthetic 
choices and formal moves, the choices and moves themselves convey social meanings.2 
 
Nevertheless, the aim here is not to analyse portraits as reflections of fixed ideological 
mechanisms and positions. In this respect, I am critical of the essentialist view that 
there is a single, homogenous, bourgeois visual ideology that carries on unaltered 
throughout the history of Western art, and that portraiture, in its bourgeois forms, is 
best representative of. Artists do not inherit ‘visual ideologies’ blindly. On the 
contrary, work is produced in internal negotiation with such ideologies. But, at the 
same time there is a crucial distinction that has to be drawn between works that 
reflect prevailing social and cultural attitudes and mores (commissioned portraits) and 
ones that are less bound by these constraints (non-commissioned portraits). In the 
case of the former an artist is required to carry out a portrait that is mediated by the 
desires of the sitter, which at the very least involves a certain level of flattery, and at 
the most, an incorporation of the conventions of popular style. Therefore, the terms 
ideology and visual ideology, will only define attitudes of certain individuals and 
groups at a given historical time and context. By extension, therefore, the application 
of these terms cannot be universal. Finally, in an effort to avoid vulgar uses of these 
terms they will not be employed to describe the intentions of individuals alone, but to 
question the impact of personal interests on creative outcomes. 
Likewise, the relationship between portraiture and philosophy are not causally 
linked in a direct sense, since such a position would presuppose the subordination of 
art to philosophy. Therefore, an account of portraiture is at the same time not 
reducible to the formation of the Western subject.   However, we have to ask why do 
portraits exist in the intellectual form that they do? My approach to this art=historical 
question is defined by the view that the relation of art and philosophy is synagonistic 
and not antagonistic, both sharing a common reflective nature and often, as such 
sharing similar paths in their development. The notion that the causal view is highly 
                                                
2 Harry Berger Jr., The Fictions of the Pose: Rembrandt Against the Italian Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 10-11. 
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problematic is highlighted by its potential methodological ineffectiveness in a 
discussion of early portraiture in relation to the representation of the self, since the 
self as a distinct concept did not exist before Descartes, in spite of the fact that the 
dualist mind/body problem derives from Plato and Aristotle. A systematic philosophic 
analysis of human nature and metaphysics might not exist prior to classicism, yet, the 
strong influence of the concept of the ‘after life’ in Egyptian religion, culture and art 
(viz pyramids, sarcophaguses) acts as a testament to the fact that artists’ dealing with 
certain issues which have come to be considered as philosophical subjects, might be 
parallel to, yet independent of philosophy.3 For these reasons, it should be clarified 
that the use of philosophic terms does not imply a causal relation between art and 
philosophy, but rather serves as the appropriate means, for clarifying the shared 
terrain of art and philosophy. 
Thus, artists may not necessarily be philosophically aware of the mind/body 
split but they do acknowledge the issue through the adoption, transformation and 
development of the subgenres of portraiture. It could be argued that every artist that 
has dealt with portraiture has dealt, to a variable extent, with the question of being 
and identity. As part of their methodology during the execution of portraits artists are 
forced to take a position and decide on whether they will acknowledge the existence 
of a soul or a self. In many cases, this does not reflect their own personal beliefs. For 
an artist practising in Europe during the period from 13th – 17th century it would be 
impossible to evade the handling of the portrait in relation to religious doctrine, 
considering that the Church was the main patron of arts, besides royal courts. It is 
generally perceived that the exception to this rule is the majority of 17th century Dutch 
portraits, which is one of the reasons why the second chapter is devoted to this 
historical era. Finally, to claim that an artist is philosophically illiterate (in terms of 
dealing with and producing ideas – not necessarily studying philosophy in the 
academic sense) is to reduce artistic practice to a purely technical activity and 
disregard its intellectual significance and cultural contribution. 
                                                
3 In his seminal essay on portraiture Ernst H. J. Gombrich discusses how the experiments on the 
psychological and cognitive perception of the human face run by Töpffer preceded the similar ones run 
by the psychologist Egon Brunswick in Vienna one hundred years later. Ernst H. J. Gombrich, "The 
Mask and the Face: The Perception of Physiognomic Likeness in Life and Art", in Ernst H. J. 
Gombrich et al., Art, Perception, and Reality (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1972), p. 120. 
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The treatment of the soul varies throughout the history of art and is 
determined by a variety of factors that are bound to cultural conditions and stylistic 
preferences, and occasionally, as in the case of commissioned portraiture, are infused 
by ideological concerns. However, it would constitute a methodological error to 
associate dualism with a certain aesthetic style, be it either naturalism or abstraction. 
For this reason, it is crucial to examine certain key positions in relation to the question 
of representation. In his seminal essay on portraiture, Ernst H. J. Gombrich argues 
that representation is a matter of resemblance, since the “experience of likeness is a 
kind of perceptual fusion based on recognition, and here as always past experience will 
colour the way we see a face.”4 Gombrich goes on to discuss certain psychological 
aspects of perception in relation to a set of permanent and mobile variants, claiming 
that a “likeness has to be caught rather than constructed”.4 These variants are of 
crucial importance to Gombrich, since they determine perception. However, the 
hierarchical distinction that he enforces between permanent and expressive alterations 
is sympathetic to dualism.5  
Conversely, Nelson Goodman is critical towards a model of representation 
that is based on resemblance, disregarding such models as “naive”.6 Goodman argues 
that representation is not a matter of imitation, and therefore, resemblance could not 
be regarded as sufficient for representation.7 What he proposes instead, from a 
semiotic perspective, is that denotation – which is independent of resemblance – lies 
at the core of representation.8 Illusionism is problematic for Goodman since it 
“confuses the representation with the represented” which is further complicated by the 
fact that “what is observed varies with interests and habits”.9 Thus, and in a clear 
response to Gombrich, Goodman perceives representation as a “symbolic relation that 
is relative and variable” according to cultural contexts and aesthetic standards and “not 
as an idiosyncratic process like mirroring”.10  
                                                
4 Ibid, p. 108. 
4 Ibid, pp. 116, 124-125. 
5 Ibid, pp. 129-130. 
6 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), 
pp. 3-4. 
7 Ibid, pp. 4, 10. 
8 Ibid, p. 5. 
9 Ibid, p. 34. 
10 Ibid, p. 43. 
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Goodman’s view has a lot in common with the linguistic studies of Valentin 
Voloshinov, who, writing in the 1930’s, argues that signs are “multi-accented”, thus 
are able to carry “multiple meanings”.11 Voloshinov’s views stem from a critical 
engagement with Wilhelm von Humboldt’s understanding of language as a 
‘generative process’ that is “implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers”.12 
Voloshinov is particularly critical of the Sausserian school, for in his view the 
treatment of the “relationship of sign to sign within a closed system” and the excessive 
interest in the “logic of signs itself, taken, as in algebra, completely independently of 
the meanings that give signs their content” is influenced by the Cartesianism and 
Rationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries.13  
An interesting semiotic approach to portraiture is proposed by Harry Berger 
Jr., who builds his argument around C. S. Peirce’s semiotics of representation.14 
However, by resorting to the Lacanian view of self-presentation as constructed and 
composed, Berger claims that early modern portraiture is governed by fiction due to 
the sitters’ habit of posing. Accordingly, he argues that “the portrait presents – 
performs, displays, stages – not a person but a representation, and the representation 
not of a person but of an act of self-presentation”.15 Therefore, for Berger, “a portrait 
presents itself as a sign that denotes its referent by resemblance; the referent it denotes 
is not simply a person but a person in the act of posing; and since posing is part of the 
causal event that produced it, the portrait as a sign is indexical as well as iconic.”16 As 
sound as this argument might be, it has to be noted that the view of the portrait as 
‘iconic index’ is only applicable to certain historical eras (from Renaissance until 
modernism), to commissioned portraiture and to many portraits that are produced in 
artists’ studios where posing is a central constituent of the process of self-
representation. The fact that this model is prescribed for the pre-modern era is 
                                                
11 Valentin N. Voloshinov, Marxism & the Philosophy of Language (New York: Seminar Press, 1973), 
pp. 21, 81.   
12 Ibid, pp. 48-49, 98. 
13 Ibid, p. 58. 
14 Peirce distinguishes between three modes of representation: the icon (the sign that denotes be 
resemblance: a visual imitation), the symbol (the sign that denotes by convention: language), the index 
(the sign that points not merely to a referent to some dynamic relation between itself and its referent 
(e.g. smoke is an index of fire). Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 
Peirce Edition Project (ed.) (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
15 Berger, Fictions of the Pose, p. 13. 
16 Ibid, pp. 26, 174. 
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enforced by Berger’s insistence on relating denotation to resemblance, which is 
contrary to Goodman’s position. Consequently, a semiotic account of portraiture 
derived from Berger cannot act as a methodological panacea for the understanding of 
portraiture’s development throughout history, since it assumes in a highly 
undifferentiated way that all portraits are idealised representations; to accept this 
position, therefore would be highly essentialist. 
Is the reading of portraits best represented by the psychological confirmation 
of likeness as in Gombrich, or is it actually separate from issues of resemblance as 
Goodman argues? Cubist portraiture is the moment that these models clash: the 
period where formal abstraction clashes with the demands of facial resemblance. By 
the beginning of the 20th century the traditional mimetic realistic portrait was no 
longer able to carry forward the traditional dualist split. By the time of Cubism a 
divide had opened up between a dualism inherent to traditional portraiture, and the 
complex requirements of representation of the self. Although Gombrich’s model may 
be, to a certain extent, applicable to pre-modern and early modern portraits, 
Voloshinov and Goodman’s approaches offer a more appropriate means of 
understanding the history of Western portraiture, given the fluctuating aesthetics of 
this tradition. In other words, it would be impossible to imagine that a conventional 
portrait is able to stand as a critique of dualism, if we were not to perceive portraits as 
multi-accented signs.  
Accordingly, the third chapter looks at the demise of the naturalistic painted 
portrait at the end of the 19th century (Courbet, Manet) and the rise of modernism 
(Cézanne, Cubism) in relation to expressive models of subjective interiority in 
painting. Portraiture’s development in modernism is significantly different to pre-
modernist models, which is due to the reconfiguration of the artist’s role in the 
modern, industrial world and the emergence of the concept of stylistic novelty and the 
‘new’. For instance, the artist now takes pride in being the sole creator of his art, 
refusing to employ assistants in his or her studio. In addition, naturalism is no longer 
the preferred model for the representation of the sitter’s ‘inner being’, insofar as it is 
regarded as too formally restrictive and too subordinate to the interests of clients. 
Accordingly, formalist abstraction begins to replace naturalism as it enables an 
impression of the ‘spiritual’ in artistic form to transform the physical representation of 
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the subject. Cubism's challenge to the belief that visual resemblance of the external 
characteristics of the subject is necessary to the representation of individual identity 
will be seen as the key point of transformation in this process of denaturalisation. In 
these terms, this chapter focuses on Picasso’s cubist portraits of his dealers in an effort 
to clarify the Cubist portrait’s position in respect to the emerging crisis of the 
Cartesian tradition.  Moreover, the socio-economic nature of Picasso’s relationship 
with these sitters calls for an examination of the modernist portrait’s social function, 
in relation to the new complexities that arose with the new artistic freedoms and 
autonomy of the artist under industrial capitalism. 
The critical moment in Picasso’s Cubism is that the process of 
denaturalisation of the figure seems to be in conflict with portraiture’s conventional 
demand for visual identification. Did Picasso acknowledge this problem through the 
execution of his dealers’ portraits? In other words, did the creative process of these 
works force him to seek a solution for this rupture somewhere between his own 
creative demands (abstraction) and his sitters’ expectations (some level of realistic 
representation appropriate for identification)? Prior to modernism, it was only the 
subjectivity of the sitter that was honoured, through the noteworthy individual’s 
inclusion into the pantheon of portraiture, whilst the subjectivity of the artist was 
‘honoured’ as the receiver of a commission – denoting a form of ‘benighted’ creative 
subservience of the artist. Modernism’s objection to patronage, however, allowed the 
artist to become the primary selector of his subjects, as a result securing a certain level 
of creative autonomy on the part of the artist. Sitters and commissioners, then, were 
not expected to submit fully to the creative intentions of artists. As a result, their 
yearning for the accommodation of their desired projections of themselves in the 
creative outcomes of the artists reveals a spiralling conflict of interests between the 
subjectivities of the artist and the sitter. In an attempt to address such issues, Picasso’s 
Cubist portraits of his dealers are examined for possible mimetic compromises that are 
the immediate outcome of Picasso’s realisation that his subjectivity was interfering 
with the representational demands of portraiture. Such creative decisions are further 
analysed in relation to Cartesian dualism and to G.W.F. Hegel’s work on art and 
aesthetics, since the Cubist portraits’ aesthetic compromise between naturalism and 
abstraction seems to comply with Hegelian aesthetics. 
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A return to early Cubist writing is considered necessary, given the fact that a 
rereading of these texts will highlight the use of dualist language and, consequently, 
represent attempts to brand its style as a Cartesian enterprise. As we will see, these 
attempts are located in their anti-classicist rhetoric, which in many respects conforms 
to dualist views. To further understand Picasso’s practice, his methodology is 
examined in comparison with Braque’s by looking at accounts of the artists’ studio 
practice by those who were close to both artists and who actually witnessed their 
collaborations. Such analysis will assist greatly in comprehending Cubism’s position in 
relation to dualism, since, in contrast to early Cubist writing, contemporary readings 
seem to propose an anti-dualist reading of Cubist style. 
 The results of this analysis are employed for an extensive assessment of 
Picasso’s portraits of his dealers. In doing so, the works are viewed in the context of 
Picasso’s business relationships with each of his subjects in order to question the 
impact that they had on Picasso’s creative choices. As we will see, the weight of these 
choices is quite significant both in terms of Picasso’s career moves as well as his work’s 
relation to modernist attitudes (e.g. ‘free expression’ – free that is from heteronomous 
practices such as commissioned portraiture), and to dualist positions. This chapter 
also argues that the problem posed by portraiture’s demands for resemblance was so 
important that it forced Picasso in the following years to work simultaneously with a 
plethora of styles, appropriate for the varying representational demands of different 
subjects. To support this argument, the closing part of this chapter looks at the stark 
contrasts between Picasso’s portraits of his close business associates and prospective 
patrons (neo-classicist), and those of his partners at the time (expressionist, surrealist, 
etc.). 
Finally, the fourth chapter reflects on post-60s portraiture: portraiture after 
both modernist denaturalisation of the figure, and the expulsion of expressive, 
individualistic modes of making art. This part of the study will consist of work by 
artists who have employed post-Cartesian modes of portraiture (repetition, seriality 
and sequencing) in order to address the problematic nature of the honorific.  Artists 
discussed in this chapter include: Andy Warhol, Art & Language, and Mary Kelly. 
What unites the practices of these artists is their common employment of allegory in 
their pursuit for non-abstract alternatives to mimetic resemblance. In this respect, the 
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allegorical principles of fragmentation, confiscation, superimposition, and 
decentralisation are analysed in relation to the dualist notions of originality and 
immutability. Moreover, the allegorical production of meaning is discursive in 
ambition, in so far as it encourages the viewer’s participation in the process of 
deciphering visual metaphors. Thereby, this chapter’s examination of allegory focuses 
on the critique allegory makes of the inherent hierarchical and conflictual function of 
hermeneutics. In hermeneutics the author/work dictates the meaning of the work to 
viewers, and as such successful interpretation depends on the skill of the viewer/reader 
to unlock the content of the work, whereas in allegory, meaning formation relies on 
collaboration, between author and audience, and, therefore, rests on an extended, 
temporal, process.  
An analysis of collaboration and its various forms is central to this chapter, 
therefore, due to its essential place in the critique of Cartesian subjectivity in art. The 
methodology inherent in Descartes’ model of self-reflection, as described in 
Meditations, proposes the dualist subject as singular, monadic, introverted individual. 
Thus, the ideal Cartesian artist would abstain from all processes and methods that 
would weaken the expressive externalization of interiority, such as mechanical 
reproduction; he or she would engage on a private and reflective process in order to 
determine the final form of the artwork. This process of sole and privatised 
authorship is in full agreement with Platonic and Cartesian models of the subject, 
both founded on the notion of the individual as a producer of self-originating 
knowledge. Such a model reaches its full manifestation in modernist artistic practices, 
where the artist takes pride in being the singular producer of his or her work. 
Participatory and collaborative practices, then, are particularly successful in 
deflating dualist subjectivity and overcoming the restrictions of sole authorship. The 
collaborative production that took place in Andy Warhol’s early Factory is a well-
known example of such practices, even though Warhol insisted on not sharing the 
intellectual rights of the works. In their ontological critique of the category of art 
Conceptual artists inherited the tradition of the readymade from Duchamp and 
Warhol and expanded it into forms of anti-dualist making-at-distance. More 
importantly, many Conceptual artists collaborated in the production of their art as a 
shared intellectual research project, the foremost example being Art & Language. 
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This artist collective rejected traditional modes of sole authorship while its members 
substituted the employment of traditional craft skills with group discussion and the 
development of intellectual skills in an effort to eradicate any remnants of individual 
self-expression associated with painterly or sculptural practice. Recent collaborative 
and relational practices further expand this critique of authorship by substituting sole 
authorship with dialogic agency, and forms of collective poly-authorship. The 
resulting artwork is not a static and formally complete object, but a subjective and 
immaterially continuous process that is open to variable contributions through open 
participation. Charles Taylor’s notion of the ‘framework’ is employed to justify the 
position that free will and agency are socially bound notions, thereby, suggesting that 
perhaps introversion and singularity are not the best artistic means by which to 
approach the nature of human subjectivity. In addition, W. Teed Rockwell’s ‘network 
theory’ is used as a methodological tool, since his concept of consciousness, based as it 
is on a model of collaboration, can be proven to be extremely helpful in an 
examination of collective artistic practices. 
There is a limited critical literature on 20th-century portraiture. What exists is 
engaged predominantly with the discussion of portraiture across genres, and as such 
lacks any analysis of the relations between problems of identity, representation and 
the construction of the self. Likewise, scholars seem confused when it comes to 
understanding dualism’s early visualisations and its subsequent development during 
modernism, let alone the character of its contemporary rejection. This is mainly due 
to an ongoing failure of major scholars of portraiture, such as Norbert Schneider and 
Joanna Woodall, to distinguish the two major forms of dualism (Platonic and 
Cartesian), which, among other problems, can lead to a confused understanding of 
the varied uses of physiognomy in portraiture. 
Thus, Schneider views German idealist philosophy as a platform for the 
development of Cartesian dualist tendencies in late 18th- and early 19th-century art, in 
so far as he holds it responsible for the emergence of an expressionist aesthetic which 
gave “metaphysical presence to the “essential being” of the subject portrayed”.17 But, 
he links the development of this Cartesian dualism to the use of physiognomy alone, 
disregarding altogether the bodily abstraction that G. W. F. Hegel, for instance, 
                                                
17 Norbert Schneider, The Art of the Portrait, Iain Galbraith (trans.), (Koln: Taschen, 2002), p. 18. 
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demands in his lectures on art, and which stands in stark opposition to the 
physiognomic requirements of flawless representation of facial characteristics.18 This 
confusion is probably located in Schneider’s emphasis on Descartes’ call for 
‘objectification’ of the worldly in physiognomy’s methodology (objectification of facial 
characteristics). In this respect, Schneider fails to acknowledge that physiognomy is 
unable to fully ‘disengage’ from the material (facial characteristics), as the results of 
such ‘scientific’ examination are presented with and through the assistance of the 
body. Even though this process asserts the soul’s superiority (as facial characteristics 
are subservient to mental states) it automatically cancels the Cartesian notion that the 
soul is able to exist outside and independent of the body. Descartes talks of how the 
soul instrumentally controls the body, not of how it depends on it in order for it to be 
accessed. 
The relationship between classical physiognomy’s demand for an acute 
naturalism of facial features and Cartesian dualism’s demand for the abstract 
treatment of the body seems problematic, therefore, in relation to the presence of 
dualism in modernist portraiture. Like Schneider, Joanna Woodall too fails to 
distinguish the two major forms of dualism in her historical analysis of portraiture. By 
employing the Platonic self as a dualist model she is left with a similar confused 
account of the role of physiognomy in modernist portraiture. For instance she views 
the work of Courbet, Manet and the Impressionists as an “interrog[ation of the] 
presumed identification between individualised physiognomy and a distinctive, 
interiorised identity” and as such “a visual mode which subverted the distinction 
between sight and insight, object and subject.”19As such, like Schneider, for Woodall, 
modernist abstraction of the body establishes a rejection of dualism, despite the fact 
that this move, as I have suggested above, is in full agreement with the thinking of 
Descartes and Hegel. There is no doubt about modernism’s interrogation of the 
physiognomic model in order to achieve an ‘inner reading’ of the sitter. However, the 
rejection of physiognomy cannot be equated with a rejection of dualism per se, but 
rather as a reconsideration of such a position. In fact, it can be argued that regardless 
                                                
18 “It was thought that this quality [essential being of the subject portrayed] could be ascertained 
directly from physiognomic expression.” Ibid, p. 18.  
19 Joanna Woodall, “Introduction”, in Joanna Woodall (ed.), Portraiture: Facing the Subject, 
(Manchester, Manchester University, 1997), p. 6-7. 
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of the extent of bodily abstraction, the modern portrait retained most of 
physiognomy’s effects, such as the attention to the face at the expense of the body. 
Modernist distancing from the real can be seen in relation to the ideal 
representation of the aristocracy in previous centuries, and perhaps this is what also 
produces Woodall’s confusion. As Woodall carefully remarks the modernists 
“…challenged the belief that visual resemblance to a living or once-living model is 
necessary or appropriate to the representation of identity.”20 But, they did so in order 
to break free from the stylistic and methodological restrictions of mainstream art and 
portrait theories of the time, and not because they were reconsidering the validity of 
dualist notions of identity, or of self, and its possible incorporation into art. In fact, 
the modernists strongly believed in the Platonic notion of the artist’s penetrating gaze 
that could reveal the sitter’s true self, but this should not thereby encourage us to 
believe that the Platonic self was still active during modernism. Rather, Platonic 
notions – such as the penetrating ‘artistic vision’ – remained active in modernism via 
their mediation by Descartes and other Christian scholars. As such, this Platonic 
notion (artistic vision), combined with the notion of artistic freedom, is responsible 
for the immense plurality of group and personal styles that distance themselves from 
realistic representation. 
In light of such scholarly confusions, my research addresses how theories of 
the subject and the history of the Enlightenment, bear on the production of the 
category of portraiture within art history and art theory, in a study of the transformed 
social function of the portrait in art over the last 350 years. This will provide a critique 
of the dualist accounts of self and identity, which underlie conventional 
interpretations of portraiture. For this purpose, the thesis begins with an examination 
of the historical conditions of the emergence, development, and transformation of the 
honorific in relation to the mind/body problem in Hellenic philosophy. This historic 
and philosophic examination will provide the context for the subsequent critique of 
dualism’s reification in the traditional genre of portraiture. However, the aim of this 
contextualisation is not to employ the early history of portraiture simply to illustrate 
this critique. On the contrary, the aim is to re-think the relationship between dualism 
and portraiture as a problem of artistic form, and to trace the historical conditions of 
                                                
20 Ibid, p. 7.  
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dualism’s incorporation into portraiture, and, therefore, how it has affected its course 
and development.  
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Narcissus’ Legacy: 
The Origins of the Western Portrait & the Emergence of Dualism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are certain myths about the origins of portraiture that we should first 
take into account in our narrative, since they reflect common (dualist) conceptions of 
portraiture. Firstly: the well-known myth of Narcissus. In classical Hellenic 
mythology, Narcissus, born at Thespia, in Beortia, is loved by Apollo and is counted 
among the most handsome of young men. According to some, he was the son of the 
river God Cephisus and the nymph Liriope, or according to others, the son of 
Endymion and Selene (Moon). One day a nymph, Echo, saw Narcissus hunting, as 
he pursued the chase upon the mountains. She fell in love with him and followed his 
footsteps. Rejected and in despair of having in vain endeavored to attract him, Echo 
prayed to Nemesis, the Goddess of Rhamnus, that he might some time or other 
experience what it was like to love and, yet, meet no return of affection. The Goddess 
heard and granted the prayer. On yet another day of hunting, Narcissus came to this 
pool heated and thirsty, fatigued from hunting. He knelt down to drink and saw his 
own image in the water. He thought it was some beautiful water-spirit living in the 
fountain. He stood, gazing with admiration at those bright eyes, those locks curled 
like the locks of Bacchus or Apollo, the rounded cheeks, the ivory neck, the parted 
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lips, and the glow of health and exercise over all. When later Narcissus realised he was 
facing his own image, he fell in love with himself, and not being able to find 
consolation, he died of sorrow by the same pool. It is said that Narcissus still keeps 
gazing on his image in the waters of the river Styx in the Underworld kingdom of 
Aides.21  
 Another myth tells of the Corinthian maid Dibutade, who was the daughter of 
Butade, a potter of Skyon. Her lover was about to embark on a perilous and 
treacherous journey to foreign lands. About to be separated from her lover, she 
realised that she could preserve his likeness by tracing the outline of his shadow cast 
on a wall. The maid's father Butade, a potter of Skyon, used the drawing to model a 
clay relief, which he baked in his kiln to create a ceramic memorial, in order to 
comfort his lonely daughter - Pliny uses the story to illustrate the origins of clay 
modeling.22 By the eighteenth century, the myth became popular, as artists such as 
Joseph Wright of Derby, Joseph-Benoît Suvée, and Anne-Louis Girodet de Roucy-
Trioson depicted it as the origin of painting and of, portraiture.23 
In the Bible, when Christ fell on his way to the Golgotha, Veronica, one of 
the holy women who accompanied Christ to Calvary, came running to him, holding 
in her hands a wet towel. She compassionately pressed the cloth on Jesus’ face and 
wiped his sweat and blood, leaving an imprint of his face on the wet cloth. She, then, 
went to Rome, bringing with her this image of Christ, which was then exposed to 
public veneration.  
Christian legend relates that St. Luke, a Hellene physician from Antioch, the 
compiler of the third Gospel, the Acts of Apostles, and Paul's companion, was the 
first Christian painter, after he painted a number of icons of the Virgin Mary holding 
the Child Jesus from life, having experienced a vision of the Virgin Mary. As a 
consequence of his religious painting he was attributed the status of the painter par 
                                                
21 For further reading on the subject refer to Apollodorus, of Athens, The Library of Greek Mythology, 
trans. by Robin Hard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Sabine G. Oswalt, Concise Encyclopedia 
of Greek and Roman Mythology, (Chicago & Glasgow: Collins, Follett, 1969); Kenneth P. Corsar, 
Discovering Greek Mythology, (London: Edward Arnold, 1977). 
22 Pliny, the Elder, Natural History, in Katherine Jex-Blake and Eugenie Sellers, The Elder Pliny's 
Chapters on the History of Art, (Chicago & Fort Lee, N.J.: Argonaut, 1968), p. 175. 
23 For more information about the story of Dibutade and related imagery, see Frances Muecke, 
"'Taught by Love': The Origin of Painting Again," Art Bulletin 81 (1999), pp. 297-302; Robert 
Rosenblum, "The Origin of Painting: A Problem in the Iconography of Romantic Classicism," Art 
Bulletin 39 (1957), pp. 279-290. 
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excellence, and became the patron saint of painters, and the patron saint of painting 
guilds in many towns and cities before and during the Renaissance – from Candia 
(Crete), Florence and Rome to Antwerp and Bruges. St. Luke’s icons are said to be of 
the full ‘oδηγήτρια’ (hodegetria) type, which means that the icon is a ‘guide’ or 
‘indicator of the way’. Even though there is only one copy saved today, of the original 
three, many churches all over the world later copied the ‘οδηγήτρια’ style, which has 
become one of the prominent compositional styles of the Christian tradition.24 
 The reason that I mention these myths is to draw out significant aspects and 
models of portraiture, and not to simply trace the alternative historic origins of this 
genre. The reference to Narcissus, for instance, points out the vain desire of human 
subjects to be included in the ‘restricted pantheon’ of portraiture. In doing so, and in 
conjunction with the myth, subjects consider themselves in possession of bodily 
attributes worthy of commemoration. What is significant about this swift 
misplacement of attention is that the ‘right’ to be portrayed is dependent upon bodily 
attributes, and not intellectual excellence or other moral values. By portraying 
Narcissus as an awkward character, the story places emphasis on the fact that 
portraiture constitutes a synthesis of both external appearance and internal 
characteristics. Consequently this story of the first self-portrait addresses one of the 
two important prerequisites, which underline the dual identity of this genre: that 
vanity and pride can often be regarded as perilous virtues of a personality, but 
nevertheless can act as the driving force behind a commission.  
 Resolving problems of re-presentation, making present a subject that is absent, 
is also located at the core of naturalistic portraiture. It is within the intellectual quest 
for resolving such problems that Aristotle treats portraiture as the absolute model of 
re-presentation, since it does exactly what it sets out to do, by making present again 
the depicted person. For him our pleasure in viewing a portrait does not lay in the 
artistic style of the creator, but in his/her ability to employ technical skills in order to 
assist the viewer in recognising the depicted person: 
 
«Τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι 
τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς 
                                                
24 George Angelini, The Book of Saints: The Lives of the Saints According to the Liturgical Calendar, V. 
Hoagland (ed.), (Regina Press, Malhame & Company, 1986), pp. 246 – 248. 
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πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτα λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας 
χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων και καὶ νεκρῶν.»25  
 
The instinct of imitation is implanted in humans from childhood, in this we differ from 
animals, that is, humans are the most imitative of living creatures, and through 
imitation learn the earliest lessons. This is justifiable according to real experiences, 
where while we view certain objects with sorrow, we are delighted to view images 
reproduced with minute fidelity, such as forms of ignoble animals and dead bodies. (my 
translation) 
 
Portraiture was the paradigm of representation in Aristotle’s discussion of literary 
genres of poetry and drama, which in turn informed his thinking about pictures: 
 
«ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιόνων ἢ ἡμεῖς, δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς 
εἰκονογράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφὴν ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες 
καλλίους γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους καὶ 
τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν, οἷον τὸν 
Ἀχιλλέα ἀγαθὸν καὶ παράδειγμα σκληρότητος Ὅμηρος.»26 
 
Since Tragedy is a representation of better people from those of our times, one should 
imitate good portrait painters, who, while rendering the distinctive form and achieving 
a likeness, yet paint people better than they are. So too the poet should ennoble the 
representation of people who are irascible or have other similar defects of character; just 
like Homer portrays Achilles as a noble, yet also as an example of brutal strength. (my 
translation)27 
 
If we look closely at these myths, we can see that they cover almost every generic 
aspect of portraiture; self-portraiture (as in the cases of Narcissus and St. Veronica); 
                                                
25 Αριστοτέλης, Περὶ Ποιητικῆς (Αθήνα: Κάκτος, 1995) [Aristotle, Poetics (Athens: Kaktos, 1995)], 
4.1448b 3-13.  
26 Ibid, 15.1454b 8-14.  
27 There are two suggested ways of translating the word ‘ἀγαθὸν’ in the last phrase. The one proposed 
in the publications by Rostani and Bywater, takes ‘ἀγαθὸν’ as s reference to the poet Agathon and his 
work Telephos. However, the translation of ‘ἀγαθὸν’ as ‘noble’, as found in the latest academic revisions 
in the source at hand, seems more appropriate for grasping the dialectics of Aristotle’s argument, those 
between acute representation and idealisation. 
 
25 
portraiture in its conventional form where it incorporates an artist and a sitter (as with 
Dibutade and St. Luke); and, portraiture of a divine inspiration and subject-hood.  
 
 
The Honorific and Exemplary in Egyptian, Hellenic, Roman and Christian Portraiture 
 
 Painted or sculpted figurative, or genre type of artworks, have been evident since 
the first days of human creativity. However, the first portrait - that is, a visually 
identified representation of a human being - emerged in ancient Egypt. Here also 
emerges the honorific function of the portrait, albeit an extremely self-restricted 
process. It might not be quite obvious today, but until recently, portraiture was inter-
related with religious systems at a very high level. In ancient Egypt, for example, 
where naturalistic portraiture28 initially emerged, those worthy of commemoration 
were either Gods, semi-Gods, or sons of Gods; in other words, only individuals of a 
divine origin. Only pharaohs were eligible for such an honour since they were thought 
of as divine beings. On their departure from earth they would ascend to the gods, 
where it was believed they came from. This was exactly the purpose that the pyramids 
where built for – not a demonstration of the power of the rulers or manifestation of 
their riches, but as a means for making the ascendance of the pharaohs easier.29 At the 
very least these robust and immensely fortified memorials would help preserve the 
body, which was an essential prerequisite in order for the soul to transcend to the 
beyond. That was why Egyptians were so keen in preventing the corpse from decaying 
by applying the delicate and detailed processes of preservation, which has become 
known as mummification. In an effort to secure the eternal existence of pharaohs they 
believed that an exact preservation of their likeness should be achieved too. The 
means, by which such a representation was to take place, was through this process of 
mummification, in which the painted sculptural sarcophagus, acting as the immediate 
host of the corpse, was perceived as adding symbolic value to the ascendance of the 
                                                
28 By naturalistic portraiture, I would agree with Joanna Woodall in referring to a physiognomic likeness 
that refers to the identity of the living or once-living depicted person. Joanna Woodall, “Introduction”, 
in Joanna Woodall (ed.), Portraiture: Facing the Subject, (Manchester, Manchester University, 1997), p. 
1. 
29 William S. Stevenson, The Art and Architecture of Ancient Egypt, revised with additions by W. Kelly 
Simpson (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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body. And, as if this was not enough, they also ordered sculptors to execute accurate 
busts of the kings’ heads’, out of extremely durable materials, such as granite. The fact 
that these were placed inside the tomb where no one could view them, leaves no 
doubt that these busts were created in order to retain the soul in the afterlife; hence, 
the practical function of the portrait during the Egyptian era. As Ernst Gombrich 
informs us, one Egyptian word for sculptor, was actually, 'He-who-keeps-alive'.30 At 
this point it is very crucial to clarify that despite the deification of the pharaohs, the 
sculptors were not concerned with flattering their subjects; they left every lesser detail 
out, dealing only what they thought of as essentials. 
 Flattery was not sought after in classical antique portraiture either, since 
Platonic tendencies of pure representation dominated the arts. In contrast with the 
criteria of the Egyptian ruling class, though, the Hellenes broaden the scope of 
inclusion to the ‘pantheon’ of immortality. This was a result of portraiture’s social 
function in the early Hellenic democratic society, which can be defined as exemplary. 
This exemplary function of art is also evident in the popular treatment of figurative 
works – that stretch beyond the genre of portraiture, as they are not attributed to 
specific individuals – that stood as examples for the ideal athlete, soldier, or even 
young man and woman (Gr. kouros and kore). This time eligibility for inclusion in the 
pantheon of portraiture was not only granted to Gods, and divinities, but also to 
individuals whose intellectual ability was considered advanced, and who developed 
this intellectual ability for the purposes of civic humanist issues. This ability could 
either be defined on the grounds of introducing a new social system, such as 
democracy, or even contributing to philosophic and scientific practices. Such portraits 
were sculpted out of marble, and treated their subjects in full and life-size formats. 
Upon their completion they were installed in public spaces, such as squares and 
stadiums, to act as leading demonstrations of exemplary heroic or civic virtue. The 
origin of these various heroic or intellectual abilities were thought of as divine, but 
certainly not of a hereditary nature as in the case of the Egyptians. This model 
encouraged self-development in citizens and reinforced pragmatic criteria of judging 
an individual according to their social contribution.   
 A great desire for individuality is noticeable in the portraits of military generals, 
                                                
30 Ernst H. Gombrich, The Story of Art, (London: Phaidon, 1995). 
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state and civic administrators, and, of course, in those of scientists, writers, and 
philosophers. At the same time, the social role of these individuals is crucial to 
understanding the portrait’s exemplary function in Hellenic antiquity, which drew its 
subjects from civic, military, or intellectual excellence. The diversity of these portraits 
also signifies the multiplicity of the orders of the Hellenic world, through a type of 
portraiture that has been described as “a successful balancing act.”31 Its structure is 
understood as the articulated expression of character through natural norms, which 
“become artistic forms only when they consolidate the codified structure of such 
temperament.” Finally, this “balance was established, on the one hand, by the urge to 
depict nature and, on the other, by the no less driving need to immortalise the 
individual temperament, the individual character.”32 Even though this view suggests 
that the treatment of the “natural norms” is subservient to that of the “individual 
character”, the balance between them is justified by the intention to do equal justice to 
both. In other words, the visualisation of “temperament” is not reified at the expense 
of “nature”. This balance was reinforced by the conscious insistence on the inclusion 
of the whole figure, in the often life-size, compositions of either paintings or 
sculptures.  
 Idealisation of natural appearance did not occur until the time of Alexander the 
Great, and the introduction of imperialist monarchy. Vasari refers to Plutarch who 
elaborates how the ancient court painters corrected physical defects while still 
maintaining likenesses, as far as possible. He also talks of how Alexander allowed only 
Apelles to paint his portraits, which perhaps stand as the first examples of politically 
infused portraiture.33 Alexander built on the exemplary function of the portrait and 
historical painting; as every one of his significant accomplishments, either military or 
civic, was followed by a major artistic commission. Copies of such commissions were 
often disseminated to both loyal and recently conquered areas. By doing so he 
employed the visual representation of his accomplishments to reinforce his support, 
and to subtly warn the recently subjugated of the consequences of opposing his rule. 
As for sculpted portraits, numerous marble copies of various formats decorated 
                                                
31 Andreas Beyer, Portraits: A History (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Incorporated 2003), p. 19. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Frank Borsi, Leon Battista Alberti: the Complete Works (New York: HarperCollins 1977), De Pictura, 
book 2, chap. 40. 
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exterior public spaces and interior civic buildings. The delicate expressiveness of his 
face and overall body pose of these sculptures demonstrate the development of the 
portrait through the initial incorporation of his teacher’s (Aristotle) physiognomic 
theories. Eventually, the success of this productive relationship was elevated as an 
exemplary reference for rulers and their portraitists of the future.   
 However, it was only in the first century A.D. that the portrait fully developed 
into a political medium, given the Romans elaborate use of them in their civic and 
imperial roles. During this era, the portrait never ceased serving as a form of a public 
statement, as it often incorporated the physiognomic characteristics of historically 
great individuals in an attempt to construct the public image of a ruler. In doing so, 
the portrait subsumed the role of transmitting each emperor’s stance on issues 
regarding politics, power, and often morals, which in turn called “for idealisation 
above lifelikeness”.34 Only this time it was done at the expense of nature, and not 
through the balanced co-existence of nature and character. The sole reason for this 
imbalance is that temperament was seen as constructed, and not a given attribute at the 
time that the sitting took place. And this construction of character, in contrast to the 
Classical tradition, was visualised through the subservient employment of natural 
norms. To emphasise the level of physiognomic manipulation that every emperor’s 
portrait underwent, we only have to observe the various types of portraits that could 
be formulated over the course of a reign. A good example of such types is the 
incorporation of ‘old age’ in portraits of politicians, as it stood for mature wisdom and 
political ability, possibly deriving from the sagacity of the aging appearance of classical 
philosophers and scientists. As if this was not enough, the divine connection of the 
Egyptian period – also rejected in the Hellenic tradition – resurfaced, which even 
permeated the names of the emperors in the form of Julius, Augustus, etc. As a result, 
Roman rule depended on noble hereditary divine rights, which in the context of 
portraiture simply posed as another excuse for idealisation. Therefore the emperor had 
to establish his accession to power by justifying his ancestral origin through the 
delimitation of his own individual characteristics, eradicating any hopes for an 
individual image. In all, the Roman emperor’s public image was caught between a 
                                                
34 Norbert Lynton, Portraits From a Pluralist Century, introduction in Robin Gibson, Painting the 
Century: 101 Portrait Masterpieces 1900 – 2000, (London: National Portrait Gallery, 2000), p. 9. 
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desire to address specific social issues in connection to political questions, and a 
defence of familial origin that underlined the precedence of social and political 
context over appearance.35 
 During the early Christian years, and the formation of the Byzantine Empire, 
the right to be portrayed was restricted to holy subjects. The lack of development of 
Christian art was due, essentially, to the conservatism of the Christian church, which 
derived from the Old Testament objection against graven images.36 Extreme views on 
the subjective and aesthetic nature of 'images' lead to the Iconoclastic controversy 
during the 8th and 9th century. The instant rejection of the portrayal of subjects 
external to Christian doctrines, along with the immediate prohibition of any three-
dimensional format (as anything sculptural expressed Idolatry) reflected the nature of 
the victorious iconophiles' views. They argued, however, that representation of Christ, 
and other holy subjects, was eligible on the grounds of Christ assuming human form 
through incarnation, and, therefore, he could be portrayed as an embodied man.37 As 
Christianity flourished, pictorial representations of aspects of Christ's life, as 
documented through the Old Testament, as well as images of saints, and scholars, 
were produced in great numbers. For icons were officially attributed the same status as 
that of gospels, as they were thought of as visual expressions of verbal doctrines, and 
as such served as an alternative means for religious communication.38 Moreover, the 
victors of the Byzantine iconoclasm escaped accusations of idolatry by arguing that 
icons embody their subjects and did not simply represent them. In agreement with the 
Egyptian belief of the pharaohs' divine origin, and the God-like status of Roman 
emperors', Byzantine emperors were thought of as God’s vice-regents on earth, as well 
as being the defenders of Orthodoxy and the 13th Apostle.39 They were often 
portrayed crowned by Jesus Christ, while emerging from a ‘heavenly’ background 
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surrounded by angels, and so forth.  
 In contrast to Hellenistic and Egyptian traditions of accurate representation, 
physical likeness was not the primary concern of early Christian art. Instead it sought 
to identify the spiritual interiority of the depicted subjects, resulting in the emergence 
of a homogenous pictorial style that treated the human body as the host of the soul, 
hence the unflattering slim figures. Bearing this in mind, then, the frontal facial view 
certainly encouraged a more engaging inner reading of the subject. Inspired by this 
emphasis on interiority in Christianity the emperors gradually rejected the Romans’ 
extensive use of the distant ‘profile’ in publicly disseminated portraits, such as those 
found on coins and medallions. Within this pictorial tradition certain compositional 
formats began to emerge – such as the appropriation of the ‘οδηγήτρια’ with the 
emperor in place of the Virgin mother, and the group court portrait – and it is notable 
how these remained active over a long period of time, despite a few minor 
modifications.40  
The Christian church did not hesitate to value the immense influence that 
portraiture had on its viewing public. It built a view of portraiture that was driven by 
an effort to distinguish and elevate religious subjects for the common public, 
employing a stylistic treatment that disregarded the material body in favour of the 
divine soul. In doing so, these subjects served as role models of proper Christian 
practice by transmitting Christian dogma. By extension, these portraits sought to 
underline the main opposition between the spirituality of Christianity and the 
physicality of the pre-existent paganist type of religions.  
 It was not just the Christian Orthodox Church that employed the honorific 
aspects of portraiture for promotional purposes. In fact, it can be claimed that 
Byzantium portraiture did not really manage to step beyond the innovation of a 
physically reductive treatment of its subjects, within its narrow Christian context. In 
other words, any claim, or any comment on social and political matters, was confined 
within and relied upon spirituality’s hypothetical superiority. Within the Catholic 
tradition the portrait, and especially the papal portrait, functioned more politically. In 
Raphael’s Portrait of Pope Julius II, 1512, for example, the Pope is sitting in a throne 
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or cathedra, which clearly is associated with secular power. The cathedra is crowned 
with two exquisite acorns that are part of the coat of arms of the Pope’s family, della 
Rovere. This familial identification that was also sought after by the Romans, was 
incorporated only in the portraits of the late Byzantium emperors. Paradoxically, the 
Byzantium Orthodox patriarchs, in contrast to the Catholic Popes, refrained from 
making any familial references, but only because they were satisfied with their 
involvement in God’s immediate family. This negation should not be seen as a 
manifestation of an opposition to an active involvement in politics. On the contrary, 
during the Byzantium era religious influence shaped and often determined state 
affairs.  
This presentation of the Pope, as an enthroned royal caught in a moment of 
divine contemplation, would haunt future portraits, such as Velasquez’s Portrait of 
Pope Innocent X, 1650. Raphael reworked the papal portrait with more inventiveness, 
incorporating familial references, in the Portrait of Pope Leo X with Cardinals Luigi de’ 
Rossi and Giulio de’ Medici, 1517-19. In this work the Pope wished to present himself 
next to his cousins, Luigi de’ Rossi and Giulio de’ Medici, who he saw as his 
successors  (the demand for two candidates was a matter of caution in case one of the 
two men were to die). A demonstration of the political power of the papal portrait is 
clear in Cardinal Innocenzo Cibo’s commission of a copy of the portrait from 
Guiliano Burgiardino following the death of de’ Rossi in 1519.41 Being also one of the 
Pope’s nephews, therefore, a possible successor, he decided to assert his ambition in 
public. In the re-worked portrait he stood where the deceased de’ Rossi once stood. 
On the whole, this reconstructed commission is a visualisation of Innocenzo Cibo’s 
career aspirations. Eventually, Giulio de Medici became Pope Clement VII. 
 Within the Protestant tradition, Martin Luther treated the portrait as “an 
effective strategy for political success”.42 Lucas Cranach painted most of the almost 
five hundred portraits that visually supported Luther’s and the Wittenberg Court’s 
religious war. Initially it was Dürer - an excellent engraver - who wished to capture 
Luther in his preferred medium of printmaking, being fully aware of its opportunities 
for religious dissemination. Cranach, inspired by Dürer’s unsatisfied desire, engraved 
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Luther’s first portrait in 1520, which was the beginning of a tradition that formulated 
his image according to certain roles for propagandist purposes. He carried on painting 
Luther, mostly with his wife Katharina van Bora, as well as contributing book 
illustrations that, along with the paintings, were distributed to as many churches as 
possible. In these images, the ideal couple is depicted as half-length figures in three-
quarter view. However, in his own portraits Luther is seen in various roles, such as a 
preacher or a monk, but he also appears in classical allegorical roles, such as Hercules. 
In line with the revivalist spirit of the times, Cranach nurtured a certain fondness for 
classicism, which is also apparent in the application of the antiquity profile in a few of 
Luther’s engravings. On the whole, the religious portrait gradually distanced itself 
from the physical reductiveness of its primary Byzantium abstract formulation (via the 
Catholic physiognomic attention to the contemplating gaze and the Protestant use of 
contemporary and historical styles), but it always prioritised a superiority of 
spirituality over the materiality of the body.   
 Aristocratic courts have never ceased to employ portraiture’s promotional 
virtues since antiquity, as rulers and nobles always regarded it as the most important 
medium in the art of court politics. In the early modern period rulers made full use of 
the services of specialists, and their creative relationships were often compared with 
that of Alexander and Apelles’s.  Following an extensive period of the rejection of 
realism (Byzantium to Middle Ages), when it was restricted to a generic abstract 
genre-type, the court portrait reincorporated classicism by reintroducing individual 
likeness. This visual identification of rulers, which was enforced by the growing 
importance of their public personality, was located on facial features that could be 
composed in order to present a desired character, or allegorically suggest common 
virtues with those of mythological or historical figures. So, “by silently assimilating 
the real to the ideal…[naturalistic court portraiture]…enabled a particular human 
being to personify the majesty of the kingdom or the courage of a military leader”.43 
Yet, the genre-type formulation was not disregarded altogether. Instead its content 
was infused with a broad variety of types to suit any demand, leading to new kind of 
ideological compromise. Where the Hellenic portrait was seen as a balance between 
“individual character” and “nature”, the early-modern court portrait becomes a 
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“balance between personal individuality and universal canon.”44 Thus, an acceptable 
degree of idealisation of subject and style is permitted, so it can satisfy the demands of 
a constructed individuality and its subsequent universal identification and application, 
leaving the divine, and hereditary origin of those virtues as the “ultimate, permanent 
reality.”45 Alberti was the first to identify a similar idealisation in the practice of the 
ancients as told by Plutarch, who describes how they corrected physical defects of 
kings while still maintaining their likeness.46 The length to which a painter would go 
to satisfy his commissioner, on these terms, is reflected in Titian’s relationship with 
Charles V, who repeatedly reworked the king’s portraits until the king was satisfied. A 
distinctive and consistent portrait model is just another benefit that is associated with 
the long-term employment by royalty of a prestigious painter for the means of public 
image making. Such distinctions are demonstrated in the luxurious intimacy of 
Velazquez’s images of the Spanish Royal family, as well as van Dyck’s insistence on 
the outdoor setting of most portraits of Charles I of England, and of course in Titian’s 
grand full-length portraits Charles V, who often called him his Apelles. These 
luxurious settings set the standards for the court portrait.  
 After centuries of conscious neglect, ‘individualised’ depiction was revived in 
the period between the late Middle Ages and the seventeenth century, which has 
come to be known as the Renaissance. Italian artists, such as Leonardo da Vinci and 
Michelangelo, sought to align themselves with the ancient spirit by rediscovering the 
particularities of nature. They treated nature with utmost realism and rejected the 
mimetic restrictions imposed by the iconographic traditions stemming from the 
Middle Ages. As a result, portraiture became more realistic and fuller with the 
assistance of the newly invented ‘perspective’, while the body was given back its 
rightful pictorial value. In contrast with the ancient and the Middle Ages tradition, 
the sculpted, three-dimensional freestanding portraiture now stood unbound by its 
architectural context.  
This reawakening of the individual not only manifested itself in court or 
religious portraits, but also re-defined, in a classical manner, the prerequisites for 
portrayal, since the virtues of individualism were becoming more evident amongst 
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highly esteemed members of the court and of leading social groups. Hence, successful 
merchants, craftsmen, artists and humanist scholars sat for portraits, which tended to 
focus on their non-noble virtues. According to Woodall, the difference between noble 
and non-noble virtue was located in “content” and not in “kind”.47 In other words, 
hereditary nobility rendered their identity inseparable from the body, since it relied 
upon family genealogy, whereas, the emerging bourgeoisie class of merchants and 
scholars sought to distinguish themselves from the nobility by detaching their virtues 
from the body, and asserting the mind over the body. Yet, despite their effort to 
become ideologically independent from the aristocracy, they failed to overcome the 
noble contexts of historical association – though they rejected the familial, they 
promoted the ‘exemplary’ through pictorial references to the great intellectuals of the 
past. Of these portraits, the ones of scholars are the most distinct. Unlike the nobles’ 
insistence on physically justifying the continuation of a dynasty or of a family, the 
humanists’ main interest was focused on establishing their own intellectual self-image. 
They articulated their personalities by referring to their practice and work, which was 
an immediate result of superior intellect, spiritual values and ethical independence. 
But as Norbert Schneider carefully identifies, “counterfeits of humanist scholars, 
however subtle or discrete, were also displays of power and social prestige”, since they 
were “competing for status with the rich merchant class and nobility.”48 Indeed, they 
were particularly fond of the print medium as a means of disseminating their 
honorific portraits - perhaps learning from Luther’s strategies. Dürer’s comment on 
painting’s inability to capture the ‘mind’ (as inscribed in his engraving of Philip 
Melanchthon, 1526 demonstrated the increasing dissatisfaction with, and opposition 
to, contemporary aristocratic concepts of identity, and the subsequent failed 
incorporation of spiritual individualism into the arts through an idealised form of 
realism.  
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Dualism and the Portrait: 
Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas 
 
The distinction between a divine intellect located in the mind, and a material, 
‘mechanical’ body - that has come to be known as ‘dualism’ - reached its definitive 
formulation in the seventeenth-century in the writings of René Descartes.49 Prior to 
Meditations, Descartes reached the conclusion that the soul, or thinking self, must be 
entirely distinct from anything material, since it was possible to doubt the existence of 
his body, but not his own existence as a conscious, thinking being.50 In the Second 
Meditation he applies the systematic method of doubt to demonstrate that thought is 
inseparable from himself.51 He then carries on to the Sixth Meditation to define, not 
just the distinct but also, the opposing nature of body and soul, according to the 
divisibility of the body, in various parts, and the indivisibility of the soul.52  
Dualism did not just appear in Descartes’ writings. Its origins lie in Plato, in 
his reconstruction of a conversation that takes place in Socrates’ condemned cell.53  
Socrates embarks on a distinction between a changing world of senses and an 
unchanging realm of knowledge and understanding. He follows by defining the act of 
death in dualist terms: 
 
«Ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ 
τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, 
χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα 
μὴ ἄλλο τι ιἦ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;»54 
 
Could this (death) be anything else but the separation of soul and body? Is it not 
being dead when the body is to exist separately and autonomously from the soul, and 
the soul is to exist separately and autonomously from the body? Is death something 
other than this? (my translation) 
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Socrates then embarks on a discussion regarding enquiry into knowledge, where the 
role of the body is somewhat problematic. He is critical of the powers of vision and 
hearing,  concluding that the body and its desires can easily be deceived in the search 
for truth: 
 
«Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν 
τις αὐτο ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόν δε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει 
ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν 
ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ’ ἀκούμεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδεν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ 
τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ ποθ 
τούτον φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν;…Πότε οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε 
ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ….Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτην τούτων 
μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ’ ὅτι 
μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτην γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται μὴ 
κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ’ ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.»55 
 
What shall we say is your opinion of the actual acquirement of knowledge? Is the 
body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? For instance, I mean to 
say, have sight and hearing any truth in them, or are they not, as the poets are always 
telling us, inaccurate witnesses? And yet, if even these are inaccurate and indistinct, 
what is to be said of other senses? For you will allow that these are the best of 
them…Then when does the soul attain truth? For in attempting to consider anything 
when the body is interfering then she is obviously deceived…And thought is best 
when the soul is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her, neither 
sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure; when she takes leave of the body, and 
has as little as possible to do with it; when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is 
aspiring after true being. (my translation)56 
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Socrates proposes a conception of the immaterial soul’s superiority over the 
material body. His distinction of the two is informed by defining the divine, 
immortal, and unchangeable essence of the soul, as opposed to the material, mortal, 
and changeable body: 
 
«Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλέυειν καὶ 
ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν 
σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον 
ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ 
δουλεύειν;…Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ῷ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν 
συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιλύτῷ καὶ ἀεὶ 
ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτα ἔχοντι ἑχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ 
και θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτα ἔχοντι 
ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα.»57 
 
Now consider the matter in another light: when the soul and the body are united, 
then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. 
Accordingly, which of these two functions is akin to the divine and which to the 
mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, 
and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?...Then, reflect Cebes on all of 
which has been said on whether we reach conclusion that the soul is in the very 
likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and dissoluble, 
and unchangeable, and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, 
and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. (my translation) 
 
At some point Simmias, one of the participants in the dialogue, objects to this 
separation by asserting the soul’s dependence on the organisation of the body’s 
materials, refering to a musical instrument’s tuned harmony, which is dependent on 
the arrangement and existence of strings. Socrates, then, resolves the argument by 
stressing the lack of harmony that occasionally exists between the appetites and the 
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urges of the body and the desires of the soul. Plato’s, and Socrates’, distinction is 
based on the view that the good life is achieved through a mastery of self, which 
presupposes the dominance of reason, located in the soul, over bodily desires. Plato’s 
oppositions are not formulated in terms of inner/outer and the prioritization of the 
former against the latter, as much as on the immateriality and eternality of the soul, 
which is aligned against the materiality and ephemerality of the body. But, in crucial 
contrast with the Cartesian view, rationality is to be achieved by connecting the self to 
the larger cosmic order, and not to a personal world that is internally explored 
through contemplation.  
Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, rejects the connection between an awareness of the 
order in our lives and of the cosmic order, since the latter is a type of a science in the 
strong sense of a knowledge of the unchanging and eternal, and the former is an 
understanding of the ever-changing, in which particularities can never be captured in 
detail under general rules. Therefore, to behave under ‘practical wisdom’ requires the 
encompassing of all goals and desires into a unified order, where reason provides the 
ability to balance and order a unified whole in order to live a good life. However, even 
though he distinguishes these two forms of knowledge, he clarifies that knowledge of 
the eternal order, in the form of science, is as essential to a rational good life as is the 
awareness of the right order of our lives. 58 Aristotle also challenges the framework 
that treats the soul as something separable and capable of existing apart from the 
body: 
 
«Φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνεθ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον 
ὀργιζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι…ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη 
πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ 
φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα…εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι 
τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν…»59  
 
In most cases the soul is not affected nor does it act apart from the body – for 
example in being angry, being confident, wanting and perceiving in general…It seems 
that all the affections of the soul involve the body – passion gentleness, fear, pity, 
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confidence, and also joy and both loving and hating. For at the same time as these 
occur, the body is affected in a certain way…If this is so, it is clear that the affections 
of the soul are principles involving matter. (my translation) 
 
For Aristotle, all living things have a soul, but instead of being separable, it supplies 
the form and organisation to the matter out of which it is composed. In other words, 
soul stands to body in the same way as form stands to matter:  
 
«Λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μέν, ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ’ 
αὑτὸ οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ’ ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ 
τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων.»60 
 
We speak of one of the kinds of things that there are as substance, and under this 
heading we speak of one aspect as matter (which in itself is not a particular), and an 
other as shape and form (in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular [being]), 
and a third as the product of the two. (my translation)  
 
Aristotle’s ‘hylemorphism’ account of the body-soul relationship – from the Hellenic 
words for matter (hyle) and form (morphe) – offers a middle way between radical 
materialism and dualism, since in his view these are simply two aspects of one and the 
same biological being:  
 
«ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιόνδε, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ  ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἡ ψυχή· οὐ γάρ 
ἐστι τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον 
ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσιαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν 
ἔχοντος…καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.»61 
 
Since substance is indeed a body of such a kind (for it is one having life), the soul will 
not be body. For the body is not predicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject 
and matter. Therefore, the soul must then be substance as form of a natural body 
which has life potentially…It has been stated in general what the soul is: it is 
substance corresponding to the principle of a thing. (my translation) 
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As for the special case of the ‘intellect’, he allows that it may be separable from the 
body, but he strongly resists a concept of the soul being an immaterial autonomous 
entity. Thus, he opens the way for the integration of psychology into the quest for 
understanding human nature: 
 
«…μάλιστα δ’ ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ 
φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν οὐδε τοῦτ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι…ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν 
ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι…ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές 
ἐστιν…περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ’ ἔοικε 
ψυχῆς γένος ἓτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον 
τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, 
καθάπερ τινές φασιν…»62 
 
Thinking, however, looks most special to the soul; but if this too is a form of 
imagination, or does not exist without imagination, it would not be possible for it to 
exist apart from the body…The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of 
substance, and it seems not to be destroyed/decayed…But the intellect is surely 
something more divine and is unaffected (by decay)…Concerning the intellect and 
the potentiality for contemplation, the situation is not far clear, but it seems to be a 
different kind of soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting can from 
the perishable. But the remaining parts of the soul are not separable as some like to 
claim… (my translation) 
 
Aristotle’s uncertainty about the intellect’s independent existence influenced 
Thomas Aquinas who, among other Christian philosopher-theologicians of the 
Middle Ages, set himself the task of reconciling the great thinker’s principles with the 
doctrines of the Church.63 In resolving the problems imposed by ‘hylemorphism’s’ 
unity of soul and body, Aquinas picked up Aristotle’s hesitation, to argue that the 
intellectual soul is capable of existing on its own. It was Aquinas’ special treatment of 
intellect and will that laid the foundations for Descartes’ formulation of the radical 
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body and mind dualism, hence the famous cogito quote, “I think, therefore, I am.” 
Christianity’s contribution to the formulation of dualism was the establishment of 
soul’s supremacy over the body, as well as advocating the Platonic belief of the 
immortality of the soul. The scholar who is more responsible than any other for the 
modification of the Platonic notion of self-mastery according to Christian ideals is 
Augustine of Hippo. He employed the Platonic distinction between the bodily and 
the non-bodily to expand the Christian opposition between the soul and the body in 
terms of the temporal and the eternal, and, most importantly, of the inner and the 
outer.64 Plato’s notions of Ideas and of cosmic order are still viewed as eternal but only 
because they are now perceived as God’s own, directed by His eternal law.65 Hence, 
we are in a quest to find God, who will show us our place in His cosmic order. In 
explaining the means to do so, and in preparing the ground for Descartes, he went 
against Plato’s ‘engagement’ with an objectified world to suggest a turn inwards.66  
God is not to be found just in the world but most essentially within us, in the form of 
ultimate Truth, which is more important than Reason since it is instrumentally crucial 
to it.67  
 
 
Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume 
 
As we have seen Descartes’ dualist formulation was informed by Augustine’s 
turn inwards and Aquinas’ ‘special’ treatment of the intellect. Augustine’s radical 
opposition to Platonic dualism was the rejection that Ideas are embodied in the 
cosmic order; Ideas, rather are to be found within us. Descartes’ turn inwards was 
driven by his desire to interpret the world scientifically, in Galilean mechanistic terms. 
Following the representational account of the Galilean view, Descartes declared that 
to know reality we must have a correct representation of things.68 Here lies Descartes’ 
main contrasting difference with the Platonic notion of self-mastery, where he calls 
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for an objectification of, and disengagement from, the material world, including the 
body, so that it can be understood mechanistically, and thus scientifically.69 It is 
through this objectification of the body that Descartes manages to affirm an 
immaterial inner nature, and transform the Platonic notion of self-mastery. Self-
mastery now is not seen in terms of a correct vision of the cosmic order, but in terms 
of our capacity to internally construct an order according to the appropriate standards 
required for reason’s dominance, and therefore establish control over the material 
body and its bestial passions and desires.  
Driven by a spirit of independent and scientific thought, John Locke rejects 
both the Platonic notion of the world as the embodiment of Ideas, and Descartes’ 
doctrine of innate ideas. He views the first as problematic since it goes against a 
‘mechanical’ universe as it is interlinked with assumptions regarding a ‘meaningful’ 
order, and the second as restrictive and unexamined. By extension, Locke disagrees 
with a ‘self’ being either naturally driven towards or responsive to the truth, asserting 
from a proto-empirical stance that our conception of the world is the result of our 
receptive, sensory and reflective engagement with it. He then takes up the classicist 
position on the negative effects of unruled passions and desires, stressing the 
importance of custom and education in guiding our thoughts.70 Thus, the path for this 
independent, self-responsible ‘self’ strengthens our disengagement from our passions 
and beliefs in order that we are able to critically and constructively reflect on them, 
and reach true scientific knowledge. In his discussion of personal identity he espouses 
what seems to be a Cartesian dualist distinction, but this time in the name of 
‘consciousness’.71 Through a series of thought experiments Locke regards the self as 
solely dependent on consciousness, and he completely discounts any importance of it 
being material or immaterial. However, through these experiments it seems that 
consciousness, or self-awareness, could be separated from its embodiment, as it is 
allowed to separate and recombine. Nevertheless, consciousness is what assists the 
‘self’ to remain an enduring entity, by depending on psychological links enjoined by 
                                                
69 Descartes, Meditations, III, p. 34, & IV, p. 66. 
70 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690], Peter H. Nidditch (ed.) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), Epistle, p. 14. 
71 Ibid, Book II, ch. 2. 
 
43 
memory. Despite its empirical nature Locke’s view still subordinates our physiological 
nature in favour of the inner awareness that each of us has as a conscious being. 
A more materialist line and eventual rejection of Descartes’ dualism has been 
the practice of mainly twentieth-century thinkers, though similar approaches have 
been expressed even before Plato’s dualist views. Democritus (b. 460 BC), for 
example, argues that the ephemerality of the soul is justified on the grounds of its 
explicable physical nature. He believes that human consciousness, or soul, consists of 
atoms, therefore, it is bound to cease to exist when the rest of the body does so.72 
Even Descartes’ seventeenth-century contemporaries, such as Thomas Hobbes and 
Benedict Spinoza, subjected Cartesian views to criticism. Hobbes claims that all 
mental faculties and activities of human beings are located in the nervous system and 
are nothing more than the result of moving particles.73  
Like Hobbes, Spinoza rejects the idea of an autonomous, immaterial, and 
eternal soul.74 He replies to the confused dualist solutions of the Aristotelian 
uncertainty on the intellect, by simply reflecting on the lack of scientific knowledge of 
how the brain actually works. Therefore, we should not account a separate soul 
responsible for the complexities of human behaviour, simply because we presently fail 
to understand how it functions neurologically. In order to study human behaviour 
Spinoza proposes the employment of two languages: a mental one for understanding 
actions and decisions, and a physical one for describing the function of the body and 
nervous system. To escape falling into a dualist trap Spinoza clarifies that at any given 
time there is only one set of events going on, which may be conceived under the 
characteristic, or perspective, of either ‘thought’ or ‘extension’.  
Building on Hobbes and Spinoza’s rejection of Cartesian views David Hume 
produced a radical account of personal identity. 75 He went as far as to assert that the 
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idea of the ‘self’ is an illusion, or a kind of fiction, as it is not the cognitive outcome of 
any experience or internal impression. In an endorsement of Locke’s empiricism, 
Hume’s ‘self’ is nothing but a state of confusion derived from multiple perceptions and 
impressions of the mind, which are conceived incessantly and trick us into attributing 
to it an unreal, metaphysical identity. Hence, Hume’s groundbreaking notion that the 
self is not an enduring entity has provided the foundations for the emergence of the 
contemporary Reductionist views of consciousness and the self. 
 
 
Ryle, Parfit, Taylor 
 
It was the twentieth-century philosopher Gilbert Ryle, however, who 
systematically challenged the Cartesian framework.76 Ryle argues that describing the 
mind as a separate realm existing alongside the bodily is a confusion that is rooted in a 
category mistake. Mental events and properties are not separate and superior to 
physical ones, just as the identity of an institution consists of, and is not separable 
from, its buildings, administration, employees and customers, etc. Regarding ‘mental 
states’, Ryle claims that these are modes of behaviour and reactions in response to 
special circumstances, and not statements of private, inaccessible activities that take 
place in the subjective theatre of the mind. Though Ryle’s approach to the mind may 
be seen as kind of ‘behaviourism’, it did influence subsequent philosophical work on 
the concept of mind.  In an anti-dualist manner, some philosophers have proposed a 
radically materialist reduction of mental states to brain states. More recently the 
dominant theory has come to be known as “functionalism”, which given that it draws 
heavily on Aristotle, regards mental states as formal or organisational states. In other 
words, such states should be identified by their casual links to one another and to 
sensory inputs and behavioural outputs, and not by some hidden inner property.77 
Under this view, mental attributes are in fact intrinsically dependent upon brain 
states, that is, brain states and activities determine the nature of mental states.  
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The contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit joins Ryle in rejecting the 
existence of a hidden, deep inner self. Parfit sets off by expanding Locke and Hume’s 
understanding of human identity, and dismisses the view that personal identity can 
only be defined in terms of a whole life.78 For Parfit, it seems impeccably natural to 
distinguish between different persons in one’s life, according to, let us say, different 
time periods, i.e. childhood, and adulthood. He then claims that there is nothing 
beyond physical and psychological continuity, regarding the endurance and survival of 
the self, under what he calls a “Reductionist View”.79 In proving his point he discusses 
the case of tele-transportation, where a machine digitally fragments, scans, records, 
and transmits a body to Mars, only to be rejoined by a similar electronic machine back 
on earth.80 Parfit then argues that as soon as we liberate ourselves from the belief that 
there is a metaphysical entity, perceived either as self or soul that could be ‘left 
behind’, then such an uncommon ‘journey’ would seem perfectly normal and safe. 
And as soon as we let go of the idea of a single, identical, and enduring self we might 
then feel less guilty of our pasts, and less anxious about our futures.   
 In a straightforward opposition to such ‘reductionist’ and ‘naturalist’ views 
Charles Taylor places immense value on the importance of morals in the formation of 
modern selfhood.81 Locke’s perception of ‘identity’ being the result of a neutral ‘self-
awareness’ is challenged by Taylor on the grounds that the ‘self’ is: “…something 
which can exist only in a space of moral issues.”82 For Taylor the making of the self is 
a subjective process that is located in everyday ordinary life, not in the Platonic 
rational cosmic order or in the Cartesian internal order of divine origin. Bearing this 
in mind, in his attempt to demonstrate that the modern turn to introversion is the 
outcome of efforts to search and define the Good, he incorporates what initially seems 
to be a combination of aspects of both Platonic and Cartesian notions. However, he 
refines his position when he clarifies that morals vary according to historical and 
cultural ‘frameworks’ - which is in sharp contrast to Plato, Descartes, and Locke, who 
all reject the place of ‘custom’. In addition, Taylor argues that Plato’s concept of 
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‘virtue’ is particularly problematic because it is not to be “…found in public life.”83 
Accordingly, the notion of cultural and spiritual ‘frameworks’ as determinates of ‘self’ 
are crucial as they “…provide the background of our moral judgements, intuitions or 
reactions in any of the three dimensions of our moral life (respect, integrity, 
dignity).”84 He then links the modern importance of these ‘frameworks’ with the post-
Romantic understanding of universality. Universal terms do not exclude, but are 
predicated on difference, on the particularities of cultural or national backgrounds.85 
Therefore, it is through ‘qualitative distinctions’ based on these ‘frameworks’ that the 
self is produced.86  As such these frameworks presuppose the formation of ‘self’ in the 
social and communal context of ordinary life  “[O]ne is a self only among other selves. 
A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it”.87 As Taylor 
argues, the self only exists, in “webs of interlocution”. Concomitantly he regards 
‘language’ and conversational exchange as fundamental to achieving this process self-
definition, and to the “continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding.”88 In a 
final rejection of a Cartesian model of self and consciousness that calls for worldly 
disengagement for the sake of inner contemplation, Taylor insists that “the drive to 
original vision will be hampered, will ultimately be lost in inner confusion, unless it 
can be placed in some way in relation to the language and vision of others.”89  
Taylor doubts Parfit’s thesis that human life is not the expression of a prior 
unity or that personal identity doesn’t have to be defined in terms of a whole life and 
its ‘narrative’. According to his notion of ‘frameworks’ a ‘self’ exists only in a certain 
space of questioning, “…which touch[es] on the nature of the Good that I orient 
myself by and on the way I am placed in relation to it.”90 It is because of the fact that 
the direction of our lives is determined by our constantly reconsidered place in relation 
to the Good that we “…must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a 
quest.”91 In other words “the sense of Good has to be woven into my understanding of 
my life as an unfolding story…our lives exist also in this space of questions, which 
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only a ‘narrative’ can answer…in order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have 
a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.”92  
He then takes on the reductive Naturalist perspective by claiming that under 
this view ‘frameworks’ are classed as human inventions, and “…not answers to 
questions which inescapably pre-exist for us, independent of our answer or inability to 
answer”93. By extension, “[g]oods or ‘values’ are understood as projections of ours onto 
a world which is neutral”94, but most importantly that “morality is conceived purely as 
a guide to action” and that “…the task of moral theory is identified as defining what 
the content of obligation is rather than the nature of the good life”95. He then argues 
that it is because “thinkers of a naturalist temper, when considering ethics, naturally 
tend to think in terms of action…[that] this temper has helped contribute to the 
dominance of moral theories of obligatory action in our intellectual culture.”96  
 Although Taylor is critical of the Cartesian disengaged self, his overall views 
do not reflect a clear anti-dualist position, bearing in mind his dismissal of Parfit’s 
materialism and reductionism. In addition, due to the moralist nature of his argument 
his writing often resides within deistic approaches to the subject. In particular, he 
highly values the influence of the Judaeo-Christian tradition on the formation of the 
self. As a result, Taylor’s reference to this religious tradition as a means for the 
emancipation of virtue is a sly insertion of the notion that religion is the guarantor or 
regulator of moral order. Whereas Augustine and Aquinas replace the platonic cosmic 
order with divine order, Taylor is doing something similar with society by resorting to 
a specific religious doctrine as the basis for his moralist model. However, it is due to 
Taylor’s social reading of the embedded self, as opposed to the Cartesian introspective 
self, that his views are deemed important here.   
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Searle & Rockwell 
 
From the mid-20th century onwards the fields of philosophy of the mind and 
cognitive sciences have been primarily concerned with resolving the problematic 
dualist nature of the Cartesian subject. In addition to the positions of Ryle, Parfit, 
Taylor, and Dennett, scholars such as John Searle and W. Teed Rockwell have 
produced additional alternatives to Cartesian dualism and vulgar materialism. Searle 
rejects both dualism and materialism in favour of a neurobiological account of the 
mind. His objections to reductionist materialism (behaviorism, functionalism, 
physicalism) can be summed up in his claims that, an “objective account cannot 
explain the subjective character of consciousness”, thus, “any account of the mind that 
leaves out…qualitative experiences is inadequate”.97 According to Searle the rise of 
materialist accounts of the mind is the direct outcome of the failures of dualism 
(which often leads to irreducible mental phenomena being treated as “indigestible”98) 
and the successes of the physical sciences. For Searle the basis of all mental 
phenomena is biological and related to specific organs. Although he rejects dualist 
distinctions between natural and mental, and natural and cultural phenomena 
(“culture is the form that biology takes in different communities”99), his distinction 
between low bodily and high brain features remains loyal, at one level to the Cartesian 
prioritization of the mind over body.  
On numerous occasions Searle enforces his distinction between the “different 
phenomena of the third-person behavioral, functional, neurobiological structures and 
the first-person conscious experience”.100 Consciousness and intentionality for 
instance, are unique for Searle in that they have a first-person ontological subjectivity. 
At the core of Searle’s argument lies his perception of consciousness as a product of 
neurobiological processes in the brain, which exist as “the biological features of the 
brain system”.101 By extension and contrary to Romantic views, Searle argues that 
subjective states can exist in human or animal organisms. In order to resolve the 
mind-body problem Searle suggests the use of a “topic-neutral vocabulary”, a move 
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that poses no threat to mental features.102 A revision of the Cartesian definitions of 
the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ would allow the recognition of the mental qua mental 
as physical qua physical. Thus consciousness for Searle is a “qualitative, subjective, 
first person process” of the brain that can be reduced causally, but not ontologically.103 
Instead of accepting the existence of ‘physical’ and mental’ phenomena, Searle 
suggests that some brain processes are simply conscious experiences. Finally, in a 
compromising and almost dualist manner Searle surprisingly characterizes 
consciousness as “indivisible” and “a unified structure”.104 
Searle concludes that consciousness is caused by neurobiological mental 
“microlevel processes” that are realised in the brain as a “high-level or system feature”, 
and best summarised by his claim that consciousness is the “essence of the mind”.105 
However, consciousness for Searle is not a separate entity from the brain, “but the 
state that the brain is in”.106 To argue his point about the inter-relation of low and 
high level processes Searle draws parallels between consciousness/ the brain, and the 
liquid body of water and its molecular behaviour of the H2O molecules. Searle’s 
suggested reconfiguration of Cartesian vocabulary here, however, is not that much 
different from Descartes prioritisation of the subjective over the objective. In other 
words, Searle replaces the Cartesian dualism of mind/body with that of the 
brain/body. The concept of the self thus remains enigmatic for Searle, who seems to 
agree with Hume that we should not confuse personal experiences with the actual 
existence of a self.107  
 Rockwell is very accurate in identifying the survival of Cartesian principles in 
recent philosophical attempts to resolve dualism under the heading of ‘Cartesian 
materialism’.108 In this respect the mind-body distinction characteristic of dualism is 
replaced wholesale by the brain-body distinction, which by treating the mind as the 
brain is not that far from Descartes’ claim that the mind lives in the brain. Rockwell 
argues that the mind is not solely dependent on the interaction of cranial neurons, but 
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on the interactions between a brain, a body, and a material world. Drawing from 
recent research that demonstrates that the brain is in fact, more hormonal than neural, 
Rockwell is skeptical about treating the brain as equivalent to the mind (on the basis 
of neural interactions).109 By considering the mind as a biological concept Rockwell 
aims at producing a functional definition in addition to a causal one. Like Charles 
Taylor, Rockwell attempts to re-introduce the mind to the cultural and social 
particularities of the world, avoiding the mistakes of a world-independent Cartesian 
materialism. Surprisingly, and even though he discusses a significant number of key 
texts, he fails to acknowledge the Platonic origins of the notion of being-in-the-
world. 
Rockwell is particularly critical of Searle’s claims that consciousness is just a 
biological property, disregarding its functional properties altogether.110 He is also 
critical of Searle’s demand for a physical study of the intrinsic nature of consciousness 
since for Rockwell consciousness is a relational property and not an intrinsic physical 
one.111 From this perspective the self is regarded as an evental continuum of subjective 
qualities, which is the outcome of the collaboration between the objective items of the 
nexus brain/body/world. He is also sceptical of the functionalist notion in Searle of 
the “ontological independence of mental events…that frees them not only from 
behaviour, but also from brains”.112 This fails to perceive the mind as a “dependent 
pattern that gets its cognitive and biological significance from the context in which it 
dwells”.113 As such, he disagrees with Searle’s assumption that the brain alone is the 
headquarters of consciousness.114 
According to Rockwell, neuroscience considers brain events to be the cause of 
mental events and, in this, it seems to follow Descartes’ model of a central CPU 
(brain) that receives information from message cables (neurons). The view of the 
mind as a biological computer is put to the test by the fact that neural networks 
around the body are not structurally different from the ones located in the cranium; 
and importantly most neurons are not receptors. Furthermore, the brain’s process of 
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cognitive description actually seems to appear in other organs too, which gives 
Rockwell the right to ask whether we should call this bodily processes ‘thinking’ too. 
Indeed, Rockwell proposes that consciousness is not the sole product of a centralised 
mind located in the brain at all, but it is instead the product of the entire nervous 
system.115 Contrary to neuroscience, and artificial intelligence theory, this approach 
therefore does not focus on the brain’s intrinsic qualities, but relates brain activity to 
behaviour, language, etc.; in short it perceives brain activity as a part of a “nexus of 
relations between brain-body-world”.116 Therefore, the brain should not be seen as a 
“separate organ distinct from the rest of the nervous system” 117 as this leads inevitably 
to materialist claims regarding unidentified brain activities, and also to the 
metaphysical claim that some sort of ‘psychic’ power is involved in channeling 
information from body-neurons to the brain. If, instead, consciousness is a property of 
the brain and the rest of the body then there is no need to talk of the internal 
channeling of information. 
Rockwell does not doubt that some experiences, in their entirety, might be 
caused by the brain, but he argues that such experiences are still causally dependent on 
the brain’s interactions with the rest of the body and on the body’s interaction with 
the world.118 Hence he is somewhat skeptical of the broad use of the concept of 
‘supervenience’ – which has allowed the mind-brain identity theory to avoid a variety 
of philosophical problems – in so far as that, without disputing that the mind 
supervenes on something physical, he doubts that the brain provides the complete 
supervenience-base for consciousness. In addition, the employment of the concept of 
supervenience implies a notion of dualist prioritisation and hierarchy. If we consider 
an identity or causal relationship as purely supervenient, the supervenient depends on 
what it supervenes. Therefore, Rockwell insists that a variable level or type of brain 
activity is “necessary” for mental states, but he refuses to accept that brain activity is 
“sufficient to account for every mental state, and sufficiency is what defines 
supervenience”.119 What he offers instead is a notion of a ‘relational supervenience’, 
where the mind supervenes on the causal relations that hold the brain-body-world 
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nexus together, simply because the brain is dependent on these relations, and not just 
on the ones between the skull and its neurons. For Rockwell, the application of 
relational supervenience stretches beyond ‘thought’ to include ‘feelings’ and 
‘sensations’ as they too rely on the same nexus.  
Thus, Rockwell is allocating an equal importance to all parts of the brain-
body-world network by rejecting the false perception of a hierarchical order with an 
independent brain sitting on the top. However, he does not claim that all parts of the 
nexus are self-conscious, but that, consciousness is a collective product and an emergent 
property of the interactions between the nexus’ parts. The outcome is that the central 
dualist image of a conflictual relationship between mind and body is replaced by one 
of distribution and collaboration.120 Finally, Rockwell divides this system into to 
subsystems: one for logical processes such as linguistic affairs, and one for experiences 
and sensations.121  
There are obvious similarities between Rockwell’s network theory and recent 
‘relational’ and discursive models and attitudes in art, where collective collaboration is 
combined with site and/or situation specificity.122 However, quite often, hierarchical 
models of collaboration remain consciously or unconsciously active in relational and 
discursive artistic practices. In this case the brain-body-world network develops in the 
form of brain/artist – body/public collaborators – world/public domain of production 
and/or exhibition of work. As such, this limited understanding of network theory falls 
back into an old dualist hierarchical structure, in which the artist acts as a manager 
who directs a body of assistants disguised as collaborators (in this respect the 
collaborators are often are not attributed any authorship or copyright access to the 
work that they have co-produced). The question pending, therefore, is whether 
Rockwell’s co-operative brain-body-world network model could assist in resolving the 
semiotic rupture that is produced by the traditional artistic network for portraiture 
(artist-sitter-portrait) and its inherent clash of subjectivities? More importantly can 
the collaborative nature of Rockwell’s network theory replace the competitive nature 
of the creative processes of dualist portraiture?  
 
                                                
120 Ibid, p. 104. 
121 Ibid, p. 129. 
122 See for example Nicholas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Les Presses du Rèel, 2002). 
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Heads & Bodies: Dualism & Physiognomy 
 
  As already outlined, the main dualist positions are those of Plato and 
Descartes. However, the crucial difference between them is that Plato’s self is vitally 
connected with an objectified world and Descartes’ is disengaged from it. Therefore, 
prior to an analysis of anti-dualist perspectives in portraiture, a thorough 
understanding of the distinct visualisation of both dualist perspectives is necessary. 
The common dualist outlook in art, and especially in portraiture, presupposes that the 
body is incapable of representing the sitter’s inner identity, since it is perceived as an 
independent entity. Therefore, an acute realistic full-size treatment of the sitter 
accounts for half of his re-presentation, that is, for the objective, material part. The 
other half, that is, the subjective, non-material requires an autonomous pictorial 
handling. This is the Cartesian viewpoint, whose extremeness is rooted in the demand 
to visually represent or construct something that has no substance, therefore, no image. 
By extension, the constructed visualisation of a sitter’s subjectivity is derivatively 
analogous to his or hers inner ‘construction of orders’. Modernist abstraction of the 
body (as a manifestation of the soul’s prioritisation that stretches so far as to deform 
the figure), is the moment the Cartesian perspective achieves its ultimate formal 
expression, but the origin of this gradual formal abstraction, like dualism, is Platonic. 
In dualist portraiture, physiognomy (the inference of personality traits from 
facial characteristics) set out to close the divisible gap between body and inner self, by 
employing facial expressions in order to read the self. Platonic dualist ideas informed 
its theoretical development in antiquity, and Aristotle frequently incorporated such 
theories in his philosophical discussions, but always within a unified model of the 
self.123 The oldest surviving treatise on physiognomy Physiognomica is ascribed to 
Aristotle, but it is thought that it is a product of his ‘school’. Aristotle is also 
responsible for declaring the face and bodily gestures as the means for expressing 
emotions in poetry, acting, and the arts:  
 
                                                
123 See for instance Αριστοτέλης, Άναλυτικῶν Προτέρων (Αθήνα: Κάκτος, 1994) [Aristotle, Prior 
Analytics (Athens: Kaktos, 1994)].  
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«ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον· πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς 
αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσίν εἰσιν, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ 
ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα.»124  
 
The poet [as creator] should enliven his/hers work with appropriate gestures. The 
most convincing are those who adopt and act with similar emotions with those of the 
character they represent; accordingly, the anxious demonstrates anxiety, and the angry 
demonstrates anger with the most lifelike reality. (my translation) 
 
In addition, there is a curious analogy in the Egyptian sarcophagus, as a material host 
contains the deceased pharaoh. However, there are no indications of physiognomic 
notions until Hellenic classicism. Physiognomy is attuned with Plato’s dualism, since 
its vision of an inner ‘order’ is parallel to his notion of a correct vision of the cosmic 
order revealed by reason. In art, the viewer’s reading or vision of the subject’s inner 
character is aided by the artist’s rational vision of his subject, which he or she 
communicates with his or her audience through the employment of physiognomy.125 
At the same time, physiognomic readings of the self are of the body, and their 
visualisation is again located on the body, which is yet another justification of its 
Platonic foundation, as it remains engaged with the worldly. In this respect, Harry 
Berger Jr. proposes a more accurate definition of physiognomy: “the face is the index 
of the mind’s ability to make the face (appear to be) the index of the mind”.126 During 
the Classical period physiognomic idealisation was not ‘allowed’ by contemporary 
theories of balanced representation. Eventually, the idealisation trend of the 
                                                
124 Αριστοτέλης, Περὶ Ποιητικῆς, [Aristotle, Poetics], 17.1455a 29-32. 
125 According to Plato artists are capable of applying a pure truth-seeking vision to their subjects, which 
is possible given the divine origin of the soul. Plato also associates the concept of Truth with aesthetic 
notions of Beauty, in that the artist is employing Truth to identify worldly instances of divine Beauty 
(Πλὰτων, Φαίδρος (ἢ περὶ Ἔρωτος) (Αθήνα: Κάκτος, 1996) [Plato, Phaedrus (Athens: Kaktos, 1996)], 
248c-249e). 
Plato is drawing a different image of the artist in the Πολιτεία (Republic). This time the artist 
is perceived as a deceiver whose creations stand far from true representations, since he/she is 
preoccupied with the individual specifics of subjects, rather than emphasising their universal and 
eternal aspects (Πλὰτων, Πολιτεία (ἥ περὶ Δικαίου) (Αθήνα: Κάκτος, 1992) [Plato, Republic (Athens: 
Kaktos, 1992)], 595b-608b. Yet, we should be careful in our understanding of the crucial dualist 
methodological distinction that Plato draws in these two texts. Whereas in Φαίδρος (Phaedrus) Plato is 
praising the conceptual process of an artist as the outcome of divine vision, in the Πολιτεία (Republic) 
he stresses the ‘imperfections’ located in the process of mimesis, which in focusing on the specific and 
unique properties of an object, overlooks the universal.  
126 Harry Berger Jr., Fictions of the Pose: Rembrandt Against the Italian Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), p. 131. 
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Hellenistic and Roman periods permitted just enough reconstruction of physiognomic 
features to define a general type of character. However, its application remained 
determined within limits, set by, yet another form of idealisation: the demand for 
familial reference.  
The main advocate of the pseudoscience of physiognomy in the modern 
period was the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater.127 Lavater built his argument as to 
the importance of the indexical reading of one’s inner self through facial 
characteristics, on the writings of the Giambatista della Porta and Sir Thomas 
Browne. In 1586, Della Porta was the first to illustrate the comparisons between 
human types and animal species, made since antiquity.128 Browne, who possessed 
several of della Porta’s studies, revisited the subject from a religious perspective.129 
Lavater’s essays were first published in German, but, they achieved great popularity 
when they were translated into French and English, and even gave life to the practices 
of silhouette and caricaturial drawing. 
Dualist pictorial interests of a physiognomic nature produced certain side 
effects that played a dramatic part, not only in the stylistic treatment of the sitter, but 
also, in the final composition of the portrait. Dualism’s divine-bestial association, 
asserts a hierarchy that favours the subjective self, or soul. This supremacy of soul over 
body presupposes the prioritisation of the visualisation of the soul, leading to an 
emphasis on the head, or face at the expense of the neglected body. The reduction, for 
example, of the figure to three-quarter, half-length, or even bust sizes, is a result of 
physiognomic attention to the face, in addition to the notion that the soul rests in the 
mind. Another manifestation of such a prioritisation is through the actual 
illumination of the face, as opposed to the darker rendering of the body, which 
contributed to the immense sense of interiority developed in Dutch seventeenth-
century bourgeois portraiture. As Woodall points out, this was the result of the fact 
that the emerging bourgeoisie located virtue in the ‘contemplating soul’ and not in the 
                                                
127 Johan Kaspar Lavater, Essays on Physiognomy for the Promotion of the Knowledge and the Love of 
Mankind, translated by Thomas Holcroft (London: G. G. J. Robinson, 1789). 
128 Giambattista della Porta, De Humana Physiognomia, (Naples: Suor Orsola Benincasa, 1986; reprint 
of 1586 edition) 
129 Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici: A letter to a Friend, Christian Morals, Urn-Burial, and Other 
Papers (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2008), Religio Medici, part 2:2; and Christian Morals, part 2 
section 9. 
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body, in their effort to distinguish themselves from nobility.130 Dualism, then, is best 
exemplified in portraiture, as an imbalance created by an emphasised face at the 
expense of an (overlooked) body. 
 This insistence upon the head at the expense of the body was the result of a 
Roman obsession with physiognomy, even though it was subsequently abandoned 
until the revival of individualism in western European portraits in the 16th century. 
Roman artists were the first ones to reduce the classical full size statuesque marble 
carved portraits to busts. Following the reduction of size, Roman nobility were also 
the first to discover and implement the commanding ‘distance’ imposed by the profile 
pose, which was mostly employed for the depiction of rulers on coins and medallions. 
Both politicians and artists held it in great respect as it was in full compliance with the 
demand of physiognomic depiction, since it showed characteristic features of the face 
in distinct clarity. The reliance of the 18th-century practice of silhouette drawing on 
the profile pose verifies its close relationship with physiognomic practices. Christian 
art, especially during the Byzantium era, gradually returned to the classical formats of 
full life size depictions, however the bust format remained marginally active. As for 
the head’s pose, early Christian art abstained from a utilization of the ‘distant’ profile, 
given Christian art’s emphasis on the spiritual. Hence, the reductive, often 
dematerialising treatment of the body asserted the rule of the soul when the full 
frontal head pose was presented openly to the viewer. As for the in-between pose, the 
contraposto three-quarter view, Beyer believes that it is “…a torsion that represents the 
separation of body and mind, that is, sensuality and spirit.”131 Even though this pose is 
mostly popular in Renaissance portraiture, it does remain active in the subsequent 
development and formation of the Cartesian dualist portrait. This attention to the 
head carried on well into the 20th century, despite the weakening of the idea that 
human character may be inferred from external, and especially facial, characteristics.  
In noble portraiture, from 16th century and onwards, the construction of ‘inner 
virtue’ was composed from the employment of characteristic poses that derived from 
classic models of physiognomy. Giovanni Lomazzo’s mannerist theory of portraiture, 
underlines the rising significance of symbolism here, as he advises painters to “[first] 
                                                
130 See fn. 26. 
131 Beyer, Portraits, p. 68. 
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take into account the rank of the person being portrayed and give the portrait a 
symbol appropriate to that rank.”132 Lomazzo is not neglecting the importance of 
physiognomy as he also describes how various body postures could be employed to 
indicate the subject’ s personality.133 The constructive role of physiognomy in 
achieving ideal likeness, is clearly reflected in his advice for the painter to ''emphasise 
the dignity and grandeur of the human being, suppressing Nature's irregularities.''134 
The contrasting differences between Classicist and Cartesian dualist 
perspectives in portraiture are evident through these two examples from the same 
historical period. The Cartesian portraits of the emerging bourgeoisie treat their 
subjects as positioned on their own, in neutral indoor environments, usually domestic 
(‘inner’), void of any objects or props, and with a clear attention to their heads at the 
expense of their body. Even though the contemplating self of the sitters is still located 
on their body, these subjects are depicted in solitude, and disengaged from the world, 
as there are no indications of their profession, social rank, etc. In contrast, noble 
indoor portraits are not just full of references to a worldly life, but their subjects, are 
for at least half of the time, even seen in outdoor contexts, which is in full agreement 
with Platonic notions of the self. The composition of the classicist noble full-size 
indoor portraits is produced from royal ornaments and coats of arms that signify rule 
of land, objects that refer to talents, or achievements in battle or civic rule; whatever 
the case, these figures are always seen in relation to a public life.  
Despite their differences both of these types still place massive importance on 
physiognomy, which demonstrates that the Cartesian model had still to reach its full 
development. However, the importance that they both allocate to this pictorial device 
is for opposite reasons. The classicist model employs physiognomy primarily to modify 
facial characteristic according to a flattering ideal, thereby, to visually construct the 
impression of a given character according to a given ideology or tradition. Such a 
possibility was identified as soon as it was realised that facial expressions reflected 
emotional states. Yet the distinctiveness of emotional and mental states was not as 
                                                
132 Giovanni P. Lomazzo, Trattato dell' arte de la Pittura, Scultura et Architectura [3V] [1584], Richard 
Haydocke (trans.), (Oxford, 1598 and Rome, 1844, & Hildesheim, 1968); quoted in Beyer, Portraits, 
p. 175. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Lomazzo, Trattato dell' arte de la Pittura, Scultura et Architectura; quoted in N. Schneider, The Art of 
the Portrait, p. 18. 
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crystal clear in antiquity as it is today. The ultimate result of the employment of the 
classicist model is mirrored in the 17th- and 18th-century idealised portraits of nobility, 
which so many contemporary critics dismissed as pure flattery.135 In contrast, the 
dualist model (both Platonic and Cartesian) employed physiognomy – in a Hegelian 
sense136 – in order to read the inner state of the subject by focusing on facial 
imperfections; like Narcissus gazing at his reflection in the pool. In opposition to the 
idealising demands of the aristocracy it abolished flattery, in so far as it prevented a 
truthful inner reading of the soul. Such a difference is defined on the one hand by the 
classicist (Aristotelian) belief in the self as mutable, and on the other by the dualist 
claim of the self as immutable.  
Even though both of these notions tend towards (Platonic) abstraction, they 
do so by fundamentally different means. Classicist idealisation, in fact, remained 
realist in the painted or sculpted treatment of its subjects, both in size, format, and 
style, but the impact of flattery surely denied its subjects a meticulous and acute 
representation. Similarly, despite the ‘true’ likeness employed by Cartesian-type 
portraits, the compositional cropping and reduction of the body, along with the 
atmospheric effects of chiaroscuro, lent the works a particular artificiality. 
Furthermore, Rembrandt’s proto-impressionist brushstrokes could be seen as laying 
the foundations for the modernist abstract formulation of the dualist portrait, whose 
practice is the focus of the upcoming chapter.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
135 See Denis Diderot, ‘Anatomy’, in his Encyclopaedia, Stephen Gendzier (ed. and trans.) (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967), 1:409. 
136 In his Aesthetics, Hegel proposes that a work of art is completed and reaches its final form only when 
it is apprehended by a viewer: “By displaying what is subjective, the work, in its whole presentation, 
reveals its purpose as existing for the subject, for the spectator, and not on its own account. The 
Spectator is, as it were, in it from the beginning, is counted in with it, and the work exists only for this 
point, i.e., for the individual apprehending it.” G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 
translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 806. 
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Rembrandt’s Dilemma: 
The Introduction of Cartesianism in 17th-Century Dutch Portraiture 
 
 
 
One could put Rembrandt’s 
representation of himself into words: 
I paint (or I am painting), therefore I am.137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is widely believed that the emergence of the modern dualist portrait took 
place in the newly formed Dutch Republic in the 17th century. During this century 
Dutch citizens, particularly merchants, traders, renowned preachers, painters and 
humanist scholars commissioned portraits to establish their new social identity, 
infused as it was by a sense of individualism and independence that followed the 
revolt against the Spanish court and the separation from the Catholic church. This 
tendency brought about a spirit of innovation, invoked by such canonic names as 
Rembrandt, Franz Hals, Vermeer, and many more. Three distinct artistic trends are 
evident in Dutch painting of that time: Caravaggism at Utrecht, realism at Haarlem, 
and classicism at Amsterdam.138 Besides this plurality of trends, there were variations 
in size and format of portraits, ranging from life-size to miniature, from full-length to 
just faces, and in between, from knee-length to half length to busts (with or without 
hands).139 Moreover, not all of these portraits reflected the interests and values of the 
                                                
137 Svetlana Alpers, Rembrandt’s Enterprise: The Studio and the Market (London: Thames & Hudson, 
1988), p. 115. 
138 See for example Jean Leymarie, Dutch Painting (Switzerland: Skira, 1956), p. 125 
139 For a discussion on the variety of formats refer to Bob Haak, The Golden Age: Dutch Painters of the 
Seventeenth Century (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1984), p. 98 
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emergent bourgeois state. Recent research shows that members of the emerging 
Dutch middle class often adopted pictorial styles that suited their interests best, which 
even included aristocratic formats of portrayal.140  
In my introduction I outlined a comparative analysis of the two philosophical 
dualist tendencies of Platonism and Cartesianism in relation to classical and Christian 
portraiture. This chapter will examine the early stages of the formation of the modern 
dualist portrait, and question the level of success of these positions in relation to 
surviving classicist tendencies within the Dutch Republic. Recent research in this area 
will allow me to examine the influence of dualism on the Dutch burghers’ attempts at 
self-definition through portraiture, enabling me to define two key areas: under what 
social and cultural circumstances were such attempts at self-definition made? These 
circumstances will assist towards an understanding of the reasons behind portraiture’s 
popularisation in the 17th-century Netherlands, as well as shed light on the conditions 
that influenced the formation of the Dutch portrait format, for example: to what 
extent did classicist models remain active in the culture, either in opposition to, or 
‘combined’ with, dualist notions?  
As I have argued, there are strong connections between Platonic dualism and 
its subsequent Cartesian formation, yet, there is also a fundamental difference. 
Although Plato and Descartes share a distrust of the senses and call for reason’s 
dominance and control over bodily passions, Descartes’ substitution of Reason with 
divine Truth is a clear distancing from Plato’s notion of self-mastery through active 
being in the world; relying, instead, on a methodological disengagement from the 
material as the means for understanding a subject scientifically. Descartes’ extension 
of Plato’s dualism is the result of an elaborate effort to modify already existent notions 
of an immaterial and eternal soul in Christian dogma, where such notions are at its 
core. Aristotle, on the other hand, rejected any metaphysical claims of the soul’s 
inseparability from the body and emphasised the importance of lived experience, and 
eventually his philosophy became the most popular classicist position. As such 
Aristotle’s writings were targeted by the Church. Christian thinkers such as 
Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas used Aristotle’s notion of the immateriality 
                                                
140 Joanna Woodall, “Sovereign Bodies: The Reality of Status in Seventeenth-Century Dutch 
Portraiture”, in Joanna Woodall (ed. and introduced), Portraiture: Facing the Subject (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 75-100. 
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of the intellect (regardless of how much he stressed his opposition to a separable soul 
throughout his writings) in order to reconcile Aristotle’s philosophy with the 
Christian dogma of the autonomous soul. To a large extent Descartes formed his 
cogito argument on the basis of Augustine and Aquinas’ work.141 
Classicist models of representation remained truthful to a full-figure treatment 
of the subject, as both Platonic and Aristotelian notions of self-mastery emphasised a 
mode of active being in the world. In addition, the Aristotelian idealisation of external 
appearance provides an opportunity for the portrait to be employed for the 
communication of the sitters or patrons’ interests. The exemplary function of 
portraiture and contemporary physiognomic treatises introduced forms of idealisation 
that stood side by side with realistic trends of representation. The classicist 
(Aristotelian) model has traditionally been associated with aristocratic courts since the 
days of Alexander the Great and the heirs to his empire, as it served the dominant 
interest of verifying a hereditary right to rule. Accordingly, facial and bodily 
characteristics are idealised in order to bear witness to acknowledged predecessors, 
and in some cases to claim a non-familial, divine link to mythological heroes.  At the 
opposing end, the early formation of Cartesian dualist portraiture built extensively on 
the cogito argument and directed all its attention towards the representation of the 
head, where the intellect was supposedly housed and expressed itself; hence, its 
distancing from the constructed effects of idealisation, since they interfered with the 
true representation of the subject. Accordingly, the proposed supremacy of soul over 
body prioritised the artistic visualisation of a singular head or face at the expense of a 
neglected body. As a result, the figure and format of the portrait are reduced to three-
quarter, half-length, or even bust sizes. In brief, this process of compositional 
abstraction reflects the fact that dualism is produced, as I have stressed, in the last 
chapter, as an imbalance between body and face, instantly establishing a dual 
relationship between head and body.  
Dualism’s profound effect on portraiture is mirrored today in the common 
conception of the portrait as being nothing but the head. In the case of the Dutch 17th 
century portrait, such prioritisation is further enforced through the direct illumination 
of the face, in opposition to a shadowy or ‘fading’ body, heightening a sense of 
                                                
141 See Chapter 1, pp. 22-25. 
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interiority.142 The Cartesian, or dualist format was preferable among members of the 
middle class as it drew attention to inner virtues that were free of hereditary 
connotations. Furthermore, emphasis on realistic representation of external 
appearance (verisimilitude) limited the works’ reliance on idealised rendering. 143 
In this chapter this analysis will be employed in an enquiry into Rembrandt’s 
self-portraits, single portraits, and group portraits, in order to search for a clarification 
of the inter-relation of dualist and classicist tendencies in his work. Most traditional 
scholarship on Rembrandt treats the notion of self in his portraits from a highly 
subjective and interiorised position, leading Rembrandt to be treated as the foremost 
painter in prioritising portraiture as a visualisation of  ‘inner states of being’. 
Consequently the majority of studies of Rembrandt’s work, especially of his self-
portraits, approach issues of the self and representation from a conventionally 
Cartesian dualist perspective. For example, Jakob Rosenberg elaborates on 
Rembrandt’s “strong urge to go deeper than the average patron expected, and to 
describe not only man’s outward appearance but to express his inner life, his spiritual 
existence”.144 In another instance, Jean Leymarie argues that “whereas Rembrandt’s 
compatriots depicted the world and life of their day as seen from the outside, he 
examined the world within himself, observed and faithfully recorded what he saw 
there; thus his vision was at once intensely personal and universal”.145 Rosenberg 
adopts a traditional notion of the split between the body and the soul, and Leymarie 
carefully distinguishes between the Platonic notion of being in the world and 
Cartesian self-examination. Suffice it to say, that the views of such authors as 
Leymarie, Rosenberg, and Joseph-Emile Muller are discussed in order to highlight 
the problems that arise from romanticist approaches to the work of Rembrandt, and 
not for their intrinsic critical value. 
Rembrandt’s portraits have been traditionally divided into three periods, 
according to his transformed and altered pictorial interests. In his early period, 
Rembrandt explored the representation of facial expressions; in the middle period he 
experimented with poses, gestures, dress and devices; and finally, in his late period he 
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143 Mariet Westermann, The Art of the Dutch Republic (1585-1718) (London: The Everyman Art 
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144 Jakob Rosenberg, Rembrandt: Life and Work (London and New York: Phaidon, 1948), p. 36. 
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implemented the knowledge gained from all the years of practice, with a clear focal 
attention to the face. Rosenberg’s view encompasses the general perception, which 
assumes that whereas Rembrandt’s self-portraits “emphasise the blend of the 
subjective with the universal”, his single portraits “strongly reflect Rembrandt’s 
susceptibility to the spiritual side of man and show both his breadth and profundity in 
the interpretation of human character”; and finally, his group portraits “manifest, in 
addition to these basic qualities, the artist’s ability to relate individual figures in 
common activity or in co-operative situations”.146 In this respect, Rembrandt’s self-
portraits are discussed from a dualist perspective, based on claims that they assert the 
subjective aspects of being as universal. As we will see, there are identifiable aspects of 
Platonism in Rembrandt’s ability to ‘interpret’ human character through 
physiognomy, and in the belief in the artist’s pure vision. Yet, this vision is not turned 
towards the world or ‘cosmic order’, but, rather, in a Cartesian manner, directed 
within. Combined with his talent to unite individuals under a ‘common activity’, this 
early clarification certainly forces into question much of the Cartesian aspects that 
historically have been attributed to his approach to human nature. This, and further 
uncertainties of a similar sort regarding Rembrandt’s work will be examined with the 
assistance of the writing of Harry Jr. Berger, Christopher White, Quentin Buvelot, 
and Svetlana Alpers, following a clarification of the Dutch portrait’s dualist 
tendencies, based on Joanna Woodall’s classifications. 
 
 
1566 Riots 
 
The 1566 Protestant (Calvinist) riots against the Catholic Church is the 
historical moment that brought into being the subsequent Dutch state and social 
reforms, which in turn, provided the foundations for the emergence of an early 
bourgeois culture. These events developed into a full-scale revolt against the authority 
of the Catholic monarch, Philip II of Spain. Philip the II’s rule of the Netherlands 
combined bloodthirsty extirpation of heresy and penal taxation (the wealth of the 
powerful Flemish merchants was subject to taxation, unlike the wealth of the Spanish 
                                                
146 Rosenberg, Rembrandt, p. 37. 
 
64 
nobles and clergy), yet, he reacted moderately towards a petition signed by four 
hundred nobles requesting the proclamations against Protestants to be alleviated and 
the inquisition to be discontinued. Unfortunately, the Spanish King’s reply reached 
the Netherlands two days late, and failed to prevent the revolt and subsequent 
iconoclasm.147 Living conditions were poor for the majority, and unemployment was 
high among the peasants and dockworkers. As a result, the revolt of August 10, 1566 
was directed towards the outward symbolic source of personal and social repression 
and exploitation: the Catholic Church. Prior to the iconoclasm, the combination of 
persecutions roused both Calvinists and Catholics alike, and they soon found a leader 
in William the Silent, Prince of Orange. But the destruction of religious decorations 
and heathen icons was detrimental to William of Orange’s public approval, as it cost 
him those Catholic supporters that were originally opposed to the royal policies and 
practices.  
In 1609 hostilities with the Spanish court ceased with the proclamation of the 
Twelve Years’ Truce.148 The lack of religious reference in the official documents 
allowed for the Calvinists to secure their power and as a result to limit the public 
worship of other sects. The Truce was beneficial in terms of trade too, as there was no 
mention of the Spanish demand to restrain Dutch trade in the Far East as well as in 
the Atlantic Ocean. So, by the turn of the century, the once Spanish-ruled region had 
become a complex, Protestant-dominated polity: the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands. Lacking a monarch, the noble estate was led by the Princes of Orange. 
Members of this family monopolised the office of Stadholder, previously occupied by 
the king's lieutenant in each province, which now became the highest office in the 
land. The Stadholder established a court in The Hague and his influence was based 
on command of the army - the traditional preserve of the aristocracy. The 
Stadholder's power was, however, limited by the representative assemblies of the 
seven provinces, in which the voice of the cities had been significantly strengthened. 
In 1581, for example, the province of Holland decided to increase the cities' 
representation from six to eighteen, while the noble estate retained its single vote. The 
                                                
147 For a detailed historical account of the formation of the Republic of Netherlands see Jonathan Israel, 
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political power of these cities was supported by their economic success, built upon the 
opportunities provided by war, immigration, religious toleration and colonial 
expansion. Following the end of the twelve-year truce with Spain hostilities resumed. 
Only this time, the defeat of Philip II’s great-grandson, Philip IV, improved the 
Republic’s diplomatic position, when it achieved official and international recognition 
as a sovereign state through the Treaty of Munster in 1648.  
 
 
The Remonstrant Crisis and Cartesianism 
 
The central religious debate of the Reformation revolved around issues of 
salvation, God’s election, and predestination. The Remonstrants, under the guidance 
of Arminius (1560-1609) and Gomarus’ (1563-1641) four-point declaration of 1610, 
situated the problem of predestination in the context of grace and redemption. By 
extension, the main difference between the Remonstrants and the Orthodox 
Calvinists is based on whether the Bible and the Holy Scriptures were open to 
interpretation. Where the former supported this view, the latter feared that such a 
position allowed for possible revisions of the Scriptures, an act that could potentially 
lead to scepticism and atheism. Most importantly, they blamed the Remonstrants for 
attempting to manipulate the meanings of passages that they disagreed with. The 
debate with the Orthodox Calvinists expanded through the public and political role of 
the Church, due to the immense social importance of religion. In fear of the national 
detrimental effects of a possible religious schism among Protestants (between 
Remonstrants and Calvinists) on the unity of the nation, the States of Holland agreed 
with the Arminians in their view of the Church as a political institution. The 
Orthodox Calvinists, without denying the above, clarified that the Church should not 
be subservient to political pressures, as this would imply a reversal of hierarchical 
order, particularly if it involved toleration of heresy. As religion was the only unifying 
force of this new nation, in order to prevent the isolation of the Low Countries, such 
matters became an issue of the States General. This decision proved to be unfortunate 
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for the Remonstrants; even though they were the majority in the Province of Holland, 
they were not so in the whole of the United Provinces.149 
In a way, the Remonstrant crisis prepared the ground for the early reception of 
Descartes’ philosophy (due to the similarity of issues under debate). Descartes lived in 
the Netherlands from 1628 until 1649. In some cases the furore around Descartes was 
conceived as being even worse than Armenianism (in the words of Jacobus Revius 
(1586-1658) one of Descartes’ biggest adversaries). To add to the general tenor of 
controversy, the translation of Descartes’ Discours intos Latin were carried out by the 
Remonstrant theologian Ètienne de Courcelles (1586-1659). However, we should not 
thereby, draw a simplistic connection between the two positions, as most Cartesians’ 
religious orientation was arguably Orthodox. There were important doctrinal 
differences between Cartesianism and Remonstrantism, for example, the latter’s 
hesitation in accepting the existence of an innate idea of God. However, they shared 
common ground concerning issues and questions on the relationship between reason 
and faith, the dispute about the truth of the Bible, the debate on the freedom of the 
will, and the problematic relationship between body and soul.150 The overlapping of 
debates is evident in Thersites Heautontimorumenos (1635), a satire against the 
Remonstrants written by the Orthodox Gysbert Voetius (1589-1676) and Martin 
Schoock (1614-1669), which subsequently fed into Schoock’s Ardmiranda Methodus 
(1643), one of the most important works written against Descartes.  
Besides the Remonstrant Crisis, the early reception of Cartesianism was also 
influenced by the fact that most of the debates took place primarily in an academic 
context, where Cartesianism stood as the exact opposite of Aristotelianism.  Until 
Cartesianism’s emergence Dutch Universities’ philosophical orientation was 
overwhelmingly Aristotelian. For instance, at Leiden’s University foundation (the 
Netherlands’ oldest university), it was declared that its teaching must at all times 
remain Aristotelian. Descartes’ ideas were faced with strong opposition not just from 
university-based Aristotelians, but by clerics, who were largely supporters of Aristotle. 
Most of the debates took place in academic meetings in the form of disputations, 
although the strongest polemics were expressed in published books and pamphlets. 
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The largest academic support of Descartes centred on his method of doubt, which is 
rooted in the controversial rejection of the senses. Apparently, his metaphysics did not 
receive much support, not even from his followers. This is perhaps because the 
academic Cartesians’ intention was to separate philosophical issues from theological 
ones in order to neutralise religious objections. Eventually Cartesianism gained 
significant ground during the second half of the 17th century, following the death of 
Descartes. Nevertheless, Aristotelianism remained the dominant philosophical 
position, which is reflected in painting and culture in the Dutch return to classicism 
in the Baroque period.151 
In September 1649 Descartes left the Netherlands to spend a year at the Court 
of Christina, Queen of Sweden. From the outset it was intended to be a relatively 
short visit, as he announced that he would only stay for a year. However, he never 
managed to leave, dying of pneumonia on 11 February 1650. Following Descartes’ 
death, in 1651 the Count Louis Henry of Nassau, the sovereign ruler of the 
principality of Hesse-Nassau, addressed Dutch Universities with a letter enquiring 
about their position regarding Cartesianism, and whether it could be adopted without 
posing a risk for Orthodox religion. The University of Leiden decided to reply by 
forwarding the 1647 decree, which forbade the mention of Descartes’ name. The 
Cartesians consented because they were at least satisfied by the fact that the decree 
did not contain any doctrinal commitment. Utrecht forwarded the 1642 judgement 
and 1644 university law, condemning Cartesianism and denouncing it as threatening 
to the higher faculties, such as Theology. The reply also emphasised that the 
University’s philosophical teachings remained Aristotelian, which posed no threat to 
Orthodox doctrine. The University of Groningen defined Descartes as a Catholic 
nobleman, whose work, however, had been the basis of significant public and 
academic conflicts. Yet, they underlined that despite the importance and impact of 
these conflicts, in Leiden and Utrecht there still were professors teaching Cartesian 
philosophy. Characteristically, they concluded by stating that Aristotle’s reign should 
not be turned into a tyranny, and by extension become the suppression of truth.152 
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During his last years, Descartes seemed to be unaware of the increasing 
academic support that his followers were receiving from university administrators. 
Descartes’ Dutch students sought to resolve two problems. First, they tried to 
accommodate Cartesianism within an academic context, a goal to which Descartes 
seemed to be indifferent. Therefore, it was scholars such as Adriaan Heereboord 
(1614-1661), Johannes de Raey (1622-1702), and Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665), 
and not Descartes himself, who assisted in transforming his philosophy into an 
academic system. Second, the Cartesians focused their efforts in neutralising 
theological and religious objections raised by Orthodox doctrine. On this, Descartes 
had misjudged the situation and believed that the evidence of his arguments was so 
strong that they would compensate in the case of protestation. The obvious solution 
for the Cartesians was to separate philosophy and theology, hoping that such 
clarification would grant theological objections as irrelevant to philosophical debates. 
Despite his academic followers’ efforts, Descartes was still disappointed by the fact 
that university administrators, some of whom were his friends, signed their names on 
decrees forbidding the teaching and discussion of his work. He repeatedly failed to 
acknowledge that by the enforcement of these decrees the administrators really 
intended to prevent, or even neutralise, prospective attacks on his philosophy. As a 
result, after 1650 Cartesianism was almost as eminent as Aristotelianism, possibly 
because for a few years it was no longer the target of vicious attacks. This allowed for 
Cartesianism’s wider public acceptance and for selective academic credence. In 
addition, Cartesian method was acquiring respectability because most of the Dutch 
Cartesians were hesitant in endorsing Cartesian metaphysics, which the Orthodox 
regarded as its most objectionable aspect.153   
The university administrators’ policy of control was in fact in line with the 
regents’ public intentions that aimed at control rather than reform. The Cartesian 
academic debate provided regents with the opportunity to assert control over the 
Church in a field they regarded as their own, that is, public teaching. Moreover, the 
Cartesians’ insistence on the distinction between theology and philosophy was ideally 
parallel to the regents’ intentions of separating public life from religion. According to 
Theo Verbeek, the attempt to transform Cartesianism into an academic philosophy 
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had a serious impact on public and academic life. In public life it gave regents the 
opportunity to reinforce their idea of pluralist republicanism, by gaining control of 
public teaching from the Church. By extension, in the field of religion Cartesianism 
instigated new debates on theological rationalism, and posed an enquiring threat to 
authoritarian theological dogmatism. Finally, in a philosophical context it generated a 
renewed interest in the problem of the transcendental conditions of knowledge.154   
Crucially, the political aspect of Cartesianism is what attracted governmental 
support and protection, which in turn assisted Descartes’ successes in Leiden and 
Utrecht, even though it went against the 1656 States’ legislation prohibiting Cartesian 
philosophising. The political opposition was located in the Orthodox belief that the 
magistrate should obey the Church, since he too was one of its members. Naturally, 
most rulers objected to this view and claimed an independence from politics that the 
Orthodox were unhappy with.  Descartes too supported the view that Church officials 
and ministers should be involved with religious issues, such as enlightening and 
educating their subjects, and should not get involved with governing. From this 
perspective, it would be easy to assume a close connection between the regents’ 
ideology and Cartesian philosophy, as it further supports a disconnection of 
philosophy from theology, which lay at the root of the Dutch ruling class’ 
conservatism. For example, the foremost regent Johan de Witt, who was fascinated by 
Descartes’ mathematical studies, yet accepted the States’ decree of condemnation of 
Cartesianism, questioned a particular connection between Descartes’ philosophy and 
regent ideology. Furthermore, Descartes’ several governmental friends in Utrecht were 
perplexed by his claims for protection on the ground that his philosophy was ‘simply 
true’. What is quite clear from the behaviour and philosophical preferences of 
government officials in the debates and crises with clergymen and theologicians is that 
they adapted to, and parted from, the position that could best serve their own 
intentions.155 
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The Popularisation of Portraiture 
 
The Reformation’s impact on portraiture was also significant, as it provided 
the socioeconomic background for a rising interest in self-representation. As Mariet 
Westermann argues the significant 17th-century commercial demand for portraits of 
individuals needs to be seen against the lack of religious commissions by the state and 
the Church, as a result of the rise of Calvinism and the iconoclastic opposition against 
Catholicism.156 Until the historical moment of this rupture, the Christian Church had 
been the sole patron of the arts, besides aristocratic courts, for approximately twelve 
centuries. During the early Christian years the Orthodox Church of the Byzantium 
Empire did not just commission art with religious themes, but actually strove to 
channel all art production within these prerequisites. Artists were employed to 
decorate churches, royal palaces, and public spaces according to the prevailing 
religion, as well as executing portraits of heads of state and religious subjects (from 
heads of the Church to Saints and Patrons). The Catholic Church built on this pre-
existent tradition, and did not alter the religious character of its commissions, even 
after the spread of classical ideas in by the Renaissance. In fact, the revived classical 
tendency offered the opportunity for religious projects of bigger scale and grandeur, as 
reflected in the work of Michelangelo, and his fellow artists of the time.  
Calvinism, on the other hand, rejected both the sculpted Catholic and the 
painted Orthodox temple decorations of religious imagery.157 As a result, demand for 
religious paintings in Holland from official bodies diminished, and was restricted to 
private individuals’ commissions, destined for domestic interiors. The gap created by 
the lack of religious commissions was filled by the emerging bourgeoisie’s desire to 
represent their newly emergent social identity. Their favourite subjects were drawn 
from everyday life, specifically domestic and familial activities: from cleaning, and 
taking care of children, to social moments of elaborate dining and drinking sessions. 
According to Jonathan Israel, the flourishing of the arts in the Netherlands, and the 
Dutch bourgeoisie’s desire to be represented in the form of the portrait, was the 
outcome of three principal factors: firstly, a recognition of the courage and 
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determination by which they sought their independence as a class (reflected in the rise 
of public art commissions illustrating battles taken from the Revolt); secondly, a sign 
of their nation’s increasing power and wealth, given its reliance upon the commercial 
and trade successes of its burghers; and, thirdly, as a consequence of this increase in 
national wealth, the rapid emergence of private collections.158  
Calvinist iconoclasm, however, did not force out religious images altogether, 
as the Catholic faith was still prominent in Utrecht, which, along with Haarlem and 
Amsterdam, was one of the three major economic and artistic centres of the 17th-
century Netherlands. However, whereas Utrecht and Haarlem were by now 
Remonstrant cities, Amsterdam remained counter-Remonstrant. As a result, the 
classicist themes (often drawn from Greek mythology and infused with eroticism) that 
were accommodated in the artistic production of Remonstrant cities were criticised in 
counter-Remonstrant cities after 1609; so for instance Pieter Lastman (Rembrandt’s 
teacher) toned down the eroticism of the themes in his work.159 Episcopal power may 
have been diminished as a result of the Reformation, but Catholicism was still active, 
laying claim to thirty-five percent of the city’s population. Utrecht’s strong Catholic 
heritage was due to the fact that in the Middle Ages the city was the Northern 
Netherlands’ main religious centre.160 Because of Catholicism the city’s artists drew 
strongly on religious subjects and often embarked on educational trips to Italy, with 
Rome being the most popular destination. The artist that they particularly admired, 
and whose ideas they brought back, was Caravaggio. Utrecht’s ‘Caravaggisti’ 
incorporated the master’s careful direction of light and chiaroscuro in Dutch 
painting.161 Consequently, at the beginning of the 17th century Utrecht became a 
leading national and international art centre. Besides the employment of light and 
chiaroscuro, Utrecht’s Caravaggism put an end to Mannerism’s artificiality, and 
remained true to a realist life-size, and lifelike treatment of its subjects.162 Ordinary 
representations of religious subjects, such as saints, transmit this new realism. 
Moreover, human figures were abruptly cropped, which, in addition to a focusing on 
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the head or face through the rigorous direction of artificial light, represents one of the 
first manifestation of Cartesianism in portraiture in this period. 
Another city with an Italian connection was Haarlem, which in the first part 
of the 17th century was among the largest cities in the Netherlands. Flemish 
immigrants stimulated the cultural and economic prosperity of Haarlem, and, 
remarkably, in 1634 the city’s guild numbered among its members fifty-eight painters, 
six etchers, seven glass-engravers, and six sculptors.163 It is no surprise, then, that 
Haarlem’s thriving artistic and commercial society attracted flattering parallelisms to 
the Italian Renaissance, indeed at the time it was known as the Florence of the North. 
In tune with the stylistic preferences of the rest of Netherlands, the realist rendering 
of subjects was the main concern of Haarlem-based artists, although these paintings 
were void of the fabricated atmosphere generated by chiaroscuro and the focal 
direction of light evident in Utrecht works.164 In Rudolf Hermann Fuchs’ view Frans 
Hals and his contemporaries were approaching their portrait subjects with a “closer 
approximation to the living person”165 by emphasising their “vitality and actuality”.166 
Moreover, Westermann argues that this vitality is achieved by the “quick and decisive 
look of each stroke [that] suggests spontaneity, the recording of one specific instant in 
the life of the sitter”.167The rendering of these works, especially Hals’, is certainly 
‘expressionist’ in tone, and their composition is far more audacious than the preceding 
relatively inactive poses - existing formulas that had persisted since the middle of the 
16th century constrained such stylistic inventions. Dutch burghers’ expectations of 
true, detailed representation of both bodily and dress characteristics, void of any sense 
of idealisation or fabrication, remained the foremost priority of their commissioning 
concerns.168 
After the first quarter of the 17th century Haarlem’s lead in the development of 
painting and graphic arts was overshadowed by Amsterdam’s development as a 
cultural centre and increasing attraction to artists from elsewhere, particularly 
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Haarlem.169 The main reason it became the key artistic centre of the Netherlands, was 
that it took over Antwerp’s role as the world’s trading centre, as a consequence of the 
Republic’s naval blockade during the war, resulting in the Netherlands’ dominion of 
the seven seas.170 This naval superiority, which resulted in the flourishing of trade and 
thus of the State itself, was due to the increasing successes of both the East and the 
West India Companies. Inevitably, the city’s thriving financial prospects allowed its 
population to increase astonishingly from fifty thousand at the beginning of the 
century to two hundred thousand in the 1650s. The cosmopolitan air of the city was 
at the same time analogous to the new Republic’s advanced cultural developments, 
which allowed the individual to attend to personal concerns with the appropriate 
amount of freedom and seclusion. One of the many celebrated visitors to the city of 
Amsterdam was in fact Descartes. Writing to Guez de Balzac in 1631, he praised the 
plethora of commodities that could be found in the city.171 Comforts of everyday life 
only added to its suitability for a peaceful, solemn retirement, which in his view 
surpassed the Capuchin and Carthusian monasteries. 
Art production in Amsterdam is characterised as classicist and historicist, but 
with a strong infusion of Caravaggism.172 It is generally perceived that whereas 
Haarlem painters “focused on the physical aspects of the problem”, Amsterdam artists 
focus on the “psychological aspects”.173 For example, the work of Pieter Lastman, 
Rembrandt’s master for six month in 1624, prior to Rembrandt’s move to 
Amsterdam, treats historical and mostly biblical subjects with a certain theatricality 
and expressivity. After spending four years in Italy studying the great masters, 
Lastman became Amsterdam’s leading history painter upon his return in 1607. 
Lastman’s appreciation of Italian art,174 especially Caravaggio, was passed on to his 
pupil, who intensified the spiritual effect of his biblical paintings by amplifying the 
effects of chiaroscuro. His early works still reflect Lastman’s classicist influence in 
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terms of composition, and gestural theatricality.175 However, Rembrandt’s later 
concentrated use of light along with a broader use of chiaroscuro, and the gradual 
negation of vigorous contrasts of colour, indicate a distinct move away from 
Lastman’s manner. 
Following this short outline of the three major 17th century Dutch styles we 
can point to their various association with dualist notions. Thus although they share a 
common insistence on naturalistic bodily representation and realistic depiction of 
dress - as a truthful illustration of bourgeois class values – these styles reflect a few 
contrasting differences. Utrecht Caravaggism is the style that stands closest to 
dualism, particularly in terms of composition. The prioritisation of the ‘inner self’ is 
established by a focal attention to the head through a reduction of the body, in terms 
of the size and portrait-format, which creates a classical compositional imbalance 
between head and body. In addition, chiaroscuro is employed as a means of creating 
an artificial sense of atmosphere; and the direction of light is focused clearly upon the 
head.  
Haarlem’s realism, on the other hand, has all the characteristics of Aristotelian 
classicism. The majority of these works incorporate sitters in their full figure, and life 
size, instantly cancelling out a possible imbalance in the head’s favour. Furthermore, 
there is no impression of fabricated atmosphere or of chiaroscuro. Certainly, there are 
half-length portraits, such as those of Hals, but despite this reduction the face is not 
highlighted, either by illumination, or by a more abstract treatment of the rest of the 
figure. Finally, what enforces these works’ classicist nature is their immense sense of 
vitality and gestural activity, especially in Hals’ group portraits, which are in full 
harmony with the Aristotelian and Platonic notion of achieving self-mastery through 
being active in the world.  
Amsterdam’s combination of classicism and chiaroscuro has all the signs of an 
amalgamation of both Utrecht’s Cartesian Caravaggism and Haarlem’s classicist 
realism. In these works, portrait subjects are treated with a heightened realism, but 
often in knee-length format. Only the very wealthy were painted in full-figure, life-
size format - a type that originated in court circles.176 Yet, all formats incorporated 
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ephemeral gestural activity, either through the turn of the head in a three-quarter 
pose, or by the positioning of hands. Finally, the purpose of both the application of 
chiaroscuro and the employment of light were to direct enough attention upon the 
face. However, these effects are somewhat constrained in the Amsterdam works, 
when compared to portraits painted in Utrecht.  
 
 
Joanna Woodall: Aristocratic and Bourgeois Formats 
 
Amsterdam burghers did not blindly adhere to a specific type of portraiture. 
As Woodall argues they tended to choose one format or another, depending on the 
intentions behind each commission. More importantly, in her view “there was no 
immediate sense of an irreconcilable division between established aristocratic identity 
and the complex of values which ultimately came to be defined as distinctively 
bourgeois.”177 She maintains that in the 17th-century Netherlands a bourgeois identity 
did not, in fact, fully form,178 drawing on H. F. K. Van Nierop’s identification of a 
distinct continuity between the aristocratic values that preceded the Revolt and those 
of the following century.179 Her position is reinforced by the distinction Louis 
Althusser makes between the Dutch burgerlijk – derivative of the word burger 
meaning citizen – and the more familiar concept of the French bourgeois – a term that 
indicates a fully formed class and its ideology.180  
Woodall appears to share Fuchs’ position on the un-changeability of existing 
realist formulas,181 suggesting “that [the Dutch burghers’] portraits were initially 
conceived and comprehended with reference to traditional concepts of portraiture, 
inherited and adapted from the aristocratic ideology, which predominated before the 
                                                
177 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 79. 
178 Ibid, p. 76. 
179 H. F. K. Van Nierop, The Nobility of Holland From Knights to Regents, M. UItee (trans.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Cited in Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’. For an in 
depth discussion of the new elites that arose after the Revolt (merchant elite and elite of the skilled) 
and their social standing in relation to the nobility and the regents see Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 
328-360. 
180 Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation)', in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Ben Brewster (trans.), (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1971), p. 162. Also cited in Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’. 
181 Fuchs, Dutch Painting, p. 83. 
 
76 
Revolt.”182 By this, she refers to a right-of-portrayal that was based upon concepts of 
nobility, as outlined in the work of the humanist scholar and painter Francisco de 
Hollanda183 and in Giovanni P. Lomazzo’s treatise Trattato dell’ Arte della Pittura, 
Scultura, ed Architettura di Gio184. In 1550, de Hollanda asserted that only royal rulers 
and their immediate family, and personalities famous for military, literary, and artistic 
achievements were worthy of honorary commemoration, due to their virtue and 
wisdom. According to Woodall, the qualities of wisdom, fame, and virtue that form 
the basis for de Hollanda’s classification “were conventionally associated with 
respected roles in society and formally recognised by conferment of a noble title.”185 
The noble nature of these qualities is in full agreement with the 1588 Haarlem 
humanist Hadrianus Junius’ distinction of three sorts of nobility: of birth, or the 
hereditary right of rule, of virtue, or exemplary service for the state, and of skill, or 
humanist scholarship and artistic practices.186  
A very good example of how notions of virtue were adopted by artistic 
practices is represented by Anthony van Dyck’s Iconography, which was first published 
in Antwerp by Maerten van den Enden between 1632 and 1641. In it van Dyck 
includes eighty engraved portraits of famous men of his time such as princes, 
diplomats, and scholars, but most of which are southern Dutch artists and 
connoisseurs.187 Van Dyck’s major project was fundamentally based on the aristocratic 
notion of a virtue, that is, artistic and intellectual activities, which are governed by a 
virtuous way of life. By extension, classicism is at play here in representing each sitter’s 
character through active posing, and gestural depiction of his appearance. What is 
crucial in van Dyck’s publication is that he attributes the same aristocratic status to 
artists, by applying similar criteria, and artistic rendering. The importance of this 
                                                
182 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 78. 
183  Manuel Denis (Diniz), De la Pintura Antigua por Francisco de Holanda (version castellana por Manuel 
Denis), E. Tormo y Monzo (ed.), (Madrid: Real Academia de San Fernando, afterwards Academia de 
Bellas Artes de San Fernando, (1921), pp. 255-6. Cited in Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’. 
184 Giovanni P. Lomazzo, Trattato dell’ Arte della Pittura, Scultura, ed Architettura di Gio. Paolo Lomazzo, 
3 vols. (Rome: Biblioteca Artistica, 1844), II, pp. 367-8. Cited in Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’. 
185 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 78. 
186 H. Junius, Batavia. In qua praeter gentis et insulae antiquitatem, orignem, decora, mores, aliaque ad 
eam historiam pertinentia, declaratur quae fuerit vetus Batavia etc. (Leiden, 1588), pp. 318-19 (Dutch 
edition, Delft, 1609). Cited in Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’. 
187 For a brief description of van Dyck’s Iconography I refer to Volker Manuth, ‘Rembrandt and the 
Artist’s Self Portrait: Tradition and Reception’, in Christopher White and Quentin Buvelot (eds.), 
Rembrandt by Himself, exhibition catalogue (London: National Gallery Publications; Hague, Royal 
Cabinet of Paintings Mauritshuis, 1999), p. 45. 
 
77 
aristocratisation of artists gains more significance through the fact that this profession, 
even though it was clearly not socially denigrated, was, however, of lesser standing 
than that of a tradesman or a ship owner.  
Woodall asserts that aspects of nobility justified a right-to-portrayal in 17th 
century Netherlands “because the political and economic hegemony of the aristocratic 
order had been definitively challenged.”188 Yet, there were those who did not hesitate 
to claim a position in the pantheon of portraiture through the ‘established portals’. 
For instance, the Stadholder and the remaining nobles continued to be depicted in 
aristocratic modes of portraiture that treated the figure in its full form, in addition to a 
visual identification with court etiquette, rule of land and military command. To 
emphasise the extent to which such modes were adopted, Woodall analyses Thomas 
de Keyser’s 1627 portrait of the Stadholder’s secretary, Constantijn Huygens. In this 
portrait Huygens is presented seated by a desk decorated with a globe, mathematical 
instruments, and paperwork, only to be interrupted by the receipt of a document. 
Besides the immense sense of activity here, this theatrical appropriation serves the 
purpose of characterising him as a man of virtue based on skill, while his dress alludes 
to hunting – a strictly noble activity.   
Woodall sensibly brings into question the portraits of the Amsterdam elite, 
whose members had every reason to abandon this type of court portrayal that 
espoused the aristocratic values associated with de Hollanda and Junius. In her view, 
portraiture in this period retained its social function of identifying and exemplifying 
noble attributes of esteemed virtue and wisdom, and for this reason it continued to be 
the means by which the claims of elevated social autonomous individuals where 
established. The content of the burghers’ identity was based on aspects of nobility that 
drew on skill and not on hereditary rights of birth, but it was still defined within 
aristocratic notions of value. However, this change of content certainly altered the 
form of the portrait by encouraging the production of private and personal images. 
Drawing from portraits of the Amsterdam elite Woodall identifies three strategies of 
portrayal: noble emulation, burgerlijk distinction, and a harmonious marriage of the 
two.189 As we will see, these distinctions seem to have a lot in common with the styles 
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of the three main Dutch artistic centres of the period. At the same time, each one 
reflects, accordingly, the classicist and dualist positions, and a combination of the two. 
Yet the fact that they are all developed in Amsterdam should be of no surprise, since 
the city’s metropolitan character allowed for its dominant artistic style to take shape 
through a combination of realist Classicism and Caravaggist dualism.   
Noble emulation incorporated a form of self-representation that “articulated a 
claim to immortality in terms of the prerogatives of the hereditary nobility.”190 For her 
case studies Woodall picks Cornelis van de Voort’s portrait of Laurens Reael (1583 – 
1637) (c. 1620), and the 1629 portrait of his wife Suzanna Moor (1608 – 1657) by an 
unknown artist. Reael was a highly ranked officer of the East India Company from 
1611 until 1619, serving first as a military commander and afterwards as governor-
general of the Indies. Upon his return to Holland he remained involved within 
military and political circles, and as a result in 1625 he was appointed vice-admiral of 
the Netherlandish naval force and director of the East India Company. The peak of 
Reael’s career was the moment of his ennoblement in 1626, when he was given the 
title of ‘Golden Knight’.  
According to Woodall, what associates the nature of Reael’s claims with 
Junius’ hereditary sort of nobility is its use of compositional devices implying 
sovereign authority, and engagement with military activities.191 The full length, life-
size format, is instantly identifiable with traditional aristocratic, and classicist modes 
of portraiture. Moreover, it accommodates a typical sovereign pose with legs astride 
and left hand on hip, usually – as in this case – resting on a sword. The bearing of 
arms, and the implication of military ability signified by the helmet resting on a 
covered table on the left are further indications of aristocratic etiquette, which are 
complimented with a pedestal and a curtain at the other end. Finally, the cane that 
Reael is holding with his right arm denotes exercise of sovereign rule in the form of 
judicial authority. The treatment of the whole of the painting is conventionally realist, 
with a natural flow of light, yet there is a fundamental idealisation at work. 
As Woodall identifies, Reael's portrait does not produce a realistic account of 
his current social position.192 In actual fact, this work incorporates a combination of 
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his achievements up until 1620, the year of the commission, and of his attainment of 
a noble title, which was not awarded until 1626. The gold chains, for instance, were 
probably distributed to him by the sovereign, upon his return to the Netherlands in 
1619. But the emphasis on the military and the judicial aspects, through an 
aristocratic manner, is certainly an idealisation driven by the recognition of his 
ambition. However, there are certain aspects of the work that are in tune with the 
contemporary emphasis on exact reproduction of appearances. The attentive 
treatment of Reael’s dress is driven by the burghers’ insistence on emphasising the 
difference of their appearance from court fashion. Furthermore, Reael’s subsequent 
decision to pair his portrait with his partner Suzanna Moor, whom he married in 
1629, altered the character of portrait works insofar as they became marital pendants, 
a tradition that was fundamentally linked with burghers and not with royals. Despite 
traces of burgher visual tradition, aristocratic elements of composition and treatment 
are dominant in these portraits as the means of promoting a desirable social position. 
Yet, if the emerging middle class was to seek full independence from the hereditary 
nobility, it had to do so also in terms of its visual representation. Because, as Woodall 
identifies “if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, emulation implied the 
superiority of the hereditary elite, at least in war and international politics.”193 
 Bob Haak claims that only a few of the very wealthy of Amsterdam’s elite 
commissioned full-length portraits, perhaps because they were the only ones who 
could afford to do so.194 The subjects of Bartholomeus van der Helst’s portraits of 
Andries Bicker (1586-1652) and of his wife Catarina Gasneb Tengnagel (1595-1652) 
of 1642, which according to Woodall “epitomise bourgeois values,”195 clearly could 
afford to commission the grand format. Yet they chose to go with the one that could 
establish a visual distinction from court tradition. A liberal protestant, Bicker was the 
leading figure in Amsterdam’s politics and trade between 1627 and 1650. Apart from 
being ten times burgomaster and the leader of the dominant anti-court faction, he 
and his two brothers were major world traders, with Andries specialising on exotic 
spices and Russian furs. 
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 The most striking difference between these works and van der Helst’s portraits 
of Reael and his wife is the compositional reduction of format to half size, a choice 
that was certainly not based on lack of funds. Despite Bicker’s involvement in politics, 
both of these works are void of any objects or props, which might stand as visual 
attributes of office. In contrast leisure activity, and not sovereign power, is implied by 
the book that Bicker is holding, as well as by the pair of gloves held by his wife. In 
addition to the reticent composition, these portraits are also more private than van der 
Helst’ paintings. Set against a neutral background of an unidentified interior, most 
probably a domestic space, the works’ sense of intimacy is complimented by the 
figures’ close proximity. The atmosphere and the restrained employment of 
chiaroscuro reflect a state of solitude, appropriate for self-contemplation. Light, this 
time, plays a role in gently directing attention to the sitters’ faces and hands, the sole 
purpose of which is to establish a difference in type of nobility. The figures’ reduction 
in size stands for a visual rejection of hereditary nobility, who validated their ancestral 
origin of right of rule through forms of physical resemblance (idealisation). As a 
result, the highlighting of the sitters’ face and hands asserts inner virtue and skill as 
the types of nobility of their preference, as opposed to the aristocratic hereditary 
type.196  
 For the last strategy of portrayal – a harmonious marriage of aristocratic and 
burgher formats – Woodall brings into discussion Nicolaes Eliasz’s (generally known 
as Pickenoy), c. 1635 portraits of Cornelis de Graeff (1599-1664) and of his wife 
Katarina Hooft (d. 1691), which skilfully combine aristocratic courtly values with a 
burgerlijk social position.197 Being Andries Bicker’s brother in law did not seem to 
prevent him from engaging in political rivalry with his relative, regarding the 
                                                
196 The perception of hands as the physical counterpart of human reason was discussed by Anaxagoras, 
and recorded by Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the hand is not a specialised instrument, as a claw 
for example, but allows for the possibility of many skills. Aristotle’s appraisal of the human hand, in 
relation to animal parts allowed the emerging bourgeois to refer to the hands as part of an effort to 
promote the noble virtue of their choice, that is, skill. The full passage reads: «Ὁ γὰρ φρονιμώτατος 
πλείστοις ἂν ὀργάνοις ἐχρήσατο καλῶς, ἡ δὲ χεὶρ ἔοικεν εἶναι οὐχ ἒν ὄργανον ἀλλὰ πολλά·  ἔστι γὰρ 
ὡσπερεὶ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργὰνων…Ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ καὶ ὄνυξ καὶ χηλὴ καὶ κέρας γίνεται καὶ δόρυ καὶ ξίφος καὶ 
ἄλλο ὁποιονοῦν ὄπλον καὶ ὄργανον· πάντα γὰρ ἔσται ταῦτα διὰ τὸ πάντα δύνασθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ 
ἔχειν.» (For the intelligent person would put the most organs to use in the best possible way, and the 
hand is not one organ but many; for it is, as it were, an instrument for further instruments…For the 
hand can be a talon, a claw, a horn or even a spear, and a sword, or any other weapon or tool; it can be 
all those due to its ability to grasp and hold.) (my translation) Αριστοτέλης, Περὶ Ζῴων Μορίων (Αθήνα: 
Κάκτος, 1994) (Aristotle, Parts of Animals (Athens: Kaktos, 1994)], τὀµος IV, 687α 18-21 & 687β 3-6.   
197 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 86. 
 
81 
dominion of Amsterdam. De Graeff’s family involvement with Amsterdam’s 
governing elite is partly responsible for his lenient stance towards court politics, 
especially if compared to Bicker’s source of popularity, which was due to his success in 
trade. Remnants of aristocratic behaviour can be traced in de Graeff’s passion for 
hunting, his frequent leisure trips abroad, and his eagerness for learned pursuits. De 
Graeff’s family was officially introduced into the nobility, when his father bought the 
title to Zuid Polsbroek from the Count of Aremberg in 1610. 
The balance of this ‘harmonious marriage’ is tilted towards the aristocratic 
format, since Van der Voort’s and Pickenoy’s portraits are far more alike than 
Woodall suggests. Despite some slight differences, such as the lack of, or 
juxtaposition, of objects, both works are based on typical aristocratic-type 
composition. For example, in de Graeff’s portrait there is no indication of the pedestal 
and curtain found in Reael’s, yet, these props seem to have been moved into Hooft’s. 
The depiction of dress in all four of these portraits is closely rendered and reflects 
their true social status, which is a demonstration of independence from the monarchy. 
The full-length format, though, is clearly aristocratic and classicist, as is also the even 
application of light. In addition Haak, regards the portraits of the wealthy Amsterdam 
merchant Cornelis de Graeff and of his wife Catherina Hooft as appearing “almost in 
regal finery”, although without elaborating on why.198 For Woodall, the lack of de 
Graeff’s full regality, in contrast to Reael’s, is demonstrated in the latter’s bearing and 
decoration of arms, which are completely absent from the former’s.  
Crucially, de Graeff’s involvement in politics was in terms of civic service and 
not of military achievements. Drawing from two poems by Jan Vos (1610-1670), 
composed in response to these portraits of the couple, Woodall reads a contrast 
between a male (based on ‘reason’) and a female (based on the ‘arts’) type of 
portraiture, which are respectively evident in Pickenoy’s portraits of de Graeff and 
Hooft. However, Woodall seems too hasty to accommodate the meaning of Vos’ 
poems in her reading of these portraits and, therefore, claims that a genderisation of 
virtue is taking place here: “although virtue remains close to the traditional concept of 
nobility as a personal yet eternal quality, its content is altered and moulded to justify 
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ideal, gendered citizens.”199 Woodall’s comparison of the portraits according to gender 
stereotypes  (which are the outcome of Vos’ themed poems), is based on a few  details 
that are not strong enough to carry her argument forward. For instance, claims of 
‘reason’ are attributed to de Graeff’s “precise placement of his feet upon the regularly 
ordered tiles”, 200 disregarding the fact that we cannot see whether Hooft’s feet are 
placed in an orderly fashion or not, due to the length of her dress. Moreover, the 
claim that Hooft’s “figure seems to move imperceptibly through conceptual space, 
brushing the air with her fan”201 is easily refuted once we notice that Hooft’s hand is 
extended in the same angle as de Graeff’s, establishing a certain harmonious, and 
thus, classicist compositional balance between the pendant portraits. Whereas, de 
Graeff holds an ‘invisible’ sword – another aristocratic indication – Hooft holds her 
fan. The same positioning of their other arms, both graciously holding onto the fabric 
of their attire, strengthens this balance.  
Besides the lack of martial references, the change of content within notions of 
nobility is reflected through Pickenoy’s rendering of de Graeff as an aristocrat in a 
domestic environment, and not in sovereign interiors or exterior settings. 
Furthermore, there are similar syntheses within this luxurious interior, visualised in 
the combination of courtly columns and furnishings with the black and white tiles, 
typical of Dutch interiors of the time. Finally, what is definitely aristocratic, and 
classicist is the pictorial idealisation of de Graeff’s chin to conceal a deformation due 
to childhood injury, which is only mentioned in passing by Woodall in the caption of 
the portrait’s illustration.202 It is precisely these forms of fabrication that bourgeois 
realism rejected.203 
Overall, these portraits are classicist, but they cannot account for the popular 
format of choice of Amsterdam’s burghers, since these two marital portraits are the 
only examples of courtly portraits that Haak refers to as instances of expensive full-
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length commissions.204 The majority of portraits of the time incorporate the 
Cartesian, solitary setting of the Bicker pendants, in order to declare their possession 
and preference of inner virtues over hereditary aristocratic, bodily ones. But for those 
few who preferred the traditional visual codes - that is, the classicist-aristocratic 
format – these type of portraits provided the opportunity for innovative 
embellishment, and had the potential for expressing claims of elevated status by 
reference to social hierarchies. Despite the similarities of the de Graeff and the Reael 
pair of works, Pickenoy’s reference to noble virtue is emphasised through the same 
inner charisma evident in van der Helst’s portraits of Bicker and his wife (namely 
qualities of intelligence and acumen) and not through the martial indicators 
noticeable in van der Voort’s portrait of Reael. In this context of burgerlijk distinction 
it seems that the early Cartesian format was capable of accommodating bourgeois 
values more successfully than the classicist one. De Graeff’s portrait might incorporate 
similar positions, but their manifestation is relatively weaker and more uncertain, 
compared to the clear differentiation conveyed by the common burgher format of the 
time. 
 
 
Black & White: The Significance of Attire 
 
The black and white attire and rigid poses of 17th-century Dutch citizen 
portraiture is commonly perceived as a clear opposition to the colourful, relaxed and 
gestural poses of noble self-presentation. Woodall argues, however, that through this 
choice of aesthetic Amsterdam regents were not refusing to acknowledge nobility, 
especially since black and white attire has been the characteristic choice of members of 
Spanish court for over a century.205  In fact, despite the mature citizens’ loyalty to this 
attire, younger members of the elite wore the colourful court fashion on numerous 
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social occasions. Therefore, as Woodall adds, the adoption of black and white “was in 
fact not opposition to noble values per se, but rather Amsterdam elite’s double claim 
to authority over its ‘immature’ fellow citizens and independence from the Hague 
court, which necessitated a distinctive portrayed identity.”206 The citizens’ desire for 
visual distinction from the Hague court’s style was a further means by which political 
independence was asserted, following the citizen elite’s rivalry with the court and the 
Stadholder. Interestingly, the black and white attire was eventually abandoned 
following the Peace of Münster (1648), which recognised the Republic of 
Netherlands as a legitimate sovereign state.  
Amsterdam’s regents subsequently overtook the republic’s political arena, 
when the Stadholder Willem II was defeated, and who died in 1650. At this point, 
Cornelious de Graeff obtained political leadership of Amsterdam from his rival 
Andries Bicker, marking the historical moment that the Netherlands became a 
citizen-run, free republic. Since the court did not any longer pose any threat or claims 
to power and status, citizens “adopted contemporary courtly modes of representation 
with impunity”,207 abandoning the modes that they sought to be identified with 
during times of political rivalry.208 Moreover, as Woodall notices the black and white 
mode of dress was problematic, since it was the preferable fashion of the Hapsburg 
court that preceded the Revolt. Artists such as Govert Flinck and Bartholomeus van 
der Helst welcomed the popular re-introduction of contemporary court fashion in 
citizen portraiture, which was, perhaps, the reason for them taking over from 
Rembrandt as Amsterdam’s leading portraitists. 
Drawing from citizens’ diverse modes of self-representation that often were 
not in agreement with their true social status, Woodall refuses the identification of 
Dutch portraiture’s ‘reality’ with bourgeois values. She claims that leading Amsterdam 
citizens adapted existent noble categories and conventions within a realist mode of 
painting “to claim positions equal to, but distinct from, both the hereditary nobility 
and each other.”209 In doing so, they had to elaborate identities whose aspects were 
foreign to virtues associated with hereditary nobility. As a result, they drew from 
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Calvinist and contemporary Cartesian notions of the self that emphasised the 
individual and valued the inner charisma of intelligence and genius, which later 
became the foundations of bourgeois individuality.  
At this point, it needs to be noticed that Woodall’s conclusions on the 
constructed reality of early 17th century Dutch portraiture are drawn from two pairs of 
marital pendants, out of the hundreds that were produced at that time. Furthermore, 
the sitters of these portraits are members of the Dutch elite, if not the elite itself. 
Therefore, it is impossible to draw sound conclusions from isolated examples, 
particularly if they are chosen to represent the whole of a social class. Most Dutch 
burghers adopted the portrait format similar to Bicker’s, where the possibility of 
prioritising interior states is far greater. In this context, it is no wonder that 
Rembrandt’s representational emphasis on this interiorised conception of self was 
received with a certain admiration. However, when political independence was 
achieved in the middle of the 17th century, the reconciliation of burgerlijk virtue with 
aristocratic visual modes – as seen in the work of van der Helst – was more popular 
among Amsterdam citizens.  
But to what extent did Cartesian dualist notions of the self direct the final 
formation of early 17th century Dutch portraiture? Was dualism a self-conscious and 
formalised position, or was it a secondary form, restrained by the Amsterdam elite’s 
adherence to dominant notions of nobility? From Woodall’s analysis, it is quite clear 
that the emphasis on an ‘inner’ self was temporary, and compromised and melded 
with aristocratic painterly formats. These formats visualise a conception of the self 
that derives from Plato and Aristotle’s notion of self, which does equal justice to both 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspects of a person. Most importantly, such a self achieves 
self-mastery through, as I have stressed, being active in the world. This is reflected in 
the cosmopolitan character, and indications of worldly activity, of the van der Voort 
and Pickenoy works. By contrast, Cartesian positions are synthesised through the 
position of the sitter in solitude and in a neutral, usually, domestic environments, 
which stands as a metaphor for solemn self-contemplation (as seen, in particular, in 
the van der Helst portraits). Furthermore, the attention to face, through the use of 
direct light and the compositional reduction of the body, is employed towards a 
hierarchical reformation that prioritises subjective, inner, intuitive virtues as opposed 
 
86 
to hereditary, bodily ones. Yet, despite the eventual philosophical acceptance of 
Cartesianism in the Netherlands, there was a certain academic, and possibly a popular 
resistance towards Cartesian metaphysics. Thus on the one hand, the sense of 
seclusion that is derivative of the ‘individualised’ subject represented in a state of 
solitude can be seen as a visual reference to Descartes’ method of inner contemplation. 
But, on the other, the lack of a full abstraction of the body could also be seen as a 
reflection of the popular perception of Cartesian metaphysics as problematic. In other 
words, the emphasis on the face, in addition to the lack of abstraction, could translate 
as a form of a compromise between a prevailing Cartesian and an Aristotelian 
position, given the fact the latter still retains a strong public position.  
Consequently, in the same way that Amsterdam’s early bourgeois did not 
abandon aristocratic values altogether to achieve a solid class formation similar to 
France’s nineteenth-century middle class, the dualist portrait could not emerge and 
instantly evolve into a form of abstraction similar to that of modernist practices, 
because it was fundamentally bound up with contemporary demands for a ‘sincere’ 
realism. Such a notion of realism presupposed a fundamental rejection of classicist 
aristocratic idealisation, which went beyond that of facial characteristics. Most 
importantly, it stood for a ‘true reflection’ of social status through the visual 
representation of dress appropriate to the sitter’s social standing. Failure to dress 
according to status was perceived as a threat to the class system, insofar as it would 
confuse its signs. Reformation clergymen, such as Willem Teelinck, expressed the 
view in 1620 that the financial well being of a person should not encourage him to 
dress in a manner that does not reflect his or her social position. Furthermore, an 
unidentified Amsterdam lawyer, known only by the initials J. van B., argued in 1662 
that the authorities should ban the wearing of silk and velvet according to one’s taste, 
as it blurred class distinctions. By extension, there was criticism of excessive 
consumption, as lavish costumes and luxurious fabrics had to be imported.210 As a 
result, the majority of burghers demanded to be represented as worthy citizens of the 
Calvinist and emerging financial power state of the Netherlands. They did not 
necessarily ask for pictorial appropriation of emphasised inner states of being, rather 
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for a humble but sincere justification of their respectability. One that was simply 
achieved through an honest reflection of their social position through their profession, 
independent of stylistic choices that would produce associations with the opposing 
aristocracy. Yet, as we have seen rules were bent, by those who employed the portrait 
as the means for promoting their social or career aspirations.   
In addition to the familial and political relations between the subjects of 
Woodall’s analysed portraits, there is a possibility that the artists behind these works 
were associated at a professional level. Before Rembrandt’s arrival in Amsterdam, one 
of the leading portraitists there was Cornelis van der Voort, the painter of the Reael 
portrait. Generally, his work is characterised by a natural rendering of facial colour, a 
competent treatment of light, and highly detailed illustration of dress. Haak suggests 
that Nicolas Eliasz, or Pickenoy, the painter of the de Graeff portraits, might have 
studied under der Voort, because his work reflects the same qualities.211 Based on 
Woodall’s analysis too, the only difference between these two pairs of portraits is their 
compositional additions of objects or lack of. In spite of this, the stylistic treatment of 
their subjects is almost identical, with Pickenoy giving equal attention to his sitters in 
terms of the realist rendering of skin and dress, as well as skilful application of light; 
the idealisation of de Graeff’s misformed chin could have been an isolated incident.  
More interestingly, Haak also refers to suggestions about Bartholomeus van 
der Helst (the painter of the Bicker pendants), being a pupil of Pickenoy “on the basis 
of his style.”212 As for the Bicker portraits, he regards them as examples of the 
moment van der Helst “found his true form”, only to add that this form “would soon 
make him the most famous portrait painter in Amsterdam and at the same time the 
antithesis of Rembrandt in the two artists’ concepts of painting.”213 Despite the 
compositional similarities of the two masters (the cropping of the body set against a 
domestic interior) Haak identifies a series of technical differences. For a start, van der 
Helst’s technique is realistic with clear modelling of his sitters’ expressions, as opposed 
to Rembrandt’s perceptible brushstrokes. Interestingly, Rosenberg claims that 
Rembrandt’s technique “…never became an end in itself, but always served the 
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expression of profound human content.”214 In addition, Van der Helst’s colours are 
relatively lighter and brighter, even though he employed darker colours in his early 
career. Chiaroscuro is carefully applied, as van der Helst’s energetic colouring is never 
allowed to deny the work its even unity. Moreover, Haak regards the treatment of 
light as the most significant difference between them. Indeed, van der Helst’s 
application of light is similarly restrained in order to avoid Rembrandt’s strong 
contrasts, which are the result of his concentrated direction of light, often leaving 
areas neglected and in almost darkness (Rembrandt’s exaggerated incorporation of 
chiaroscuro and tensional direction of light). It is due to this approach to the human 
subject that Rembrandt stood out from his contemporaries and is regarded as the 
foremost artist engaged in studying and revealing ‘inner states’ of being. But, did 
Rembrandt abandon existing pictorial styles altogether, in his quest of the mapping of 
the inner self? In doing so, did he also incorporate Cartesian dualist notions, or 
remain truthful to classicist, Aristotelian notions? Or did he experiment with both, 
coming to combine them in a reflection of Amsterdam’s mixing of classicism and 
Caravaggism? If he did, what pictorial means did he employ to visualise this position? 
Did he elaborate on contemporary trends, or did he innovate and invent new ones? 
But, most importantly, were these self-representations, in burgerlijk terms, honest? 
 
 
Rembrandt van Rijn 
 
In contrast to his contemporaries Rembrandt produced a large amount of self-
portraits. There is no surviving image of Vermeer, for example, unless we consider the 
artist’s back in the Artist’s Studio (Kunsthistoriches Museum, Vienna) as his own. 
Frans Hals, on the other hand, left only two representations of himself, in which he 
appears with the same ordinariness found in most of his portraits of common 
Haarlem citizens. The motives behind Rembrandt’s tendency to constantly study his 
physical and psychological aspects throughout his life have left scholars divided. 
Norbert Schneider, for instance, perceives it as “a sign of his interest in autobiography 
and as proof of the belief he nurtured, in spite of the many crises and setbacks he 
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suffered, in the uniqueness of the individual.”215 Schneider sees Rembrandt’s interest 
in autobiography in relation to the rise of the individual in the 17th-century 
Netherlands, which sparked an interest in various forms of autobiographical literature. 
Prior to Schneider, Christopher Wright claimed the opposite, and cited “Rembrandt’s 
ability to analyse his own character…[as] lead[ing] to the grave misconception that it 
is possible to work out the artist’s biography by looking at the self-portraits.”216 For 
Wright, the reason for this impossibility is Rembrandt’s consistency in failing to 
appear in his work engaged in ordinary activities, or wearing everyday dress – apart 
from a very few instances.217 
Of course, there are also the romanticist views, like that of Rosenberg’s, who 
suggests that “Rembrandt seems to have felt that he had to know himself if he wished 
to penetrate the problem of man’s inner life.”218 Andreas Beyer is initially more careful 
in avoiding a dualist language, asserting that Rembrandt used himself as an instantly 
available and costless model to “explore the fundamental problem of the character 
study before applying it effectively to other portraits.”219 However, Beyer eventually 
employs a fundamentally dualist language in explaining the means by which 
Rembrandt explored human character; Rembrandt worked through “penetrating self-
analysis and intense self-contemplation.”220 Here, the Platonic concept of the artist’s 
‘pure vision’, capable of seeing the truth in the cosmos, is inverted, insofar as to see 
the truth is to see it in human beings. In Rembrandt’s case this process is applied 
through the Cartesian mode of self-mastery, that is, a form of inner self-
contemplation determined by a disengagement from worldly and material interests.  
Westermann sees a dual condition in self-portraiture, arguing that it is both 
“confrontational” and “deeply introspective”.221 However, the term ‘self-portrait’, 
aligned with concepts of self-examination and self-awareness “with existential 
connotations,” was only introduced, as such, in the 19th century.222 Prior to the 
Romantic literature emphasis on the individual as an introspecting being, in the 17th 
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and first half of 18th centuries the portrait, and even Rembrandt’s self-portraits were 
referred to as ‘a likeness of’ a given subject. Instead of its modern function, as Ernst 
van de Wetering proposes, the self-portrait carried a dual function – alternative to 
Westermann’s –  one that can be applied to Rembrandt’s too: first, it was a likeness of 
an oumo famoso, and second it stood as proof or reason for that person’s fame.223 Of 
course, as the term implies, when a self-portrait was not commissioned it was 
executed at the desire of the painter/sitter, which often served claims for fame instead 
of confirming it. Here lies van der Wetering’s answer to Rembrandt’s large production 
of self-portraits, as he views it, as a call for fame through a visual demonstration of his 
talent in the genre that he specialised.224 The same does not account for Rubens or 
Poussin, for example, simply because they both specialised in history painting, and 
therefore their portraits could not be considered as characteristic examples of their 
practice. 
Generally, scholars are united in viewing Rembrandt’s intense study of his face 
in the Leiden era self-portraits as physiognomic experiments. Muller, for example, 
identifies the artist’s “wish to get to know the resources of expression in his own face” 
as “the most important motivating factor” behind these works.225 Schneider goes as far 
to reject a viewing of these works in light of “his religious introspection”, only to argue 
that these portrait studies were inspired by contemporary academic art theory based 
on doctrines of emotional expression.226 Thus, according to this position Rembrandt 
acted out various emotional states for the purpose of this study, which demanded that 
the face becomes the focal point of the painting, as it represents the centre of human 
expression of feelings and emotions. In doing so, the format of these portraits was 
reduced to bust-size, and any ornaments were tentatively left out. Rembrandt’s acting, 
however, instantly negates these works of any sense of truth or originality in the 
depiction of his own feelings.  
Of course, this methodological choice was not driven by the opposite of self-
analysis, that is, a desire for self-repression. But as Schneider carefully notices, in 
these works Rembrandt “was not interested in revealing his ‘innermost being’, but 
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rather in exploring his own mimic abilities to produce an encyclopedia of the human 
feelings.”227 That is, an encyclopedia that the painter could resort to for the needs of 
his history paintings.228 The search for such universal knowledge is what influenced 
several of Rembrandt’s early self-portraits to become tronies (heads), where the 
identity of the sitter is of secondary importance. The term itself is of French origin 
(troigne), and in 17th century it was usually employed to refer to impersonal busts of 
fictional figures with appropriated expressions and adorned with costumes, which 
carried specific connotations, such as the depiction of virtues such as courage and 
faith, mental states, or ages.229  A similar visual commentary can be identified in the 
Hellenic κούρος (kouros, young adult male) and κόρη (kore, young adult female), 
personifications of divine virtues and muses, and in classicist-inspired monuments 
such as The Unknown Soldier. A notion of theatricality is central for the means of 
producing this encyclopedia of tronies, and as Svetlana Alpers notices, “Rembrandt 
has had to become an actor: to get at the expression he wishes to depict, he must 
experience or at least play at experiencing it himself.”230  
 Therefore, Rembrandt’s early portraits were to a certain extent idealised, not 
objectively but subjectively. They were so because the theatrical appropriations that he 
forced himself to adopt, for the sake of technical research, were in contrast to the 
much sought after stylistic realism adopted by the Dutch middle class. In the light of 
Cartesian dualism, the lack of realism and the implementation of aristocratic 
‘idealisation’ here bring these works closer to models that aspire to the classicist 
Aristotelian notion of the self. Yet, at the same time it is problematic to read these 
portraits as ‘inner insights'. Rembrandt is representing inner emotions, but feelings 
alone stand very far from Descartes’ concept of a universal, unchanging self, because 
regardless of their intensity they are ever changing, ephemeral, and momentary. In 
fact, Descartes argued that a distinct idea of an autonomous mind does not embrace 
the operations of imagination, sensation, purposeful movement of body, appetites, 
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and, crucially to this argument, emotions.231 Quite simply, psychology should not be 
employed for the justification of an autonomous soul, since emotional states originate 
from bodily experiences, which in return are manifest through the body, and 
particularly through the face. When emotions are aroused from sole contemplation, it 
is due to the recollection of lived experiences. Nobody gets anxious, or scared from 
solving philosophical problems, for example, but various feelings are evoked in 
everybody when memories from lived events are revisited. Even the act of fantasising 
takes place in terms of constructing scenarios through specific images, borrowed from 
and reflecting the material world, and not through abstract or unimaginative means.  
 What if we were to accept the self-analytical nature of these self-portraits? At 
first, Rembrandt’s inward turn, as the means for self-exploration, seems in tune with 
Descartes’ and Augustine’s call for self-reflexivity and disengagement in search for a 
true, divine, universal being. Yet, his perspective and the methodological 
documentation that he applied with such tenacity have a lot in common with Michel 
de Montaigne’s (1533-1592) philosophical quest for self-discovery.232 In relation to 
Augustine and Descartes, Montaigne’s process was in some ways antithetical towards 
the objectification of our nature, which is central to Cartesian disengagement. He 
held the view that our own flawed nature is fundamentally relevant to our identity; 
therefore, it should be thoroughly explored in order to establish this identity.  
Even though Montaigne did not travel through the Netherlands during his 
European journeys to Germany and Italy, the Dutch intelligentsia was certainly aware 
of Montaigne’s Essays. A renowned admirer and contemporary of Montaigne was the 
Flemish professor Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), who greatly assisted in the academic 
endorsement of Montaigne’s work. From 1579 Lipsius taught at the University of 
Leiden for thirteen years until he accepted the Chair of Latin History at Louvain in 
1592. Being an important figure in the Renaissance revival of Stoicism Lipsius 
commonly addressed Montaigne as “Thales Gallicanus”, due to his influence in the 
                                                
231 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (eds.), 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, rev. edn. 1996), 
Part I, § 48, pp. 208-9. 
232 The Essays of Montaigne, Florio translation (New York: Modern Library, 1933). Van de Wetering 
discusses briefly Montaigne in relation to Rembrandt’s notion of the self. However, his reading of 
Montaigne is somewhat problematic, if not incomplete, as he fails to reflect on Montaigne’s eventual 
rejection of universality, and subsequent turn to a search of unique individual characteristics in humans. 
Ernst van de Wetering, ‘The Multiple Functions of Rembrandt’s Self Portraits’, p 19.  
 
93 
reemergence of classical thought.233 Another famous admirer of Montaigne was the 
Dutch poet Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, son of a burgomaster, who went as far as to 
include references to the  “divine Gascon” in his work.234  
 
 
Montaigne’s Self-discovery 
 
When Montaigne embarked on his reflections, he was searching for a 
classicist-inspired unchanged, universal core of being. Yet, when he commenced on 
this process of self-examination he recognized the inner instability of being. His 
reaction was similar to, but in a sense more extensive than Rembrandt’s, as he 
engaged with this instability by commented on, documenting and cataloguing his 
disparate thoughts, feelings, and responses. 235 Through this process, Montaigne 
increasingly moved towards a rejection of an inherent universality to being, as he came 
to acknowledge the possibility of inherent change not only in human beings, but also 
in all things.236 Following this rejection of a static universalism, he argued for a return 
to nature’s rule from a personal and an individual perspective.237 In this, he agreed 
with his philosophical predecessors by distancing himself from the excesses of 
passion.238 For Montaigne, to live right is to live within limits that are specific to each 
individual, and not by standards imposed by abstract spiritual aspirations.239 In fact, it 
is our very nature that could assist us in liberating ourselves from the, often, tyrannical 
demands of moral perfection, which usually treat our natural being with contempt and 
depreciation.240 Thus, Montaigne introduces a kind of self-reflection that is essentially 
individual, rid of dualist universal impersonality, whose purpose is to reach self-
knowledge without the restrains and delusions of passion.  
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Likewise, there are noticeable differences with Cartesian individualism too.241 
The intention behind Montaigne’s self-discovery is to identify the individual through 
his or her original particularities, and not through a scientific reading of the subject in 
its general essence. Furthermore, the Cartesian call for responsibility entails a 
construction of a personal order that is based on universal criteria found in every 
human being, and not on each person’s emergent singularity. In contrast, 
Montaignean singularity or originality is to be reached through (Cartesian) self-
understanding, but only when it is free from demands imposed by universal 
interpretations. To sum up, and as Charles Taylor puts it, where  “Descartes calls for a 
radical disengagement from ordinary experience; Montaigne requires a deeper 
engagement in our particularity.”242 In other words, where Descartes was in search of 
the universal and the divine, Montaigne was, subsequently, in search of the unique 
and the humane. Yet, all these differences should not allow the fundamental similarity 
between these two notions of modern individuality to be overlooked, that is, the 
importance that both writers attribute to self-reflexivity. 
Now, the important question here is whether Rembrandt was looking for the 
unique and the original in himself. If this is the case, then we would be forced to 
accept the autobiographical, self-analytical position that has been widely rejected by 
Muller, Schneider, and Beyer’s claims for Rembrandt’s performative enactment. 
Furthermore, if we agree with Schneider’s case for an ‘encyclopaedia of human 
feelings’, it seems that Rembrandt combines the Montaignean ‘particular’ with the 
dualist ‘universal’. This is so, because he studied his own personal facial expressions of 
feelings commonly found in everyone. To a certain extent, the creation of this 
encyclopaedia is similar to the dualist accumulation of knowledge through a process of 
objectification. In this case, Rembrandt’s facial expressions might be seen as evidence 
of a process of documentation, in order to assist in the ‘instrumental control’ of the 
pictorial representation of his future subjects. Yet, such an intention presupposes the 
classical (Aristotelian) act of idealisation, in terms of enlivening the appearance of the 
character through convincing, often constructed, representations of emotional 
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states.243 The fabrications of this tendency stand in contrast with Descartes’ emphasis 
on ‘truth’, and subsequently with the early bourgeois’ adherence to realism, a realism 
that was inspired by the Cartesian insistence on absolute truth. In other words, what 
is at play in Rembrandt’s early period is the coexistence of the conflictual ideologies of 
Aristotelianism, rooted in his pursuit of idealisation, and Cartesianism, through the 
development of the means for identifying and objectifying universal attributes in 
human beings. 
Rembrandt’s wish to master the representation of expressed emotions is not so 
much about the idealisation of the facial, material characteristics, but the 
appropriation of mood, whose purpose is to draw attention to the interior states of the 
self. As Woodall has clarified, the pictorial emphasis of charisma or inner virtue has a 
dual function: it is a declaration of the subject’s nobility, which at the same time 
sidetracks aristocracy’s hereditary, bodily identity.  For this, Rembrandt mastered the 
depiction of facial expression, chiaroscuro, and the handling of light. On the role and 
importance of chiaroscuro, Leymarie notices that it was “used hitherto for superficial 
illusionist effects” and goes as far as to poetically assert, “it was for him [Rembrandt] 
the language of the soul.”244 Commenting on The Raising of Lazarus, Muller’s reading 
of light is similar to Rosenberg’s, though, he is not making any metaphysical claims: 
“[it] fulfils the sole purpose of illustrating what the artist wishes to say”.245  
Rosenberg pays close attention to Rembrandt’s chiaroscuro and management 
of light in his analysis, as would be expected, due to his persistent dualist reading of 
Rembrandt’s work. For him, “Rembrandt used both light and shadow in a far more 
subjective fashion, not primarily to define form, but for their suggestive and evocative 
qualities.”246 Regarding the early studies, it is the controlled “organisation of lights and 
darks…[that] gives a striking emphasis to the psychological content.”247 Further on, 
the essence of this content is clarified, as Rosenberg talks of how Rembrandt preferred 
chiaroscuro for “suggesting mood and those intangible things which, for him, 
belonged to a full characterisation of man.”248 Rosenberg is the first to identify the 
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‘how’ of these suggestions, as chiaroscuro is employed to draw attention to the 
“essentials, such as facial expression and the hands.”249 These remarks refer to the late 
1630’s commissioned portraits, but similar use of light is noticed by Rosenberg in 
Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait of 1640 (Castiglione-type); the strongest light is directed on 
the face, which is almost illuminated.250 Discussing a group of genre-like portraits and 
studies of 1645-47, Rosenberg views this attention to the face through compositional 
arrangement and chiaroscuro as a focus upon, and a revelation of, “the inner life of his 
subjects.”251 Of course, such claims do not apply only to this specific group of works, 
but to his entire production. Rosenberg makes similar remarks about Rembrandt’s 
portraits of his son Titus that he painted between 1655-1660.252 His position 
crystallises in his analysis of Rembrandt’s portrait of Christ of 1661, where “the light 
is raised to the forehead, thus enhancing the loftiness and spirituality of the Saviour’s 
appearance.”253 Yet, he seems to equate emotional states, specifically melancholic 
mood, with spirituality. For example, in his discussion of Girl with a Broom, c. 1651, 
he talks of how the young girls “shadowed eyes…betray the slightly sorrowful mood 
of a child who bears the burden of heavy daily duties”.254 Similar comments are 
advanced in his review of Man with a Gilt Helmet, c. 1650.255 As we have seen, 
emphasis on the face produces a compositional dualism; the head is prioritised at the 
expense of the body, which often leads to reductions in size and format. But, at the 
same time, a fully-fledged dualist position is limited by the face’s ability to represent 
human feelings. In addition, the inability to represent an immaterial notion of the 
mind, soul or self separate from the body, or face in this case, restrains the full 
formation of the dualist position. 
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Theatricality & the Role of Costume in Rembrandt’s Middle Period 
 
If experiments of facial expression, application of chiaroscuro, and direction of 
light mark the early period, the middle period witnesses the implementation of these 
in further experiments with poses and gestures, as well as in the incorporation of 
ornamental devices and dress. The theatricality of the early self-portraits remains, but 
now it expands from the appropriation of facial expression to the performative posing 
in costumes, poses that do not reflect Rembrandt’s social status or even his country of 
origin – a Caravaggist strategy that was probably passed on to Rembrandt by 
Lastman.256 Commenting on Rembrandt’s middle-period self-portraits, Wright offers 
an interesting remark that contradicts his initial ‘analytical’ view, one that inevitably 
accepts a notion of theatricality: “…it may well be that many of these self-portraits 
were demonstrations of his abilities, displayed in order to impress prospective patrons; 
a kind of showing-off which had nothing to do with self-analysis.”257 Such a position 
would presuppose that Rembrandt was driven by the taste of prospective patrons, in as 
much he allowed his art to be adapted to their exotic or fanciful desires. However, 
recent research has shown that Rembrandt was becoming increasingly indifferent 
towards the patronage system, and instead preferred to act freely as a painter on the 
open market.258 His relationship with patrons was critical due to the unacceptable 
long hours he required for sittings of portraits, the habit of delay in finishing works, 
and the fact that occasionally paintings were returned by the client due to a lack of 
likeness of the sitter.259 Therefore, if these works were in fact advertisements of 
technical skill and of an ability to execute a variety of appearance, then, they were 
addressed to the open market’s popular taste and not directly to individual patrons’ 
stylistic preferences.  
For Volker Manuth the role of costume in Rembrandt’s self-portraits is to 
assist the painter in claiming a place among the greats of the Northern European 
school. Berger adds to this group the Renaissance greats; he claims that a sketch of 
Titian’s Portrait of a Man, c. 1512 lead to Rembrandt’s Self Portrait, 1640 (Castiglioni 
                                                
256 Seymour Slive, Frans Hals (London: Phaidon, 1970), p. 84. 
257 Wright, Rembrandt, p. 26. 
258 Alpers, ‘Freedom, Art, and Money’, in Rembrandt’s Enterprise, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1988), 
pp. 88-121. 
259 Ibid, p. 91. 
 
98 
type). Moreover, Berger claims that the link with the Renaissance epoch becomes 
further established by Rembrandt’s use of a costume that is over a hundred years out 
of date. With this self-portrait Rembrandt entered a competition with the greats, 
attempting to “overgo them and attain to their higher status”.260 Manuth challenges 
readings similar to those of Berger’s by drawing parallels between Rembrandt’s choice 
of 16th-century costume and composition, which refer to famous portraits of Albert 
Dürer and Lucas van Leyden instead.261 In this process, he challenges the influence of 
Raphael’s Portrait of Baldassare Castiglione, before 1516, and Titian’s Portrait of a 
Man, on Rembrandt’s Self Portrait, 1640 (Castiglioni type). The colour of the portrait 
clearly recalls Raphael, but the placement of the forearm - believed to be inspired by 
Titian - is now seen as closer to Dürer’s forearm, as depicted in his famous Self 
Portrait (1498). In focusing on the treatment of the right arm that lies on the ledge 
Manuth identifies stronger compositional links with Dürer, rather than with Titian, 
where the subject rests only his elbow. By bringing into the discussion an X-
radiograph of the work we realise that Rembrandt initially included his right-arm 
fingers, a detail that if it were not altered, would have brought this work even closer to 
Dürer’s.262  
In relation to Wright’s view of Rembrandt advertising his technical skills and 
abilities to patrons through portraits, Manuth is, crucially, replacing the notion of 
market with that of art-history, and by extension history itself. Such a move has more 
in common with Rembrandt’s indifference to patronage that Alpers suggests, one that 
is free from individual direct demands from patrons that dictate the outcome of a 
given work. Owners of important collections of artists’ self-portraits that declared an 
artist’s greatness by his/her inclusion, like the Uffizi in Florence, did not express 
demands when it came to new additions, as they tended to purchase already 
completed portraits, as well as commissioned ones.263 Indeed they preferred to allocate 
appropriate freedom to artists in order for them to produce their self-portraits, so that 
they could freely enter a pantheon of oumini illustri, and most importantly oumini 
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famosi. At the same time this creative freedom provided the selected artists with the 
opportunity to justify the grounds for their selection. However, Wright fails to 
consider the fact that in the same way that the market consists of individual patrons, 
historical greatness was realised through the choices of famous collectors. Of course, 
no direct stylistic demands are imposed, as in the case of commissions, yet artists have 
a sense of the desirable collectors’ tastes. 
During his middle period Rembrandt executed a few of the most challenging 
group portraits in the history of Dutch art. This type of portraiture apparently did not 
develop in any other European state of the time, which makes it a unique 
manifestation of Dutch culture.264 The rise of Calvinism, and the lack of a sovereignty 
able to generate commissions, are viewed as the reason for the emergence of these 
grand projects. According to Fuchs, the group portrait was in agreement with the 
Calvinist “…ethical point of view that it is idle to pride oneself on worldly power”, 
therefore “it is more discreet to have oneself portrayed in a private capacity, as 
member of a militia company or as governor of a charitable institution or a guild.”265 
The elaborate nature of this type posed a significant problem to painters. Every 
member of the group had to be treated with the same amount of attention, which 
forced the painter to arrange such compositions so that all characters were facing in 
the same direction. Thus, painters had to compromise, with compositions that 
involved a minimum of action. Yet, since the Wars of Independence (1580) and the 
increasing introduction of hierarchies in corporations, group portraits started to reflect 
this change leading to the prioritisation of “individual autonomy” over group “unity”. 
However, this autonomy was implemented with utmost respect for preserving a sense 
of unity in the group. In other words, the desired pictorial unity was no longer 
allowed to suppress the distinct representation of individuals.266 Even though, 
anatomy portraits differed from civic-guard and regents paintings by having a central 
motif, artists often failed to break through these static compositions.267 
The young Rembrandt resolved such restrictions in his Anatomy Lesson of Dr. 
Nicolaes Tulp, 1632, by emphasizing movement through the arrangement of subjects 
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around a diagonal axis. The portrait marked the occasion of Tulp’s second public 
anatomy lesson for the surgeons’ guild, which had at its disposal the body of Adriaan 
Adriaansz, alias ‘The Kid’, who was hanged the day of the anatomy lesson (31st of 
January) for committing a robbery.268 This work differs from previously painted 
anatomy lessons, in that all previous representations show the dead body lying parallel 
to the picture plane. Rembrandt broke within this conventional model in order to 
position the students naturally around the body, with Tulp facing them from one end 
in dignified pose. But, as Muller claims, “the concentration which can be read in the 
features of the best-observed characters has the effect of presenting a merely 
momentary expression, thereby denying us much insight into the workings of their 
minds.”269 The work’s tension and action lends it an immense sense of dramatic 
power, which is diversified by its sense of constructed theatricality, since Rembrandt is 
not depicting a realistic situation. The arm was the last thing to be dissected; anatomy 
lessons would begin by dissecting the abdomen.270 There are also numerous mistakes 
in the accurate depiction of the corpse’s arm muscles and tendons, yet we can forgive 
such errors, since such a meticulous subject requires advanced medical knowledge of 
anatomy, one that only a few artists at the time had acquired.271  
Rembrandt’s achievement in representing such a complicated and challenging 
occasion in an active mode is, therefore, unique to the time. Contrary to similar 
anatomy portraits, he escapes the trap of the static pose that evokes an impression of 
contemplation, regardless of it being related to the depicted educational event. The 
models of representation that involves motion and action are typical examples of 
classicist practice as they propose a model of active being in the world. At the same 
time, motion is easily idealised through the appropriation of gestures and the 
positioning of subjects; something that Rembrandt did not hesitate to apply. On the 
other hand, the subject of the portrait is essentially dualist, as we witness the scientific 
objectification of a dead body by a group of living people. This process of 
objectification is a lot closer to Descartes’ model of understanding nature that it might 
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seem, as the body is perceived as part of nature that acts as the host of the soul. So, 
understanding the logics and functions of a body void of a soul is just another 
examination of natural phenomena. Yet, what we are viewing is the sole examination 
of the function of hands, which apparently, were perceived to be the means by which 
inner virtues or even the soul expressed itself in the material world. But, should not a 
scientific analysis of the mechanics of the body reject metaphysical explanations?    
The answer to this question lies in the function or purpose of anatomy in the 
16th- and 17th-century Netherlands, and on the focus of Dr. Tulp’s anatomy in 
Rembrandt’s painting. In the early 16th century the Hellenic proverb γνῶθι σεαυτὀν 
(know thyself) came to rationalise the practice of anatomy. As we have seen in the 
introduction, this notion of self-reflexivity is what underlines dualist conceptions of 
self-mastery. By knowing one’s self one can discern the sources of one’s passions, 
master them and clear the path for truth in order to find one’s role in the cosmic order 
(Plato) or find God (Christianity/Cartesianism), and thus, achieve self-mastery. 
Descartes was a huge supporter of anatomical studies, as he frequently attended such 
events between 1629-30 while in Amsterdam, and defended the practice in his 
correspondence.272 The Delphic maxim had two interpretations at this time: cognitio 
Sui, and, cognitio Dei. The former is an extension of its ancient, but non-Platonic 
origins, where anatomy serves the purpose of understanding, thus, emphasising the 
mortality of man. The latter is derivative of the former, as it implies that by ‘knowing 
thyself’ we gain knowledge of God’s providence, by revealing His presence in the 
human body, thus, proving His existence through a study of his masterful creation, 
which is made in His image.273  
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Cognitio Dei / Cognitio Sui 
 
One of of Tulp’s influences was his teacher Pieter Paaw (1564-1617), who 
practiced anatomies in Leiden between 1589 and 1617.274 For Paaw, ‘know thyself’ 
meant to explore the ephemerality of man through a comprehension of his bodily 
functions. Of course Paaw was not the only one with such views, and medical or 
anatomy portraits illustrated this position with the addition of a skeleton or a skull 
being studied, reminding us of the inevitable, which is usually pointed at by the 
praelector.275 Fine examples of what William Schupbach calls ‘pessimistic 
iconography’ of the proverb, are Thomas de Keyser’s Anatomy of Dr. Sebastiaen 
Egbertsz de Vrij, 1617, and Nicolaes Eliasz’s (Pickenoy) Anatomy of Dr. Johan Fonteyn, 
1625, where the subjects gather around a skeleton in the former, and a skull in the 
latter, which is pointed at by the praelector. On the side of the Christian 
understanding of the proverb lies another major influence on Tulp, Andreas 
Laurentius (1558-1609), who was initially a professor of anatomy in Montpellier in 
1586 and then became Henri the IV and Marie de Mèdicis’ physician. His books on 
anatomy and medicine were received with great respect and were republished until 
1778.276 Laurentius supported the view that we reach Cognitio Dei through Cognitio 
Sui. Under this light, man is viewed as a ‘microcosm’, and by far the most perfect 
animal. The praelector’s duty was to reveal the complexity and miraculous co-
operation of human body organs as well as specific anatomical properties, created in 
God’s image, which raise humans above animals and prove God’s divine wisdom and 
creativity. Pictorial examples of this ‘optimistic view’ are Michiel and Pieter van 
Miereveld’s Anatomy of Dr. Willem van der Meer, 1617, Adriaen Backer’s Anatomy 
Lesson of Professor Frederik Ruysch, 1670, and Johan van Neck’s Anatomy Lesson of 
Professor Frederik Ruysch, 1683, where instead of a skull or a skeleton the object under 
study is a human corpse and the surgeons are viewed while in action, with no of 
pointing gestures. 
Of all the body parts, the hands were perceived as the most important, given 
that through prehension they were seen as an extension of reason or psyche. This is 
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precisely the reason for the reordering of the anatomy’s procedure. As we have seen, 
Aristotle, after Anaxagoras, praised the hands for this specific faculty,277 and Galen 
followed this by specifically admiring the mechanical excellence of the flexor-tendons 
and muscles’ intersection.278 Yet, Schupbach fails to notice that Galen, and doctors 
generally of his time, perceived this design as Nature’s; it was only in the 16th century 
that Christian doctrines claimed nature’s work as God’s.279 In this tradition, 16th 
century anatomists like Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), Julius Casserius (1552? - 
1616) and Laurentius, all influenced by Galen’s views, resorted to the human hand – 
and specifically to its finger flexor-tendons and muscles – to demonstrate, in 
Schupbach’s words, “God’s manifestation in the human body”.280 Rembrandt perhaps 
also refers to a plate in Julius Casserius’ two anatomical volumes, and to a woodcut 
portrait of Andreas Vesalius, which was included in his Fabrica and other books.281  
As in Tulp’s portrait, these images depict the muscle flexor digitorum superficialis as it 
is pulled or lifted away from the muscle flexor digitorum profundus. However, only 
Tulp recreates the function of these flexor-muscles with his left arm by a gesture that 
can be mistakenly perceived as a common teaching one. 
According to Schupbach, Rembrandt’s Anatomy of Dr. Tulp incorporates a 
“paradox”.282 The figure on the top of the external compositional pyramid is the 
surgeon Frans van Loenen. Schupbach claims that van Loenen’s pointing gesture at 
the corpse demonstrates the Cognitio Sui in a manner similar to the surgeons in de 
Keyser and Pickenoy’s group portraits. Tulp’s left hand gesture, by which he recreates 
the function of the mechanism of the flexor-muscles and tendons in the hand by 
differentiating the two flexor-muscles of the fingers with his right hand, demonstrates 
the Cognitio Dei.283 It is precisely the teleological implication of this anatomy lesson, 
which affects the expression of Tulp’s face and attracts the absorbed attention from 
his fellow participating surgeons. Apparently, van Loenen was originally portrayed 
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with a hat on that was painted out eventually,284 resembling and sharing the 
compositional importance of Tulp, yet not in perfect harmony as Tulp is clearly the 
centre of attention. In addition, Schupbach’s claim about van Loenen’s Cognitio Sui 
position is not as solid, given that he is pointing at a corpse and not a skeleton or a 
skull, as fellow surgeons did in similar paintings in support of this doctrine. Yet, when 
seen in relation to Tulp’s emphasised gesture and anatomical focus, there is a certain 
contradiction. This lack of balance between these two figures is what forces 
Schupbach to admit that overall Rembrandt’s group portrait tends to reside within the 
Cognitio Dei. However, the juxtaposition of the two opposing doctrines transforms 
the subject of the painting from a presentation of the two positions to an “antinomical 
paradox of their co-existence”.285  
So, what is observable here in Rembrandt’s group portrait is the conflicted co-
existence of the dualist and non-dualist conception of human nature, with 
predominance toward the dualist position. And, where we would normally expect a 
scientific understanding of the body’s mechanics to negate any metaphysical claims 
concerning its creation or being, instead, God is praised for his wisdom and 
providence through his ability to create something so complicated yet divinely perfect. 
Still, it remains unclear whether Rembrandt painted out van Loenen’s hat (or whether 
another artist was advised to do so). Such a question is of crucial importance, as this 
alteration changed van Loenen’s position from that of a praelector, like Tulp, to that 
of a fellow surgeon, like the rest of the participants, thus tilting the balance towards 
Cognitio Dei. In addition, once again we are faced with yet another conflictual co-
existence of dualist and non-dualist ideological positions in Rembrandt’s practice, one 
that lies between the subject and its compositional appropriation and treatment.  The 
movement in the composition carries classicist characteristics, but the subject of the 
re-touched painting depicts a scientific method for revealing metaphysical properties 
in man. The Leiden portraits’ conflict between Aristotelian intention and dualist 
means is inverted in this group portrait into a demonstration of dualist intention 
through Aristotelian means.  
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Theatricality & Performativity in Rembrandt’s Studio 
 
Of all the portrait-types, the group portrait posed the biggest threat to 
Rembrandt’s performativity, as the finished product was restricted by the need for 
Rembrandt to meet the portrait’s numerous subjects’ demands. Single or double 
portraits, and, of course, self-portraits, were ideal for applying a notion of 
performative theatricality. But as Alpers has remarked, theatrical gestures, poses and 
dressing-up are not ‘false’, in the sense of being activities that were never performed 
by Rembrandt in real life, but were acted out, either by Rembrandt or by 
“consummate actors” in studio environment.286 Alpers also notices, that this studio 
practice is without precedent, and that it could well be Rembrandt’s own invention.287 
Counter to Alpers, de Winkel claims that it would be impossible for the dresses in 
Rembrandt’s self-portraits to survive intact or to still be available in Amsterdam a 
century after they were originally created.288 Instead, she supports the idea that 
Rembrandt studied their appearance from his huge collection of art-prints and 
drawings. Originally Rembrandt turned to prints for the production of his history 
paintings, and eventually he incorporated aspects of them in his self-portraits. Yet, 
when it came to his self-portraits de Winkel seems to agree with Manuth that it was 
not so much a case of emulation of previous masters, but an attempt to claim a 
position in the on-going tradition of Northern European painters through a reference 
to poses, gestures, and costume of famous self-portraits.289 Neither Alpers nor de 
Winkel’s positions can be excluded absolutely, just as neither of them can qualify 
unreservedly as a universal definition of Rembrandt’s practice as a whole. However, 
whether imaginative, copied, or acted-out a notion of theatricality remains active. 
For proving that this acted-out theatrical model of practice expanded beyond 
his self-portraits and into paintings, and portraits of others Alpers refers to the Jewish 
Bride, c. 1665-67. The subjects of this painting have been “made to perform”, and 
they are certainly treated as models, as “they leave behind, outside the studio, their 
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social position and are transformed”.290 As a result the final work has absolutely no 
characteristics as a portrait, apart from the inclusion of figures. The subject of the 
painting and the appropriation of the sitters’ appearance have, in fact, a lot more in 
common with history painting. In another instance, that of the portrait of Jacob Trip, 
c. 1661, the sitter’s Arabian or oriental attire differs from the actual ones of the time, 
as represented in a portrait of Jacob Trip by Nicolaes Maes, c. 1660.291 
This model of practice is extended to a series of biblical drawings that 
apparently were not intended to be preparatory for his paintings, but for the needs of 
his teaching.292 Often, in these drawings a biblical narrative is repeated with slight 
alterations, which forces them to be seen as documentations of a series of performed 
scenes. Therefore, quite a few of Rembrandt’s narrative drawings are viewed by Alpers 
as “…much as rehearsals of enacted scenes as they are meditations on particular 
stories”.293 Furthermore, there are occasional comments inscribed on similar drawings, 
addressed either to a student or to himself, which could be easily perceived as 
instructions or directions addressed to actors regarding the performance of a scene.294 
There are also occasions where, in the words of Alpers, “Rembrandt effects a 
compositional change by proposing that we view the same group of actors, with slight 
alterations in their gestures, from another position: to compose is to replay an enacted 
scene.”295 Of course, drawing or painting after models was a popular practice, but as 
Alpers identifies, in comparison to Raphael’s practice, Rembrandt’s pictorial 
organisation was influenced by his observation and accumulation of the details of his 
models’ poses and “attitudes”, instead of appropriating their appearance according to 
pregiven compositional arrangements.296 To finalise her point, Alpers compares the 
role that Saskia, Rembrandt’s wife, is adopting in the numerous paintings that she 
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posed for, to that of Victorine Meurend, Manet’s model for Olympia and Victorine in 
the Costume of an Espada, concluding that for these two artists “…to serve as a model 
is to perform.”297  
Alpers is dismissive of art historical criticism of theatricality on the basis of a 
distinction between falsehood and truth, because it is derived from the position of the 
observer. Instead, she proposes an approach based on that of the artist as performer, 
whose interest lies in acting, and where the level of success is defined according to the 
adoption of roles and characters.298 However, taking ‘truth’, and subsequently 
‘likeness’, into account in an analysis of dualism is inevitable, since these are notions 
that are vital to such a philosophical position. Even if we were to adhere to Alpers’ 
view, a dualist reading of these works is problematic as they stand some distance away 
from Descartes’ sought-after-realism. On the other hand, one could argue that the 
subjects of the study drawings are of a religious nature, which falls into line with the 
dualist conceptual process of proving the existence of God. In addition, the 
compositional focus of the early and middle periods’ self-and-other-portraits is the 
head, which could be seen as an early manifestation of dualism. Yet, the cropping of 
the human figure and the attention given to the face during the early period is driven 
by a desire to master the representation of emotions. Moreover the experiments of the 
middle-period are inspired, undoubtedly, by classicist models of practice, insofar as 
the appropriation of poses and gestures is meant to compliment physiognomic 
appropriation of facial characteristics.  Finally, Rembrandt’s fabrication of or lack of 
‘truth’, in terms of likeness, appearance and social status with the use of costumes is 
not just contrary to the emerging Dutch middle class’ ideals, but also sets the ground 
for the subsequent allegorical trend that was to follow. Yet again, Rembrandt’s 
practice is infused with conflictual ideologies, mapped out by the dualist 
compositional cropping of the figure, and the Aristotelian notion of theatricality and 
idealised fabrication of truth. 
 Such a notion of theatricality presupposes that Rembrandt was keen on 
working from live models, and not on copying from great art of the past. Alpers 
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identifies that Rembrandt encouraged his students and assistants to learn how to draw 
by either working from live models or by copying aspects of his art, instead of 
following the accepted teaching practice of the time.299 This practice involved a 
gradual development of skills that were acquired by initially drawing from prints, then 
from masters’ drawings, and finally from paintings. Eventually, the student graduated 
by working from casts of statues and finally from live models.300 Despite his 
significant collection of prints and other works, Rembrandt insisted on a teaching 
practice that would allow students to copy from his own art instead, presenting 
himself in this way as the great master. He then disregarded the copying from casts or 
statues only to substitute this with copying from his drawings of biblical narratives.301 
This does not exclude the fact that he worked from live models in his studio; he 
simply worked straight onto the canvas itself. But why did Rembrandt consistently 
avoided working from the art of the past and discouraged his students from doing so? 
Alpers claims that this denial was a demonstration of his desire to be ranked among 
the greats, by “resist[ing]…the authority of tradition” 302, in order to create his own. In 
other words, if he were to incorporate all the key characteristics of Lastman, his early 
teacher, or any other great artist of his time or before, he would have been consumed by 
tradition.   
The road to Rembrandt’s individual recognition seems to have been paved 
with dualist inspiration; the method, though, is far from unambiguous here. Adding 
to Rembrandt’s insistence on working from live models Rosenberg talks of how the 
great master’s principle was to accept “nature as the only guide.” 303 To support his 
argument, Rosenberg quotes Rembrandt’s contemporary Joachim von Sandrart’s 
complaint that Rembrandt “rejected art theories, such as anatomy and proportions of 
the human body, perspective and the usefulness of classical statues, Raphael’s 
drawings and judicious pictorial disposition, and the academies which are so essential 
to our professions”, while remaining critical of Rembrandt’s claims that one should be 
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“…guided only by nature and by no other rules.”304 Such models and pictorial devices 
are based on a mathematical analysis that is inspired by Descartes’ methodology; 
hence, their rejection could be perceived as anti-dualist. In addition, Rembrandt’s 
prioritisation of nature was purposefully diminished by the Christian and dualist 
hierarchical prioritisation of the spiritual, as foreign to the natural but familial with 
the divine. Rules are products of human study of nature in order to produce criteria 
for satisfying the need to control it, or in this case represent it. In this respect, it is 
problematic to copy from neo-classical statues because they are the products of human 
mediation of nature. To copy from them is to accept that our study and translation of 
nature is superior to the original, an assertion of a superior-to-nature human activity. 
Rembrandt refused to work from, or apply the results of Cartesian-inspired 
objectification in his own painting, by refusing to work from examples of the human 
re-creation of nature. Thus, he set out to imitate nature straight from nature, not 
from existing reproductions, and certainly not through man-made artificial methods. 
Rembrandt’s teaching methods were not the only controversial practice of his 
studio. Alpers refers extensively to the recent de-attribution of a large number of 
Rembrandt’s paintings (almost two thirds of the original estimate, 600 out of 1,000) 
that were produced by either his students or by assistants that practiced in his 
studio.305 The confusion of the false attribution is rooted in the fact that these 
paintings carried Rembrandt’s signature; he encouraged his assistants to pass these 
works off as being his own.306 As Alpers identifies, there are serious questions about 
identity and the self that arise from this process of de-attribution, since 19th-century 
scholars mistakenly treated Rembrandt as the model for a highly introvert and 
individualistic artistic practice.307  
Since the Renaissance it was common for an artist to run his studio as a 
workshop by employing assistants in order to meet professional demands; as such, 
artists’ specific involvement in the production of their work was variable. Leonardo 
and Michelangelo employed assistants for preparatory duties but they were not 
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involved in the actual painting or sculptural process. Raphael and Rubens on the other 
hand were famous for running workshops with big teams under their command. In 
fact, Rubens had developed a highly organised commercial enterprise with assistants 
specialising in a variety of skills – from landscapes and animals to figures – that 
carried out most of the work, with Rubens occasionally adding some final touches. 
Unlike Rembrandt, Rubens clearly distinguished the paintings produced from his own 
hands, as he did not sign the ones that were produced in his workshop; he only signed 
five out of thousands.308 Similarly, the Dutch masters would either sign and trade 
collaborative works as products of their studio or allow their assistants to sell works 
that they had produced on their own. Rembrandt, however, seems to have taken 
advantage of the commercial opportunity presented by guild regulations, which 
allowed masters to sell collaborative works as products of their studios,309 since the 
majority of the de-attributed works were far from collaborations. 
 
 
Cartesianism and Rembrandt’s Authorship 
 
The de-attribution of a large percentage of Rembrandt’s work is in conflict 
with Descartes notion of the ‘subject’ (or soul) as the sole source of knowledge. 
Rembrandt seems indifferent to who created works in his name; therefore, his 
rejection of distinctively individual authorship is, in a way, a rejection of the ‘subject’ 
as producer. The issue becomes even more complicated by the fact that Rembrandt 
encouraged participants in his studio to actually replicate his self-portraits.310 And, as 
Alpers asks, does the replicated painting remain a self-portrait, or does it become a 
portrait by another hand? What this practice certainly does is to question dualist 
notions of the self as unique and original, as it diffuses the act of self-contemplation 
by blurring the distinction between whom does the contemplation and who is 
presenting the results this reflection, or even better, who is re-presenting it. 
There is one work that is a product of collaboration between Rembrandt and 
an anonymous assistant, which at the same time seems to be as constructed as Van de 
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Voort’s portrait of Laurens Reael. This painting, The Equestrian Portrait of Frederick 
Rihel, executed in 1663, was also one of the first disputed paintings in Rembrandt’s 
practice.311 A sense of collaboration in this work is evoked by certain inconsistencies 
and clashing features. For instance, the rider, particularly the top half of the figure, is 
treated with considerably more care than the horse. Rihel’s face and upper body are 
painted with thick pigment, yet they are smoothly executed. The rendering of the 
horse, on the other hand, is bold with long wide brushstrokes. Finally, when looking 
at the picture as a whole we notice the poor balance in chiaroscuro, which is 
unexpected given that Rembrandt was clearly good at it.  
The question of authorship is not the only issue at stake here, but also the 
identity and social position of Rembrandt’s subject in this painting. Frederick Rihel 
was a businessman from Strasbourg who moved to Amsterdam in 1643.312 While in 
the Netherlands he specialised in banking and trade, often of arms, on an 
international scale, as he lent money from the court of Hague to the state of Sweden. 
When in 1660 the Prince William of Orange visited Amsterdam, Rihel was the leader 
of one of the three cavalry groups that formed the Prince’s guard of honour. The 1663 
portrait was a commission commemorating his participation in this occasion. The 
style of the portrait, which is clearly in line with aristocratic equestrian types, stands 
far from representing Rihel’s actual social status, that is, of a merchant. In 1662 Rihel 
actually bought the title of ‘Poorterrecht’, which is the right to be recognised as a 
burgher, though it was not necessary for a businessman. Yet, he never stopped 
aspiring to aristocratic values and social status with which he familiarised himself 
through his business contacts with the courts. Bearing all this in mind, the intentions 
behind Rihel’s commission are identical with Reael’s, since they both represent their 
ambitions and aspirations by imitating an admired style. However, this time the 
notion of theatricality or of putting on fictive appearances is not imposed by 
Rembrandt, as was customary in his practice, but dictated by the commissioner.  
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In spite of the vast production of self-portraits, the first time Rembrandt 
painted himself at work or as a painter was in 1660.313 Contrary to the common desire 
of artists at the time to depict themselves in formal dress (even during the act of 
painting), Rembrandt appears in these late self-portraits in working clothes. De 
Winkel stresses that apart from being a sign of humility, his true representation of 
working attire denotes respect for the art of painting, and expresses a rejection of the 
re-emergence of Classicism.314 Here too, the face seems to attract most of the 
rendering attention, while the half-length format of the portrait further ignores the 
figure as a whole. In addition, his painting palette, brushes, maulstick, and even his 
left hand that is holding these instruments are vaguely suggested. Alpers argues that 
Rembrandt treated his left hand with such abstraction that it appears as if it has 
become one with his painting instruments, thus, reminding us of Aristotle’s concept 
of the hand315 as that which is able to adapt and transform itself into multiple organs 
or instruments.316 In fact, we can assume that Rembrandt is depicting himself at work, 
as there is no evidence of a canvas and of his right hand, the hand that he painted 
with, which is hidden. Conversely, in this self-portrait Rembrandt is asserting his 
social role as painter and not as a ‘gentleman’ or an ‘intellectual’, which was common 
in artists’ self-portraits of the time.317 He does so, in a similar manner to the Dutch 
burghers’ prevailing dualist representational tendency of the first half of the 17th 
century. That is, one should present one’s self in an interior setting, as a reference to 
introversion (with identifiable references to one’s profession), but at the same time 
one should not get caught in performing aspects of it, since any movement or action 
would deny the work as an act of self-contemplation.  
In the other two paintings in which Rembrandt presents himself as a painter, 
he portrays himself at work.318 In the Louvre portrait his left hand holding his 
painting utensils is still abstractly rendered, but this time his right hand is shown, 
holding a maulstick, and there is also an indication of an easel. Of course, the head 
remains the main focal point, but these modifications are small steps towards the 
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incorporation of action in the painting, however relaxed Rembrandt might look. In 
addition, where as in the Kenwood portrait he is shown in full frontal position – 
facing the viewer – in the Louvre portrait he turns his head towards us as his body is 
now shown from the side, facing the canvas on the easel on the right side of the 
painting. In his last self-portrait, the one that is commonly referred to as Self-Portrait 
as Zeuxis, 1669, Rembrandt is finally completing the circle of these three works, by 
actually depicting himself immersed in the act of painting. 
Here, there is no idealisation at play since signs of age are evident from the 
wrinkled face and the hunched pose; despite his now limited strength he still remains 
active as an artist. His pose is similar to the Louvre portrait, only reversed with his left 
side of the body placed at the front plane. Even though his hands are cropped, his 
maulstick is resting on, or pointing at, the painting – a gesture that qualifies as a final 
step towards the depiction of his active engagement with the painting on view. 
Rembrandt’s laughing expression and the indication of the male figure on the 
painting he is working on, have resulted in two main explanations. The first one sees 
Rembrandt as taking the role of the ‘laughing’ philosopher Democritus, known for his 
cheerful mood, painting an image of the ‘weeping’ Heraclitus, known for his 
unpleasant mood.319 The second view is based on an anecdote about the painter 
Zeuxis, who is said to have choked on his laughter while painting the likeness of a 
wrinkled old woman.320 To support that this is the most convincing view of the two, 
Beyer claims that this story was popular in Rembrandt’s studio, and was in fact taken 
up by his student Arent de Gelder in the mid-1680s. 
Both of these explanations re-introduce the notion of theatricality, and by 
extension idealisation, as they imply that he was taking up either a known 
philosopher’s or a great painter’s role, at a point where it appeared he was moving 
closer to a realistic representation of his appearance and social role. In addition, the 
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reference to Zeuxis, who stands as the model for a practice of idealisation321, is 
somewhat contradictory in relation to the level of verisimilitude invested in the 
treatment of Rembrandt’s facial features. Muller and Schneider propose more realist 
readings of the work. Muller asks whether Rembrandt is “laughing at a society whose 
preoccupations seemed to him to be ridiculous, or at life, which had buffeted him so 
much without ever succeeding in overthrowing him?”322 And Schneider claims that 
Rembrandt is not laughing at anybody, not even at himself as he is “too exhausted 
even to defy his own frailty”, but instead “it is an expression of the stoic equanimity 
with which he resigned himself to approaching death.”323  But what if in his last self-
portrait, Rembrandt finally depicts himself with honesty? Honesty in terms of 
appearance of facial features and bodily posture, as well as in presenting himself 
engaged in the activity that he loved the most, the one that defined him and shaped 
the course of his life. What if he is, as Alpers suggests in the opening quote, defining 
himself in the act of painting? Then, if this were so, Rembrandt would equate his 
being with activity, or even better, with active-being in the world.  
 
 
*  *  * 
 
 
The practice of self-representation in the Netherlands during the first half of 
the 17th century was mainly guided by contemporary dualist tendencies of self-rule, 
self-contemplation, and verisimilitude, not just as codes of behaviour, but also as 
models of representation. The great artistic and social centres of the time generated 
different responses to these aspects: the surviving classicism of Haarlem; Utrecht’s 
Caravaggisti’s introvert Cartesian tendencies; and Amsterdam’s playful combination 
of the two. If Cartesianism was intellectually prominent, the uneasiness of Cartesian 
academics to fully endorse Cartesian metaphysics produced a compromised co-
existence of both dualist and classicist elements in portraiture. As Woodall has 
                                                
321 Zeuxis is known for being able to outdo reality through idealising it. Beyer describes the occasion of 
painting the portrait of Helen of Troy, where he chose the best features of five beautiful female models 
in order to paint an ideal portrait. Beyer, Portraits, p. 222.    
322 Muller, Rembrandt, p. 245. 
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identified the Cartesian issue of truth, was sidetracked by pictorial modifications and 
alterations that served as a visualisation of the sitters’ social interests and ambitions. 
But portraiture’s general social function in this period is now separated from the 
exemplary virtues of the classicist tradition, in favour of the individualist promotional 
values – either for personal or class reasons – under the guise of universal humanist 
ideals. Portraiture is now employed in order to support claims of immortality, not for 
exemplifying the already immortal.  
And this is why Rembrandt’s practice stands out from this emergent 
promotional burgher mentality. His notion of theatricality, forced his self-portraits to 
remove themselves as far as possible from the true representation of his social status. 
His attention to, if not obsession with, the face was not inspired by a desire to 
emphasise a spiritual aspect of being, but instead was informed by his enthusiasm for 
a studio-based performativity. The means by which he chose to successfully 
incorporate it in his art appears to reflect Aristotle’s call for the convincing re-
presentation of a character by imitating and emphasising his or her emotional states 
through facial expression and gestural appropriation.324 As for his portraits of others, 
he applied his constructive method of performativity (a notion that is bound with 
action and movement) as far as he was allowed by the demands of his commissioners 
or sitters.  
In this respect Rembrandt allows for conflictual ideologies to manifest 
themselves in his practice, favouring one or the other according to his artistic needs. 
For instance, his conscious distancing from the depiction of actual situations, and his 
strong belief in working straight from nature clearly represents an anti-dualist position 
that is reinforced by his attack on authorship and his encouragement of assistants in 
his studio to pass themselves off as him. However, there are formal aspects of his 
practice that prepared the ground for the subsequent re-formation of a dualist model 
of self-representation. His proto-impressionist brushstrokes, the focal attention to the 
head through the employment of chiaroscuro and the careful application of light, as 
well as the cropping of the figure in half, or three quarter formats, affirm the face and 
the head as the locus of human spirituality.  Such readings assert Rembrandt as an 
artist who accepts the expression of feelings as a justification of the existence of soul. 
                                                
324 See Chapter 1, pp. 47-49. 
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This reading needs to be counterbalanced with the classicist element of gestural 
performativity and theatrical appropriation. To ignore these tensions, therefore, is to 
make the same mistake as 19th-century romanticist scholars, who promoted 
Rembrandt as the exemplary model of an artist who successfully incorporated notions 
of individuality and introverted contemplation.  
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Picasso’s Solution: 
The Crisis of the Honorific & the Clash of Subjectivities 
  
 
 
 
 
There is no abstract art. 
You must always start with something. 
Afterward you can remove all traces of reality.325 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The avant-garde rhetoric of boundless formalist experimentation seemed to be 
threatened by mimetic demands deriving from the viewing expectations of portraiture.  
Yet, those who were brave enough to approach this delicate, and at the time 
controversial, genre from an experimental perspective manage to reposition 
portraiture within the avant-garde as the means by which breakthroughs can be 
achieved and not be subject to restraint. One of these artists was Picasso, whose main 
stylistic innovations were the outcome of his constant desire to reconfigure the 
representation of the body. Unlike to most modernist painters, Picasso produced more 
portraits than unidentified figurative works, yet, barely any self-portraits. In spite of 
the numerous theoretical accounts of his practice, and his portraits in particular, there 
have been hardly any approaches that seek to analyse classicist or dualist notions of 
the self in relation to his work.  
This chapter will look at the demise of the naturalistic painted portrait at the 
end of the 19th century  (Courbet, Manet) and the rise of modernism (Cézanne, 
                                                
325 Pablo Picasso, ‘Conversation with Picasso’, originally published in Cahiers d’Art, X, 7-10, Paris, 
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Cubism) in relation to an increasing demand for an expressive art of subjective 
interiority and the re-emergence of notions of Cartesian individualism. Cubism's 
challenge to the belief that visual resemblance is necessary to the representation of 
self-identity is seen as the key point of transformation in this process of 
denaturalisation and ‘dehumanisation’ of the portrait. In doing so, particular attention 
will be paid to Picasso’s Cubist portraits of his art dealers, Clovis Sagot, Ambroise 
Vollard, Wilhelm Uhde, and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler in order to question the 
conflictual co-existence in Picasso, between his commitment to abstract the figure 
and, conversely, his desire to satisfy the viewing expectations derived from a visual 
recognition of the portrayed subject. The results of this proposed analysis will then 
assist us in understanding the intentions behind Picasso’s stylistic u-turn to 
Neoclassicism that immediately followed Cubism. Analyzing Picasso’s relationship 
with his Cubist and post-Cubist subjects will provide insight into the stylistic choice 
Picasso makes with regard to each work, in turn, allowing their contextualisation 
according to classicist and dualist positions. In other words, this chapter will argue 
that Picasso’s creative choices and subsequent outcomes during the execution of these 
relatively abstract Cubist portraits played a large part in his decision to resort to a 
purely illusionist form of art, especially in the implementation of portraits. What 
exactly did Picasso realise about the nature of the portrait genre from executing these 
portraits, and how important was its role in forcing him to compromise his Cubist 
advancements for the neo-classicism of the following portraits?   
To answer these questions, these works will be analysed in the context of early 
and contemporary theorisations of Cubism – ranging from painters such as Olga 
Rozanova and Fernand Léger, to Cubist painters Jean Metzinger and Albert Gleizes, 
and from theorists such as Guillaume Apollinaire and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler to 
William Rubin, Yves-Alain Bois, Rosalind Krauss, and Michael Fitzgerald, among 
many – which will then be compared with Picasso and Braque’s expressed positions 
regarding Cubism, and their reactions against critical writings about their invented 
style. Whereas contemporaneous writings on Cubism tended to adopt dualist 
perspectives and terminology alike, recent accounts regard the style as mostly 
concerned with the objective materiality of human nature. For instance, Guillaume 
Apollinaire attributes the rejection of the realist treatment of external appearances in 
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Cubism to an emphasis on “the grandeur of metaphysical forms”.326 Moreover, 
Apollinaire views a notion of “inner” or “essential reality” to be the driving force 
behind Cubism.327 More recently, John Berger regards the organisational 
fragmentation of the figure in Cubist paintings as a “reaction against excessive talk of 
the spiritual and soulful”.328 Likewise, Yves-Alain Bois argues that the “expressionist 
deformation of the mask [in Cubism] functions as a sign of a refusal of psychological 
depth”, which implies that Picasso was uninterested in addressing his sitters’ human 
subjectivity at this stage of his career.329 Yet, and as we will see, in their effort to argue 
one position or the other none of the accounts produces a bulletproof argument.   
The emergence of modernism is generally attributed to a capital-driven 
industrialisation of society. As such, according to Charles Taylor, what we witness at 
the dawn of modern industrial change is a renewed and expanded interest in 
‘interiorisation’ and ‘inwardness’; an inward movement aimed at redefining one’s 
identity in relation to the new social and cultural frameworks.330 Despite its emphasis 
on subjectivity, Taylor’s modern self is far from Descartes’, given its ability to adapt to 
external conditions, and therefore negate monadic and immutable states.331 For 
Taylor, the rise of the market and modern political economy are also signified by the 
simultaneous devaluation of aristocratic military and honorific ethics. By extension, 
the mid 19th century emergence of analyses of the role and impact of economics in 
everyday life (e.g. Marx’s Capital) suggests, above all, a focus on ordinary modes of 
human existence; an existence now characterised by ‘individualisation’ and 
‘internalisation’.332  
Plato’s notion of self-mastery – understanding our selves in relation to the 
world as rational beings – is held no longer to be valid due to the new importance 
                                                
326 Guillaume Apollinaire, ‘The New Painting: Art Notes’, originally published in Les Soirée de Paris, 
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accorded to our own personal world, which may exist within collective norms but 
functions independently from universal rules. Nature is no longer “seen as the order 
that defines our rationality”, since Plato’s mode of reason set in ontic logos has been 
replaced by disengaged reason. Thus, modern human nature is defined by “our own 
inner impulses” and not by “a substantive rational ordering of purposes”.  Nature’s 
modern role in the construction of the self is to force us to understand and encourage 
us to react against an imposing, ruling reason, which is now perceived also as a 
subjective and socially active power.333 Yet, traces of Platonic ontic logos are located in 
our desire to position ourselves within a whole, despite the fact that the humane 
whole is now more important than the universal, or natural. For Taylor, the 
depreciated role of nature in the formation of the self emphasises the predominance of 
Descartes’ ‘inwardness’ and Locke’s ‘individuality’ in modern times. Descartes’ 
contribution to the analysis of modern life is touched on in his advocacy of the self’s 
disengagement from everyday life in order to contemplate lived experiences. However, 
the occasional redefinition of our identities through the particularities of emerging 
social circumstances is far from Descartes’ notion of the ‘inner divine’ source of truth, 
and immutable self. 
 
 
Modernity & Individuality 
 
Individuality lies at the core of modernist art practices, the celebration of 
which influenced formalist abstraction through a search for a unique style that would 
justify the existence of a distinctive personality through the appraisal of its products. 
Yet, abstraction was not purely driven by vain self-indulgent explorations of 
expression, but was shaped by the experimental ‘research programmes’ of modernism 
and the avant-garde. Such experimentation relied on a deep longing for artistic 
expressive freedom. The early years of modernism are laden with artistic examples of 
this challenge to the past and tradition. In terms of portraiture, one has only to think 
of Manet’s Olympia, 1863. Intended as a critical deflation of salon taste through its 
ironic appropriation of the classicist format of the reclining nude, Olympia was heavily 
                                                
333 Ibid, p. 301. 
 
121 
criticised by Salon critics on the grounds of the work’s lack of an exemplary function 
(the fact that its nudity did not transcend social class, but signified it). The 
Impressionists’ distancing from conventional naturalism marked the beginning of the 
rejection of the illusionist tradition in painting that Manet adumbrates. Arthur C. 
Danto views this aesthetic change as “the history of traditional painting put into 
reverse”, whereby artists were looking to non-Western art for the purpose of finding 
alternative ways to address the spiritual.334 Hence, Gauguin resorted to Asian models 
in order to reconstitute aesthetic criteria and standards through a staged primitivism; 
Van Gogh turned to Japanese models, despite his early training in Dutch realism, 
aiming for the production of poetically expressive results that drew on the non-
conventional employment of form and colour, albeit based on traditional 
compositional models; Picasso also rediscovered his roots through non-Western 
forms, such as African art, and Braque sought inspiration from Egyptian types of 
representation.335 
There is a significant difference between pre-modernist and modernist studio 
practices and modes of production. In the pre-modernist studio the artist was the 
head of a creative workshop, employing various assistants and training numerous 
apprentices. The obvious metaphor of the master artist as the head of a creative ‘body’ 
(of assistants) controlling and instructing the members of his workshop or ‘body parts’ 
accordingly does not negate the fact that the head artist is not the sole producer and 
often not the true one (see Rembrandt), in spite of the fact that he retains all 
authorship of the work. Conversely, in modernist times the artist takes pride in being 
the sole producer of an artwork from start to finish. It is as if the amateur apprentice – 
that could have been at the service of a master artist – inverts his struggle to achieve 
verisimilitude in order to critique academic realist standards through a practice of 
failure (in terms of realist representation).  
 
 
                                                
334 Arthur Danto, The Madonna of the Future: Essays in a Pluralistic Art World (Berkley, Los Angeles, 
London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 194-201. 
335 See Norbert Lynton, ‘Portraits From a Pluralist Century’, in Robin Gibson (ed.), Painting the 
Century: 101 Portrait Masterpieces 1900-2000 (London: National Portrait Gallery, 2000), pp. 10-12. 
 
122 
Modernism and the Critique of Resemblance: Expressiveness, ‘Transcendentalism’, and 
Automatism   
 
Commissioned portraiture posed a huge threat to artistic freedom, stemming 
from the demands of the sitter, or commissioner of the work, which up to early 
modernism were still bound to a certain extent to a model of classicist realism. In this 
respect, the prevailing demand of naturalism in portraiture held back the very idea of 
modernist portraiture. Writing on pre-modern portraiture Harry Berger Jr. labels this 
form of practice “mimetic idealism”, based on the fact that “it privileges both the 
increased naturalism or realism…and the idealisation demanded by the portrait’s 
social and political functions”.336 Modernism’s response to this situation is reflected in 
the lack of commissioned portraits, and the substitutive introduction of family, 
friends, partners, and associates as ‘new’ portrait subjects: Matisse painted his wife and 
Derain; Derain painted Matisse; Kokoschka painted his friends, the actress Else 
Kupfer, the architect Adolf Loos, and the artist William Wauer; Picasso painted 
outsiders (from beggars to cabaret performers and prostitutes), his partners (from 
Madeleine to Jacqueline), his supporters (from Apollinaire to Uhde), his patrons 
(from Stein to Errazuriz), and his dealers (from Vollard to Rosenberg).337 Another 
reason for the modernist artists’ turn to familial subjects, is the rise of the importance 
of close human relationships’ as “safe haven[s]”, as Taylor puts it, in the face of 
industrialisation’s threatening, alienating effects and the mass transit of populations, 
usually to urban centres, generating a loss of, or reduced levels of, contact with family 
members.338 
The invention of photography highlighted the act of mimesis in art, and at the 
same time satisfied commissioned portraiture’s need for naturalistic rendering. In fact, 
photography further liberated painting from the demands of past representational 
traditions by adopting the use of conventional poses.339 Nevertheless, in spite of 
painting’s liberation from mimesis, painters employed photography as a new tool for 
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diminishing lengthy sittings and as a replacement for the mirror in the production of 
self-portraits; the expressionists Edvard Munch, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and Egon 
Schiele are among a number of modernists who employed photography for their self-
portraits. There is a common misconception that photography provides a momentary 
impression of a subject, as opposed to painting’s supposed ability to present a view of 
the sitter as extended in time.340 But, if portraiture’s role, according to Roger Scruton, 
is to provide a representation of ‘inner being’ based on artistic insight as against 
expressive technique, then photography should be equally capable of doing so given its 
inherent realism. Yet, contrary to this photography is invariably perceived as being 
unable to capture a subject’s ‘inner essence’ due to the camera’s mechanical 
functionality, which negates the supposed “semantic” abilities of the artist’s power of 
expression.341  
There is an obvious similarity between photography and 17th century Dutch 
dualist portraiture’s realism and emphasis on compositional balance, pose and facial 
expression in their distance from and opposition to forms of idealisation. In Dutch 
realism and photography the artist as photographer prepares the ground for the viewer 
to retrieve a reading of the subject’s ‘inner being’ from external appearance, which is 
depicted acutely and ‘unaltered’. The modernist artist, however, becomes the prime 
‘mediator’, the link between the subject’s inner being and the viewer’s reading of it, by 
presenting his own independent reading of the subject. We are faced, therefore, with 
a representation of the artist’s impression of the subject’s interiority, which we are 
then invited to unravel. 
Accompanying and shaping the emergence of the expressive interiority in 
portraiture is the development of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. The widespread 
impact of Sigmund Freud in early 20th-century European culture, inspired a renewed 
interest in explorations of individuality and personality in art. The work of Austrian 
Expressionists, such as Oskar Kokoschka, Gustav Klimt, and Egon Schiele, for 
instance, participated in an emerging culture of confessional portraiture that owed a 
great deal to the subjective permissibility inherent to psychoanalytic treatment. In this 
light, Klimt’s portraits are particularly intriguing due to their conflictual form: the face 
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of the sitter, as well as various body parts are rendered in realist classicism, but the 
majority of clothing, props, and other parts of the canvas reveal an intense interest in 
formal abstract experimentation. Klimt’s example underlines perfectly the problem of 
modernist portraiture: on the one hand, a necessary rejection of classicist mimesis, but 
on the other, a reliance on traditional compositional formats342 (as extensions of the 
dualism-inspired compositional advances of 17th-century Dutch portraiture).  
 Modernism’s attention to the ‘inner’ can also be traced in the ‘non-objective’ 
work of Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian, and Kasimir Malevich, who were all 
displayed in the collection of the Guggenheim Museum in New York. Originally 
called The Museum of Non-Objective Painting, its goal was set out by its founder in 
1939, the Baroness Hilla Rebay, as to collect and show abstract painting that 
addresses the spiritual by seeking to express inner states and feelings. Rebay believed 
that the difference between objective and non-objective art lay in the fundamental 
difference between modernism and traditional painting. That is, where traditional 
painting transcribes objects drawn from life, non-objective painting creates its objects, 
which it does not show, thus allowing them to become realities rather than illusions. 
Non-objectivity is almost synonymous with ‘subjectivity’, in that the paintings instead 
of representing a reality simply present a reality, an inner reality; if it is an outer 
reality, it is one that shares “the same spiritual identity as inner reality”.343  
Of course, not all modernist art practices were driven by the spiritual. For 
instance, during the early days of Dada artists turned to the mechanical and 
impersonal as the means to produce art. They did so either by reciting repetitive 
poetry during performances or by extending Marcel Duchamp’s ‘logic of the 
readymade’, which criticised notions of uniqueness and inimitable creation in art. The 
Dadaists expanded their critical perspective on portraiture with works that, at the very 
least, questioned physical resemblance as a prerequisite of meaning. Francis Picabia 
produced various portraits that substitute the human form with machine parts. For 
instance, in the 1915 Portrait of a Young American Girl in the State of Nudity, we see 
nothing more than a graphic drawing of a sparkplug. In a similar manner, in 1917, 
Picabia re-introduced the ‘machine’ in the Portrait of Marie Laurencin, a striking 
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refusal to acknowledge the portrait as a primary source of interiority on material form 
as a stand in for the self (in dualist accounts the body is usually attacked for being 
functionalist and mechanical). Marcel Duchamp, likewise, criticised the notions of 
expressive interiority and unique individuality by posing as a female alter-ego Rrose 
Sélavy and in the 1923, in Wanted, $2000 Reward by presenting himself as a fictional 
character (George W. Welch) in the stereotypical format of ‘Wanted’ posters. The 
only referentially true element of this work are the two passport size photographs of 
Duchamp, which, conversely, refuse artistic interpretation as a convincing means of 
producing portraits. Overall, Duchamp’s employment of fiction and adoption of 
multiple personas in his self-portraits are anti-dualist statements, given the fact that 
they criticise the Cartesian view of a single, unaltered identity. Yet, the majority of 
modernist practice – expressive, transcendental – chose the opposite path; it took 
almost forty years for Dadaist strategies to be reemployed as critical strategies in Pop 
Art and Conceptual Art.  
 Thus, the dominant modernist mode from 1900 is a shift from an attention to 
a subject’s ‘inner being’ (achieved by compositional cropping of the body and focal 
direction towards the head) to a celebration of expressive interiority through artistic 
modes of production that identify a rejection of resemblance with a rejection of the 
mechanical. Indeed, a rejection of mechanised mimesis is seen as a standing against 
the de-individualisation and industrial uniformity of the self in society; modernist 
expressiveness celebrates human individuality through the power of the artist’s non-
objective vision. These works are subsequently delivered to the world as exemplary 
forms of spiritual activity. Thus, dualist content can be discerned in these works’ 
overall rejection of the industrialised body as functional and opposed to autonomous 
thought and creativity.  
Modernism is the moment when dualist portraiture shifts decisively from 
compositional reductive abstraction and objection to mimetic idealisation, to formalist 
abstraction and the objection to naturalism per se. In other words, there is a transition 
from a form of idealisation that addresses the sitter or client’s demands, to a form of  
idealisation based on the creative intentions of the artist. In pre-modern artistic 
practices the painter or sculptor was, as I have stressed, at the service of his or her 
subject, idealising, through composition, pose, and appearance in order to meet the 
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demands of the subject or patron, mediated in turn by prevailing social 
norms/standards.344 In modernist practices the subject finds itself subordinated by the 
artist’s creative intentions, who often abstracts forms through a non-realistic model of 
idealisation that prioritises the subjectivity of the artist himself or herself. 
In short, pre-modernist practices prioritised the resemblance of the subject 
over the creative expression of the artist. Such prioritisation, as artists were perfectly 
aware, posed certain threats towards artistic freedom, especially as 17th-century 
realism gradually turned into a form of antiquarian and mimetic idealisation – 
invariably dictated by the subject, patron, or commissioner – as portraiture advanced 
towards the Baroque, Romanticism and to Neo-classicism. The popularity of a high 
level of idealisation is reflected in the eminent revival of the ancient pseudo-science of 
physiognomy in art, which supplied the “intellectual rationale for social formations 
legitimised by and dependent on the ascriptive categories – blood, lineage, gender, 
seniority – that naturalise customary rules and roles” and in turn “serve to redistribute 
and stabilise power in a system of differential sites of authority that represent 
exploitation as hierarchy”.345 As clarified in the introduction, the classicist 
employment of physiognomy differs from a dualist perspective, in that the former 
modifies facial characteristics according to a flattering ideal, and the latter seeks to 
access a subject’s inner being, primarily through focusing on imperfections.346  Such a 
difference is defined at the one hand by the classicist (Aristotelian) belief in the self as 
mutable – various physiognomic idealisations apply to various states and stages of 
being – and on the other to the dualist claim of the self as immutable – otherwise the 
single physiognomic reading of the self could be put in question. The very fact that 
the dualist model still relied on the body for the representation of the spiritual 
signifies that this model had still to reach its full formation. Even though 
compositional advances in favour of dualism occurred in the example of Dutch 
portraiture, formal qualities still depend on the body, which contradict the dualist 
view of an autonomous soul. In other words, a total abstraction of the body would 
signify the subservience of the (material) body to the (immaterial) soul more 
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successfully, visualised through an aesthetic hierarchical prioritisation of the latter 
through a representational disregard of the material qualities of the former.  
 
 
Modernism & Dualism 
 
What forced realism into its critical situation in the 19th century was its 
incorporation of classicist forms of idealisation. Despite its anti-dualist implications, 
idealisation was perceived as one of the causes of creative limitation, since it primarily 
served to support the interests of the patron. The general interest in portraiture 
derives from its honorific function, which stimulates a desire for individuals to be 
included in a pantheon of excellence. As a result, state, religion, and prominent 
individuals have often employed portraiture for their self-inclusion in such a 
pantheon, a process that is guided by forms of idealisation that hinder the artist’s 
control over the work – the idealisation of the pantheon is achieved through the 
idealisation of the subject’s portrait. Berger argues that the aesthetic and ideological 
effects of commissioned portraiture are in no way inconsequential, since “when the act 
of commission or donation enters into the content…when the indexical sign becomes 
an indexical icon of donor power, the traces of that power already emanating from 
every material inch of the sign are merely redistributed, not concealed”.347 
The artists’ desire, and to a certain extent their success in regaining full control 
of the work –resisting subservience to sitter/patron by being the sole producers of 
their work – contributed immensely in the reconfiguration of the honorific aspects of 
portraiture. Now, the sitter is the one that is being honoured by becoming the artist’s 
subject, as opposed to the pre-modern acknowledgement of an artist’s value in the 
form of an awarded commission. In an attempt to avoid subservience to patronage 
through a form of idealisation on these terms, abstract portraits challenged the 
importance of physical resemblance as the methodology for the representation of 
identity.348 What this new model offers modernists instead is a formal abstraction that 
is the product of the artist’s interpretative schemas, which we are encouraged to 
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decode. Modernist abstract portraiture proposes a dual affirmation of dualism in that 
it represents a metaphysical inner state through the employment of the artist’s equally 
metaphysical skills of insightful vision. But most importantly it emphasises the co-
existence of two subjectivities in portraiture, those of the ‘portraying’ artist and the 
‘portrayed’ sitter.349  
 Therefore, modernism’s additional contribution to the genre was to force us to 
reconsider our viewing expectations when addressing a portrait: do we, primarily look 
for traits of resemblance or for convincing manifestations of artistic subjectivity? 
Traditional viewing expectations of portraiture incorporate a further duality, one that 
primarily concerns the portrayed subject’s material form and inner quality. The artist, 
particularly in the modern period, is called upon to resolve the issue of representing an 
identity by projecting the sitter’s ‘inner state’ through altering or manipulating the 
sitter’s exterior form. Through this Platonic process the artist aims at the validation of 
his/her skills by supplying the sitter’s imagined interiority with a convincing expressive 
visible outer form. Hence, we are presented with a supposed semiotic unity between 
the artist’s expression (signifier) and the sitter’s interiority (signified). According to 
Ernst van Alphen, once this semiotic unity is put to the test by questioning the 
validity of the artist’s ‘pure vision’ the “homogeneity” and “authenticity” of the 
portrayed subject as represented becomes open to dispute.350 
Moreover, Richard Brilliant claims that a portrait might reflect a conflict, a 
“struggle of dominance between the artist’s conception and the sitter’s will”.351 Such a 
position puts to the test the accuracy of the artist’s reading of his subject’s inner being 
and it contests it for being either contrary to, or at the very least different from the 
subject’s own self-impression. Furthermore, from this view the modernist case for 
artistic expressive freedom is proposed not only as contrary to the demands of sitter, 
patron, or commissioner, but also more significant than the representation of the 
sitter’s subjectivity, hence personal identity. In addition, it is implied that this 
modernist process disregards the Platonic notion of the artist providing a true reading 
of his subject’s inner being for the sake of expressive freedom. In fact, what is 
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proposed here is a clash between the sitter’s true inner state as projected by him or 
her, and the artist’s will to access it; for which we should be sceptical due to the artist’s 
personal creative interests that seem to focus primarily on the appropriation of 
external appearances, demoting the importance of the subject’s interiority to 
secondary status.  
In doing so modernist artists may overcome portraiture’s main function, which 
is to present an image of a sitter’s outer appearance and inner state. Therefore, the 
artist either neglects his subject’s interiority (which is perceived as irrelevant to free 
artistic experimentation) or he or she fails to produce a convincing reading of the 
subject’s ‘inner state’ (which is not surprising since artists are not necessarily qualified 
psychiatrists). This interchange seems to resemble a vicious circle: the artist’s process 
of expression moves towards, and away from the subject in a constant unresolved 
conflict between the interests of the artist and the interests of the sitter. Thus, we 
cannot expect the sitter to totally surrender his or herself to the reading of the artist. 
Indeed we should assume that the subject would try to retain some control over this 
process by projecting certain preferable elements of self or, elevating aspects of his or 
her appearance and character at the expense of others.352 However, what happens 
when the sitter’s demands for identification actually pose a barrier to experimentation 
and the implementation of research outcomes? Picasso’s portraits reflect in a 
heightened manner these dual interests of artist and sitter. For instance, his figurative 
and portrait works during the period of Cubism appear to disregard the subjective 
properties of his sitters. Yet, his late expressionist and surrealist portraits of his 
partners are the products of his psychological impression of his sitters. 
 
 
Bergson, Golberg, & Hegel 
 
Prior to the discussion of Cubism it is worth revisiting Hegel’s writings on 
aesthetics due to the similarities between the philosopher’s attention to the spiritual 
and the modernist art’s desire to embrace it and channel it in the face of rapid 
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industrialisation. The connection of Hegelian aesthetics to Cubism is a relatively 
under-researched area due to the common acceptance that, if the Cubists were 
influenced by philosophical ideas these would more likely be those of Henri 
Bergson’s. However, as we will see there are certain historical aspects and aesthetic 
compromises, based mostly on the fact that there were two Cubists camps (Salon 
Cubists and the band à Picasso), which, although they verify Bergson’s impact on 
certain Cubists they also put it in question, particularly in relation to Picasso and his 
milieu.  
Key to Bergson’s philosophy is his call for a new interpretation and 
understanding of reality, with time playing a decisive role in this process. Reality, for 
Bergson, is founded on the notion of duration and it is perceived as a continuous and 
dynamic process.353 In this process artists play a key part since they are on top of 
Bergson’s list of those who are capable of ‘pure perception’. This concept borrows a lot 
from Plato’s notion of pure vision, since according to Timothy Mitchell, “by rejecting 
a purely utilitarian interpretation of the world, by trying to open himself up to the 
totality of experience, the artist could approach reality through intuition”.354  
In Bergson’s view the common representation of life through single images 
simply follows memory’s way of dealing with lived experiences and sensations. 
Thereby, for Bergson the perception of reality as static or divided in singular moments 
is false, since it disregards the continuous quality of time.355 In this respect, the 
familiar connection between Bergson’s ideas and Cubism is established – as Mitchell 
argues – in the latter’s “combination of several viewpoints of an object [which] force 
the viewer to become aware of the passage of time implied through the physical shifts 
of perspective”.356 Yet, as we will see the role and aesthetic function of Cubist 
superimposed planes and variable perspective is far from clear – to the point that 
Cubist writers and artists stand divided, including Picasso. Moreover, they certainly 
do not provide the fluidity and continuity that Bergson was looking for, since they are 
aligned with those fragmented functions of memory that Bergson was so critical of. 
The Cubist work is the result of various single images, and not a homogenous whole.  
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Considering the importance of ‘change’, ‘becoming’, and ‘intuition’ in his 
philosophy, Bergson was strongly criticised by the Catholic intelligentsia – to the 
point that in 1914 the holy Office included his work in their Index of Prohibited 
Books – due to the implicit critique of Christian dogmatic notions of the ‘immutable’ 
and the ‘eternal’, in his writing. Likewise, French nationalist circles, such as the 
Action Française (led by Charles Maurras), attacked Bergsonism from a traditionalist 
and Cartesian perspective.357 Yet, we have to bear in mind that the rational 
Cartesian/Classicist model proposed by Maurras and his ilk is a modified and highly 
selective version of Cartesianism, one that was suitable for the Greco-Latin 
aspirations of French nationalism. For this purpose these positions focus solely on 
Cartesian rationalism in order to counter Bergson’s notion of intuition that drove his 
increasingly popular progressive ideas, and not on Cartesian metaphysics (dualism). 
Roger Allard and Jean Metzinger introduced Bergson’s ideas to Cubist circles 
after reading Henry Le Fauconnier’s catalogue essay ‘L’Oeuvre d’Art’,358 which 
attempts to explain aesthetics in mathematical terms. By introducing Bergson in art 
theory Allard attempted to reconcile the modernism of the Salon Cubism and 
traditionalism inherent to French nationalism,359 which was contested by Joseph 
Billiet and Trancede de Visan among many writers.360 Allard’s essay, however, was 
very successful in praising the work and role of Le Faconnier (particularly Abandance, 
1910-1911) in the avant-garde, attracting the attention of other Salon Cubists such as 
Gleizes amd Metzinger.361 At this point we need to examine the distinction between 
the two Cubist groups that were active at the time: the Band à Picasso (also referred 
to as Gallery Cubism) –consisting of Montmartre based artists and writers such as 
Apollinaire, Jacob, and Salmon – and the Salon d’Autonome Cubism – consisting of 
Le Fauconnier, Gliezes, Metzinger, Leger, and Robert and Sonya Delaunay, and 
writers such as Mercereau, Romains and Allard. According to this distinction, 
Bergson seems to have been the major influence of the members of the Salon group 
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and not on the Band à Picasso – who are the focus of this thesis. Members of these 
groups rarely met or viewed each other’s work, apart from Metzinger who had 
established links with members of both.362 
After reading Metzinger’s theorisation of Cubism in ‘Notes on Painting’,363 
Bergson was critical of the way that Cubists adopted his ideas, and particularly of the 
subordination of the intuitive powers of art to rational illustrative process of 
philosophical ideas. In other words, Bergson was critical of the act of analysing a form 
of practice “instead of intuitively performing it” and of the fact that “Cubism was seen 
as yet another example of invasion of intellectual modes of thought into a field 
conductive to intuition alone”.364 David Cottington also notes how Allard, in a 
discussion of Le Fauconnier’s work,365 “developed…a fully fledged fusion of these 
seemingly incompatible notions, Bergsonian dynamism and classical stasis”.366 This 
compromise between modernity/dynamism/abstraction and 
classicism/stasis/naturalism provides another indication why Hegelian aesthetics can 
be particularly useful in understanding Cubism’s conceptual conflicts and aesthetic 
compromises that Bergsonism is incapable of accommodating.  
Hegelian ideas were not completely foreign to Cubists, mostly due to Mecislas 
Golberg’s Le Morales de Lignes (1908), which was a “paradigmatic fusion of 
Nietszchean individualism, Hegelian idealism and neo-Platonic mysticism”.367 
Golberg’s aesthetic treatise - which was published posthumously - was widely read 
and admired by Neo-Symbolists, including Apollinaire and Salmon. The role of 
aesthetics is central to Golberg’s metaphysics, perceiving beauty as “the most perfect 
expression of existence, the expression in which all contradictions disappear, giving 
way to an absolute form.”368 In a truly Hegelian and Platonic (pure vision) manner 
Golberg argued that “it was the role of the spirit, or mind, to find in things, to detach 
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and express it, but this was not easy, for it was not always apparent…the principal 
means to this, of course, was art, and the artist was chief among creators, able to 
reduce the real to its essential lines and colours”.369 Golberg’s ideas had an impact even 
outside Neo-Symbolist literary circles, as it has been claimed that Henry Matisse’s 
‘Notes d’un Peintre’ was strongly influenced by Golberg.370 In addition, Pierre Aubery 
claimed in 1965 that “most of the theories that Apollinaire disseminated…notably 
those concerning the basis for the expressive effect of the distortion and 
conceptualisation of lines and planes, are in Golberg’s writings.”371 The level of 
Apollinaire’s attachment to Golberg was made clear by the highly personal obituary 
delivered by Apollinaire at Golberg’s funeral ceremony.372 
 
 
Hegel, Dualism & Spirit 
 
To begin with, perhaps it is unnecessary to state that Hegel is a dualist; he 
distinguishes between two forms of being: the natural and the spiritual, the natural 
being the external, subordinate existence of the spiritual.373 Art, for Hegel, is a mental, 
or a spiritual enterprise, which employs imagination as its “productive activity”.374 
Borrowing from Plato (Phaedrus), Hegel argues that art satisfies spirit’s need for 
vision, which is restricted by the finitude of “existence” and “external necessity”. In 
doing so, art escapes finitude by allowing the Concept to dictate the appearance of 
life.375 Moreover, fine art achieves ‘reality’ when it conveys “the divine nature”, 
humanist ideals, and “truths of the mind”.376 On the subject of artistic expression 
Hegel argues that it derives from the human urge to “exalt the inner and outer world 
into a spiritual consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognises his own 
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self”.377 What we notice in this statement is yet another instance of the notion of the 
‘artist painting his own self’, which was first attributed to Michelangelo, and was also 
embraced by Oscar Wilde, among many others.378 This notion lies at the core of 
Picasso’s portrait practice, in that Picasso’s high modernism privileges the force of his 
own impressions of his subjects, in contrast to the artist’s subservience to a realist 
rendering of their appearances; hence, his preference for painting portraits from his 
imagination or photographs and not from sittings. Overall, Hegel similarly favours a 
spiritual mode of creativity over a realist-mechanical one, since, for Hegel the latter 
stops at the finitude of natural appearances. As Arthur Danto puts it, art for Hegel is 
the sensuous presentation of mental, or spiritual truth that manifests through a 
“conscious embodiment of truth” and not as an illustration of it.379 Ironically, Danto’s 
reading actually cancels out the dualism in Hegel’s model, insofar as embodiment 
negates the spirit of its fundamental immaterial essence.  
The Ideal in art, in Hegel’s aesthetics, is the fusion of both Idea and Shape: 
“the Idea identified with its Reality”.380 The notion of Idea is derivative from Plato, 
but it varies in that it involves both ‘concept’ and ‘reality’.381 Modernist figurative 
abstraction, excluding the historical moment of Abstract Expressionism, could be an 
adaptation of the Hegelian Ideal, insofar as, the ‘shape’ of the figure is variably 
abstracted according to an ‘idea’, or an impression of it. Concerning Beauty, Hegel 
claims Ideal beauty as perfect, since it is the product of a mental process, disregarding 
natural beauty as imperfect. In a purely dualist manner Hegel elevates the mind by 
claiming it as the sole producer of truth.382 Accordingly, the finite imprints of passions 
and rough living experiences on the body are not in agreement with the infinitude of 
the ‘inner essence’ and of the Idea.383 Hegel here is toying with classicist idealism, but 
as we will see in his discussion of Hellenic art he is relatively critical of realism.  
What could be read as an encouragement towards formalist abstraction is 
Hegel’s notion that Ideal art should “rise above the purely symmetrical”, which he 
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rates as “lifeless”.384 Alternatively, imitation leads to “formally regular and mechanical 
results”.385 In the same discussion on ‘externality’, Hegel draws up limits to 
abstraction, in as much as he is dismissive of the abstraction of colour. To argue this, 
he draws parallels with the lack of note determinacy in music performances, when 
strings of instruments are not struck with accuracy. Yet, in a contradictory move, he 
returns to a dismissal of regularity and symmetry, or “the simple determinacy of the 
sensuous material” as insufficient.386 Hegel is critical of the pure imitation of nature 
for leading to “a mere parody of life instead for a genuine vitality”; however, art should 
retain “natural shapes”.387 In a final blow against external realism, Hegel prioritises the 
spiritual as he argues that objectivity must let go of its “independence” and 
“inflexibility” in order to verify its homogeneity with its subjectivity.388 Moreover, he 
warns of the extreme realist imitations of either nature or spirituality. Hence, what 
Hegel proposes is a form of abstraction that draws from a visual co-existence of the 
two sides of man, or an “essential inward harmony”, with the scales tilting in favour of 
the ‘inner’, however, without a complete dismissal of the ‘external’: “the external 
should achieve appearance only in connection with the inner”.389 A harmony that 
‘imagination’ alone is unable to provide as “firmly” and “definitely” as reality can.  
Hegel distinguishes between three main historical types of art: symbolic, 
classical, and romantic. By symbolic art Hegel means Egyptian, Mesopotamic, and 
Asian art, where we witness a symbolic abstraction of figure commanded by the Idea. 
Hegel is critical of this process as the import of Idea results in a violent “coercion” of 
nature.390 Care should be taken at this point, since Hegel is critical of symbolic 
abstraction and not formalist. With regard to Classicism, Hegel at first praises its 
“anthropomorphism”, since in his opinion it serves the purpose of being the natural 
counterpart of the soul or mind: “the human form is employed…not as a mere 
physical existence, but exclusively as the existence and physical form corresponding to 
mind”.391 But, in clear dualist terms, Hegel is somewhat disappointed by the 
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conceptual restriction of the Mind as purely human and not “as simply absolute and 
eternal…intellectual being”.  
Hegel’s dualist perspective is expanded in his analysis of romantic art, where 
he celebrates the dissolution of the classicist non-dualist union of Idea and its reality. 
Thus, in a dualist-inspired opposition to classicism romanticist reality is not “the 
sensuous immediate existence of the spiritual”, that is, the human body, but “self-
conscious inward intelligence”.392 Therefore, the Romantic object of art is an 
intellectual product, which by addressing the mind and emotions functions as a 
revelation of spirituality. The Romantic treatment of sensuous formal externality is 
similar to that of symbolic art, insofar as it accepts human form as “transient” and 
“fugitive”. Since externality loses the significance which it enjoys in classicism, it 
resorts in Romanticism for the expression of feelings “in themselves, instead of being 
in the external and its form of reality”.393 Hegel clarifies this difference between 
symbolic abstraction and romantic formalism by claiming that the former is essentially 
defective. Romantic art, on the other hand, imposes a separation of the spiritual from 
the external in order to achieve an autonomous revelation of the Idea in its own form 
of reality, and not through the finite, and particular form of the human body. 
Another example of Hegel’s dualist perspective on art is his careful distinction 
that the spiritual “infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of 
everything particular”.394  Hegel continues by claiming art’s task to not be an 
“immersion” of the inner in “external corporeality”, but “the withdrawal of the inner 
into itself, the spiritual consciousness of God in the individual”.395 Conversely, 
Hellenic classicist sculptures of the Gods do not express adequately spirituality, 
because they lack – a Cartesian – “self-aware” subjectivity. Instead, Romantic art seeks 
to address the spiritual by focusing on ‘inner life’, since aspects of nature no longer 
symbolically contain or act as representations of the absolute and divine. Kant’s notion 
of a priori empirical knowledge is inverted into an a priori of spiritual understanding – 
which carries with it all the characteristics of the Cartesian ‘method’s’ aimed results – 
in Hegel’s claims that the content of Romantic art is “already present explicitly to 
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mind and feeling outside the sphere of art”.396 In another attack on realism (which 
could be read as yet another call for abstraction) the external is deliberately degraded 
as an “empirical reality by the shape of which the soul is untroubled”, simply because, 
for Hegel, the external no longer expresses inner life. Thus, we can conclude that 
Hegel celebrates an emphasis on the spiritual within romantic art. However, the level 
of abstraction should be limited to the extent that the human in the work remains 
recognisable. In this way, Hegelian aesthetics will help us understand the conflict 
between realism and abstraction in Cubism, a conflict between mimetic expectations 
and the prioritisation of the spiritual visualised through a form of intuitive abstraction.  
 
 
Early Cubist Writing: Metzinger, Apollinaire, Rivière, Gleizes, Léger, Rozanova, 
Kahnweiler 
 
The early Cubist writings map out the style’s theoretical development from 
the initial objection to mimesis to a justification of the reasons driving the proposed 
abstraction. For instance, the Cubist painter Jean Metzinger (1888-1957) verifies a 
rejection of classicist realism – an outcome of the modernist abolition of mimesis.397 
He then follows with a famous quote by Picasso (“It is useless to paint where it is 
possible to describe”), which is at once an extension of the rejection of classicist 
realism and an indication of a turn towards Hegelian abstraction. Metzinger’s focus 
on Picasso’s methodology, which, in the view of the author has all the characteristics 
of Cartesian objectification (framed as it is, by Bergson’s notion of intuition) is based 
on a reworking of the Platonic notion of ‘pure artistic vision’: “Picasso does not deny 
the object, he illuminates it with his intelligence and feeling. With visual perceptions 
he combines tactile perceptions.”  
Guillaume Apollinaire (1880-1918) reaffirms the negation of descriptivism, 
while in ‘On the Subject of Modern Painting’398 he joins Gertrude Stein’s preceding 
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reading of the subject’s depreciation in figurative Cubist paintings as the cost of 
boundless formal experimentation; 399 both authors’ reading reflects the then current 
disdain towards commissioned portraiture and the reconfiguration of the honorific 
strategies in portraiture, and, thus, should not be misinterpreted as a fully-fledged 
anti-dualist declaration. In this respect, I propose that Picasso’s relative apathy 
towards the subjects in his work is mainly the result of his decision to prioritise his 
own creative concerns over the conventional representational requirements of a 
portrait. In the same essay Apollinaire, adopts a Cartesian perspective for the first 
time in describing the Cubists’ artistic skills and processes as mathematical and 
medical. Furthermore, Apollinaire identifies the ‘perfection’-driven Hellenic 
conception of beauty as the locus of the opposition to classicist mimesis. He then 
follows, in ‘The New Painting’, with the first expressed alternative to the classicist 
ideal of human perfection: the dualist ‘infinite universe’, emphasised in metaphysical 
forms.400 Finally, Apollinaire underlines the importance of a ‘reality of insight’, rather 
than a reality of sight, as the methodology for addressing the universal ideal. Such a 
position seems to employ a methodology that seeks to resolve the Cartesian quest for 
the identification of universality through the Hegelian focus on spirituality (which in 
turn is implemented by the Platonic notion of pure artistic vision). 
The critic Jacques Rivière expands Apollinaire’s notion of ‘reality of insight’ in 
what he calls ‘sensible essence’ through which he justifies a distancing from realistic 
representation in painting.401  In a 1912 essay, Metzinger and Albert Gleizes (1881-
1953) also speak of an alternative realism, which they refer to as ‘profound’, as 
opposed to classicist ‘superficial reality’ – as they attribute greater validity to mental 
perception over sensual. 402 Following Apollinaire’s initial introduction of mathematics 
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into Cubist discourse, Metzinger and Gleizes elaborate this in terms of non-
Euclidean geometry.403 Superficial reality refers to the illusionistic effects of realism, 
or, in other words, classicism. Profound realism, in contrast, is the kind of alternative, 
inner realism that Hegel and Bergson encouraged artists to prioritise; a form of 
realism that Plato claims can be revealed by artistic vision. For the authors, superficial 
realism lies at the core of Impressionist painting, which, contrary to Rivière’s 
appraisal, they blame for being more obedient to the “retina” than to the “mind”.  
In yet another indication of the Platonic notion of pure artistic vision, Olga 
Rozanova (1886-1916), a prominent figure in the Russian avant-garde, claims that 
the path to such ‘realism’ is only open to “receptive souls” through the “intuitive 
principle”.404 Rozanova follows this with an unravelling of the modern process leading 
to the creation of pictures, which she attributes to the “Abstract Principle”. There are 
three stages to this process: “Intuitive Principle, individual transformation of the 
visible, and abstract creation”.405 In a discussion on photography’s mimetic, “servile” 
nature, Rozanova agrees with Oscar Wilde406 in stating that “the artist of artistic 
individuality, in depicting them [nature’s images], will reflect himself”, unlike the 
photographer or the “servile” artist.407 By criticising photography, Rozanova is 
praising the other arts – painting and sculpture – for providing the possibility for the 
artist’s subjectivity to prevail over the work’s subject. Particularly, Rozanova, and 
Wilde, view this as a process where the artist projects an image of himself in the 
representation of his or her sitter. It is very likely that Cubism was the moment that 
Picasso became aware of this conflict of subjectivities in portraiture.  This, somewhat 
shamanic, model of artistic creativity reaches its full manifestation in Picasso’s late 
surrealist portraits of his partners, where Picasso does not transfer aspects of his self 
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on canvas but rather his impression of his subjects. In this respect, Rozanova provides 
a model for understanding Picasso’s tendency to work from memory, and occasionally 
from photographs: this is done in order to avoid mimicking nature, thus allowing for 
‘profound realism’, or ‘realism of conception’, or ‘reality of insight’ to emerge. 
 Danieal-Henry Kahnweiler (1884-1976), the leading dealer and close friend 
of both Picasso and Braque, reaffirms the Platonic notion (pure vision) in his 
discussion of the ‘piercing of closed form’ that took place during Picasso’s stay at 
Cadaqués.408 Kahnweiler defines ‘closed form’ in dualist terms: the acceptance of 
objects “as contained by their own surfaces, viz., the skin”.409 The ‘Closed form’ 
method is problematic for Kahnweiler, as he views it as responsible for the emergence 
of illusionist representational techniques of Renaissance artists, that is chiaroscuro and 
perspective that drew from ‘surface’ distribution of paint. Yet, it seems that 
Kahnweiler is claiming a formal realism for Cubism that has been mostly exorcised by 
other writers of the period. It is, however, quite true, since Picasso’s Cubist portraiture 
– as we will see – never manages to escape the demands of even the most minimum 
formal reference to an object or human subject.  
Dualism seems to be Kahnweiler’s adopted perspective as he underlines 
universalism in his examination of the conflictual, yet, creative relationship between 
the artist’s ‘constructive’ tendencies and the sitter’s ‘representational’ expectations in 
Cubism’s process of revelation of the foundation of all forms. What Kahnweiler 
proposes is that the conflict is resolved by satisfying representational demands, which 
in traditional painting are dealt with through the employment of chiaroscuro, within a 
radical compositional structure.410 Thus, Picasso resolves the conflict of subjectivities, 
between his own and his sitters’, by channelling his drive for experimentation towards 
the satisfaction of representational requirements. But, whose representational 
requirements exactly? Picasso’s own – deriving from his experimental intentions – or 
those of his sitters’ – based on their expectations of resemblance?  
The Kantian notion of a priori knowledge emerges in Kahnweiler’s analysis of 
Braque’s method of introducing realistic objects into his painting. These “real details” 
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evoke memories, which in turn combine with abstract schemes of forms to mentally 
recreate the represented object in the viewer’s mind. Kahnweiler claims that once the 
object is identified through an integration of a priori knowledge of it stimulated by 
“real details”, the ‘viewing’ experience of Cubism becomes far more critically 
perspicuous than conventional illusionistic art. In this way, Cubism’s primary 
strengths lay in “the object’s form, and its position in space”; colour and “tactile 
quality” are secondary, “leaving their incorporation into the object to the mind of the 
spectator”.411 Accordingly, multiple viewing points serve a more exacting 
interrogation, or “analytical” presentation of the object, which the viewer then 
reproduces in his or her mind. For Kahnweiler, here lies the breakthrough achieved in 
Cadaqués: “instead of an analytical description, the painter can, if he prefers, also 
create in this way a synthesis of the object, or in the words of Kant, ‘put together the 
various conceptions and comprehend their variety in one perception’.”412 ‘Analytical’ 
description here seems to be incorporating the dualist method of objectification; 
‘synthesis’, on the other hand, allows for a classicist type of idealisation, albeit filtered 
through modernist ideals. 
 
 
Picasso & Braque’s Cubism 
 
But where do Picasso and Braque stand in relation to Cubism’s theorisation? 
In 1917 Pierre Reverdy collected and published twenty aphorisms that Braque used to 
note down in the margins of his drawings.413 In these, Braque expands the 
depreciation of the subject in figurative paintings, only to add that painting’s primary 
concerns are objective and formal, which deal with the “unity” and “lyricism” of the 
new techniques and aesthetic attitudes. Elements of Platonic aesthetics are reflected 
in Braque’s clarification of artistic aims as an attempt to “constitute …pictorial fact[s]” 
and not to “reconstitute… anecdotal facts”. In the same spirit, Braque agrees with 
Metzinger and Apollinaire’s dismissal of imitative creativity by adding that “[external] 
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appearance is the result” and not the focus of imitation. In the last section of his 
aphorisms Braque adopts a ‘dualist voice’ in his view of the function of the senses as 
deformative as opposed to being a formative function of the mind. In his 
encouragement of work that aims at “perfect[ing] the mind” Braque claims, from a 
dualist position, that “there is no certainty except in what the mind conceives”. 
Braque’s dualist mistrust of the senses is further expressed in the concluding part of 
the collection where he is demanding a “containment” of emotions, further 
emphasised by his final aphorism: “I love the rule which corrects emotion”.  
Picasso expressed his views on Cubism in an interview with Marius de Zayas 
in 1923.414 What is easily discernable from the interview is that Picasso is somewhat 
critical of attempts to theorise Cubism through mathematical (e.g. fourth dimension), 
of psychoanalytical (e.g. Freudian) literature and so forth, mostly due to their focus on 
the process of research rather than on found disclosure. Accordingly, in order to 
emphasise the importance of action in painting over and above abstract intention, 
Picasso refers to a Spanish saying in which “facts” rather than “reasons” matter in love. 
Moreover, he defines art as a lie “that helps us realise truth”.415 By extension, then, 
artists should employ their skills to produce truthful lies. For Picasso, what makes 
artistic research on the lines of the new science problematic is its misleading “attempt 
to paint the invisible and, therefore, the unpaintable”.416 In other words, one cannot 
paint, describe, or represent what has not been found yet or exists as a theoretical 
category; on the contrary painting is the outcome of formal research into painting 
itself. 
For Picasso, nature and art are antithetical. The only relationship between 
them that he accepts is based on the premise that “through art we express our 
conception of what nature is not”.417 Accordingly, Picasso redefines the work of great 
realists such as David and Ingres as autonomous artistic products and not as attempts 
to paint nature. In this, Picasso argues that the identity of categories such as 
“concrete” and “abstract” are inaccurate; such forms should be discussed as “more or 
less convincing lies” which are “necessary to our mental selves” since through them 
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“we form our aesthetic point of view of life”.418 Towards the closing part of his 
comments Picasso touches upon the matter of stylistic variation. Perhaps he was 
inclined to do so in order to justify his recent turn to Neo-classicism, which took place 
around the time of the interview (1923). Variation, for Picasso, should be seen as 
nothing more than a change in “thinking” that leads to change in the manner of 
expression. Picasso justifies expressive change according to the requirements of 
different motives. Yet, he is quite thorough in rejecting a sense of “evolution” or 
“progress” as derivative from stylistic change. Rather, it is nothing more than choosing 
the right means for doing justice to a variety of subjects and ideas.419  
The nature of Picasso and Braque’s creative relationship has been the subject 
of discussion by almost all main writers on Cubism. Apollinaire, who knew Picasso 
and visited his studio frequently prior to his creative association with Braque, regarded 
Picasso’s contribution to the development of Cubism as far more significant than 
Braque’s. It is true that Apollinaire occasionally wrote favourably of Braque, yet he 
views Braque’s role in the Cubist enterprise as secondary. Writing on Cubism in 1912 
Apollinaire reads Braque’s work as a “corroboration” of Picasso’s “inventions”.420 In 
the following year, Apollinaire repeated his claims in a similar, but pseudo-flattering 
tone. Praising Braque as a “serious craftsman” whose work is aesthetically pleasing, 
Apollinaire reasserts Braque’s role as a “verifier” of “new innovations in modern art”.421  
Apollinaire was far more critical of Braque in private. As William Rubin 
reveals, in a letter to Ardengo Soffici, who regarded both painters as founders of 
Cubism, Apollinaire degrades Braque’s role once again.422 In the letter, Apollinaire 
argues that the cubist painters showing at the Salon were in fact more original, since 
Braque’s work is indebted to Picasso’s to a higher degree. In addition, Apollinaire 
excluded Braque from a list that he gave to Soffici of the five most important painters, 
which included Derain, Raoul Dufy, Marie Laurencin, Matisse, and Picasso. In reply, 
Soffici seems to succumb to the demeaning of Braque by Apollinaire and agrees to the 
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latter’s choice of five painters. More importantly, Soffici admits that in the light of 
Apollinaire’s remarks he had overestimated Braque.423 Responding to Soffici, 
Apollinaire deals his final blow to Braque’s status in his clarification that he is only 
prepared to support Braque and the other Cubists, because the imposition of a new 
style requires the creation and comparative theoretical discussion of artworks of a 
variable aesthetic value. Therefore, Apollinaire endorses the “mediocre” work of 
Braque and of the other Cubists in support of “a great artist like Picasso”, so that a 
comparison between their work and Picasso’s can underline Picasso’s superior value. 
In other words, Apollinaire regarded the similarities in Picasso and Braque’s work as 
an outcome of Braque corroborating or verifying Picasso’s achievements and not as 
the result of co-authorship, which in painters’ circles was a foreign concept to the 
ruling modernist notion of supreme individuality. 
The most vicious attacks on Braque came from Stein, who, by treating 
Cubism as an entirely Spanish art, completely disregarded Braque’s role in it. 
Although Stein establishes herself as an eyewitness to Cubism’s development, she did 
not visit Picasso’s studio as much as Apollinaire or Kahnweiler; and never visited 
Braque’s studio. Moreover, when Stein ‘honoured’ Braque with a reference in her 
writing (in the 1913 essay ‘Braque’) she was extremely malicious and insulting in her 
description of his work process in his studio, dismissing his paintings in demeaning 
craft terms, as being reminiscent of his family profession (house painting and 
decorating).424 Overall, Stein had little to say about Cubism’s conceptual or pictorial 
problems, and nothing whatsoever about Braque and Picasso’s close working 
relationship. It took Braque twelve years to formally respond to Stein, whom he 
regarded as a “tourist” rather than as the “authority of the epoch” as she described 
herself. Besides criticising Stein’s ability to comprehend contemporary issues, Braque 
attributes Stein’s misunderstanding of Cubism to her perception of it in “terms of 
personalities”.425 Braque’s accurate point is evocative of both his and Picasso’s 
declarations of Cubist works as attempts to blur the boundaries of personal, 
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distinctively individual authorship.426 Similar notions played an important part in my 
analysis of Rembrandt’s practice. There is, however, an underlying difference between 
the two cases: Rembrandt encouraged the signing of his work by his students, which 
were of inferior artistic status, thus, suggesting a weakening of or disregard for the 
hierarchy of the masters’ studio; Braque and Picasso differ from this, in that, their 
impersonal working relationship shares more with post-conceptual collaborative 
practices, in which equal participation is the basis of authorship.   
On this subject, T. J. Clark defends the significance of their collaborative 
practice, which he relates to the 1920’s post-war Parisian model of nationalism as 
collectivism, for the purpose of rebuilding the country.427 By revisiting the painters’ 
remarks on how a painting had to be declared finished by both of them, Clark 
emphasises that the lack of signing the work should be viewed as the outcome of 
“laboratorial research” based on a new, mental rather than visual understanding of the 
world. However, with this conclusion Clark follows Stein and others, by asserting that 
the role of Picasso in this collaborative “dyad” is more significant than Braque’s. 
Kahnweiler was sceptical of Apollinaire’s book on Cubism; in fact he thought 
that it was “without interest”.428 His own book, on the other hand, describes Braque 
and Picasso’s contribution to Cubism as equally important, in their respective ways. 
Kahnweiler argues that Cubism’s driving force lies in the shared methodology of its 
two founders, which took the form of an “exchange of ideas” through expressive 
studio conversation.429 However, despite this sense of equality, Kahnweiler views the 
two painters’ work from opposite perspectives: Braque is the “gentle moon” – whose 
art is feminine, and “tranquil” – and Picasso is the “radiant sun” – whose art is 
masculine, and “nervous and turbulent”. Nevertheless, Kahnweiler is quite clear that 
Picasso and Braque both “deserve the credit” for Cubism. Kahnweiler’s remarks that 
Picasso’s engagement in a process of “fanatic[…] searching” is probably what 
provoked Picasso into proclaiming his devaluation of ‘research’, as expressed in his 
interview with De Zayas in 1923.   
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Wilhelm Uhde extends Kahnweiler’s view of Cubism as a combined effort in 
his 1928 work on Picasso. Uhde was a frequent visitor to Picasso’s studio (and one of 
the first) and it was his enthusiastic comments to Kahnweiler about the Demoiselles 
that encouraged Kahnweiler to visit the painter’s studio for the first time in 1907. 
While Uhde argues for Braque’s equally important contribution in the solution of 
problems, he rejects the view that their work is “indistinguishable”.430 In a similar way 
to Kahnweiler, Uhde presents two contrasting attitudes: Braque is “limpid, controlled, 
bourgeois” and Picasso is “sober, excessive, and revolutionary”. 
Rubin attributes Apollinaire and Salmon’s false assumption that Picasso was 
the sole author of Cubism as being the result of the painter’s higher market prices.431 
Prior to the moment of Cubism Picasso had already achieved an established position 
in the art market, having gone through five different styles – as such his paintings 
were selling for higher prices than Braque’s Fauvist work. During the Cubist years 
Picasso received approximately four times the amount that Braque did for a picture. 
In addition to this fact, Rubin considers the possibility of the critics not being present 
enough in the artists’ studios in order for them to understand the development of 
Cubism and the collaboration between the two painters. Picasso and Braque’s 
resentment at attempts to theorise Cubism derived from false readings of their 
methodology, which did not do justice to Braque’s position either. The specificities of 
their collaboration were hidden in the face of these inquires and reports. 
Nevertheless, Rubin presents a series of statements that clearly demonstrate 
the painters’ dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. For example, in a letter to 
Braque, Picasso is outraged about Apollinaire and Salmon’s “unjust” depreciation of 
Braque.432 In another instance, Picasso expresses his criticism of Apollinaire’s book in 
a letter to Kahnweiler, and Braque cites its “bamboozling” effects.433  
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Picasso articulated concerns about writings on Cubism from as early as 1911, 
when he joked about newspaper articles to Kahnweiler.434 Despite Picasso’s apparent 
disagreement with accounts of Cubism favouring his contribution, Françoise Gilot 
describes Picasso’s competitiveness towards his fellow artists, which she witnessed 
during the painters’ meetings, of which there is no trace in Picasso’s correspondence 
with Braque or Kahnweiler. Competitiveness is often the case when artists work 
closely together, but separately, and in most cases it is the reason for astonishing 
advances. Yet, Gilot talks of how fellow artists were cautious of showing work in 
progress to Picasso, fearing that he would rework their advances in a better way and 
eventually everyone would think of their work as a copy of Picasso’s, instead of vice 
versa. After all, Gilot states that Picasso quite often proclaimed, “When there is 
anything to steal, I steal”.435 But when it came to his working relationship with 
Braque, Picasso saw it as more collaborative than competitive, confessing to Gilot that 
“a canvas wasn’t finished unless both of us felt it was”.436  
Rubin’s recent attempt to define Braque and Picasso’s artistic relationship – 
formed after Kahnweiler’s model of comparative opposition – is by far the most 
insightful. To start with, Rubin draws a crucial distinction between Picasso’s 
employment of the figure and Braque’s preference for “inanimate” objects, and 
landscape. Rubin attributes the centrality of the figure and of the portrait in Picasso’s 
Cubism to the painter’s “interest in the particulars of the human situation”.437 Braque 
did not paint any figure works until 1911, but only because the Cubist Analytic 
fragmentation blurred the visual identification of either a figure or a still life, let alone 
a specific individual. In spite of the fact that Braque eventually incorporated the figure 
into his work, he did not title any of his figure works as portraits. Picasso, on the 
other hand, painted a series of portraits of his dealers. Perhaps Braque chose not to 
portray specific individuals because he foresaw how the representational complexities 
involved in the demand for resemblance by a portrait’s subject would pose serious 
limitations to his expressive and experimental intentions. In other words, how can one 
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successfully represent a specific person through a visual style that fundamentally 
challenges the demand for acute naturalistic representation?   
 The seemingly dualist objectification of the body – as the result of the 
representation of the subject through a multiplicity of viewing points – stops at the 
representation of physicality and does not attempt to produce an account of the 
subject’s ‘inner self’.  So the pending question is: to what ends does Picasso develop 
the category of the portrait? Rubin argues that Picasso resorted to his gifts as a 
caricaturist, to overcome Analytic Cubism’s limiting fragmentation in the creation of 
a verifiable portrait. Picasso did this, by being able to isolate facial characteristics and 
introduce them sporadically in the portraits of his dealers.438 However, as we have 
seen, the practice of caricature drawing is in fact derived from dualist physiognomic 
treatises. By contrast, an examination of Braque’s figurative Cubist works, with their 
lack of distinct physiognomic characteristics, indicates Braque’s scepticism towards 
portraiture’s mimetic demands. Of course, it could be argued that Picasso resolved 
such issues through physiognomy; however, Picasso’s solution draws on a pre-
modernist realism.  
The additional remnants of traditional aesthetics in Picasso’s practice can be 
inferred from Rubin’s following argument about Braque. Drawing on two 1912 
figurative paintings (Man with a Violin and Soda) Rubin concludes that Braque’s level 
of “anti-hierarchical” fragmented abstraction is a result of his concern with the nature 
of painting itself, as opposed to Picasso’s “will to represent directly the human 
drama”.439 Thus, Rubin views Braque’s reservation about dealing with the subject as 
an outcome of his “reverence for the language and craft of painting”, and his 
preoccupation with the dissolution of a “sign into a mark”. Rubin’s account seems to 
follow Apollinaire’s reading of the role of the subject as insignificant. Conversely, 
Picasso bypasses any ‘obstacles’ in the “the direct expression of his feelings about 
people”, and transforms a mark “into a sign for a face or figure” – a metamorphosis 
that drives Picasso’s late period.440 Where Braque reductively derives signs from 
texture, or “surface qualities”, Picasso inventively draws from the “physiognomy” of 
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shapes or objects.441 Finally, Picasso’s devotion to the “morphological” and 
“conceptual” definition of his subjects – in contrast to Braque’s preoccupation with 
compositional issues – encourages Rubin to call Picasso “an utterly representational 
painter in an increasingly abstract art”, a view that proposes an aesthetic clash in 
Picasso’s practice. 
More recent accounts of Cubism seem to negate the metaphysical readings of 
the early theorisations. For John Berger, Cubism successfully combines Courbet’s 
materialism (attention to physical properties of objects) and Cézanne’s dialectic 
(multiple view points).442 Cubism’s approach to representation, Berger writes, is based 
fundamentally on the attempt to produce a visual account of a subject from multiple 
viewing points, which above all, stresses “the physical complexity of the structure of 
[the] figure”.443 The treatment of the body is described by Berger as an organisation, 
parallel to that of a city, asserting “the unmetaphysical character of man”. Further on 
Berger adopts a ‘functionalist’ language in declaring that Cubist figurative paintings 
“infer that consciousness is a property of highly organised matter”. What Berger 
ignores, however, in his argument is the presupposition of the pictorial device of 
‘perspective’ in the process of visually composing multiple viewing points, which is 
foreign to the modernist ethos. Certainly, cubists did not employ perspective as 
Poussin did, for example, yet a total negation of perspective would result in an 
abstract chaos void of all indications of space. Yet, the possibility of this outcome is 
prevented by Synthetic Cubism’s abstract reduction of shapes to signs. 
Concerning perspective, Taylor argues that the Renaissance pictorial invention 
visually prepared the ground for the new Dualist self insofar as it encompasses a 
process of objectification of, and disengagement from, the subject or object: “the artist 
is looking at what he depicts from a determinate point of view. With the achievement 
of perspective, the depicted reality is laid out as it appears from a particular 
situation.”444 In addition, the Renaissance desire to imitate nature free from stylistic 
burdens of previous iconographic traditions, led to a more naturalistic portraiture. 
Taylor claims that in its temporal isolation of subjects from architectural or worldly 
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contexts, Renaissance portraiture asserts a rejection of the Platonic mode of being as 
part of a cosmic order; yet Taylor views the liberation of nature’s depiction – including 
the human – from iconographic traditions, as the first visual manifestation of dualist 
objectification:  
 
So the ”freeing” of the object also carries with it a “freeing” of the subject, in the form 
of a greater self-consciousness, a new distance and separation from the object, a sense 
of standing over and against and no longer being englobed by what is 
depicted…Didn’t this in its way prepare the ground for the more radical break, in 
which the subject frees himself decisively by objectifying the world? The separation by 
which I stand over against the world perhaps helps prepare for the deeper rupture 
where I no longer recognise it as the matrix in which my life’s ends are set. The stance 
of separation helps overcome that profound sense of involvement in the cosmos, that 
absence of a clear boundary between self and world, which was generated by and 
contributed to sustaining the premodern notions of cosmic order.445 
 
Despite Taylor’s convincing association of perspective with dualism, Berger’s reading 
of the effects of Cubism’s multiple viewing points manages to remain anti-dualist. In 
doing so, Berger argues, that the Cubist system, which is indebted to Cézanne, 
refuses to present a “static view of nature”.446 Through a simplification of forms, 
Cubism aims to disclose interactions between objects and subjects, thus focusing on 
exposing processes “of interlocking phenomena” rather than “static states of being”. 
The proposed associations of Cubism’s methodology with traditional pictorial 
devices should not be misinterpreted as a frail claim against the style’s achieved level 
of abstraction. Semiotic accounts of Cubism discuss its abstraction in terms of a 
reduction of shapes into signs; in this view semiotic signification replaces illusionist 
realism, and traditional notions of likeness. From such a perspective, Rosalind Krauss 
identifies and unravels the importance of ‘naming’ in the construction of a Cubist 
work’s meaning.447 In doing so, Krauss talks of how the process of ‘naming’ is driven 
by our constant search for the ultimate mode of signification “beyond which there can 
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be no further reading or interpretation”.448 Likewise, the meaning, as well as the 
signification of the naming of a subject is limited by the “the boundaries of identity”. 
The problem of misleading, or invented naming of a painting’s subject lies in the 
production of numerous failed readings by scholars, which is the result of variable 
identification.  
The issue of naming gains seriousness when a painting does not represent a 
specific, or even existing person or object. Yves-Alain Bois talks of how Kahnweiler 
named most of Picasso and Braque’s Cubist work based on the painters’ descriptions. 
But Bois also identifies instances of Picasso disapproving of Kahnweiler’s titles.449 A 
specialised study of Picasso’s Cubist portraiture could be easily derailed if the 
discussion allocates equal value to the paintings that were initially intended as abstract 
figurative explorations of unidentified subjects as well as to those that were eventually 
falsely titled by Kahnweiler as portraits450 – perhaps, as Bois claims “to prevent their 
erroneous interpretation as pure abstraction”.451 Kahnweiler’s intent behind his titling 
– that is, to limit the perceived level of abstraction of the works in their viewing – 
raises two issues: firstly, it is an act that resembles Hegel’s call for limited abstraction 
– the limit being the moment that the figure ceases to be identified – and secondly, in 
underlining the traditional portraiture’s mimetic requirements it invokes the 
imposition of such limits. 
The main focus of semiotic analyses lies in late Synthetic Cubism given the 
reading of collage as a technique that explicates a concept of the sign in a 
representational context. Krauss praises collage for challenging modernism’s intention 
to “objectify the formal constituents of a given medium” by “setting up discourse in 
place of presence”.452 Accordingly, Krauss claims Cubism as a ‘postmodernist’ art due 
to the fact that its identification and exploration of representational concerns, “to 
name (represent) an object may not necessarily be to call it forth, for there may be no 
(original) object”. By extension, and in crucial relation to the focus of this chapter, 
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collage is seen as the crystallisation of Analytic Cubism’s exploration of impersonal 
subjectivity in a work, and in authorship; only this time we also witness the addition 
of language to the artists’ palette, in the form of print or text.  
 
 
Krauss & Bois on Cubism 
 
Language, particularly the means by which it is employed by Picasso in his 
collage in the form of newspaper clips, or painted inscriptions is the focus of another 
essay on Cubism by Krauss.453 Krauss views the role of the newspaper in Picasso’s 
collages as an intention to concurrently represent and employ a procedural process of 
unfolding meaning that addresses the contextual conditions of the system that it is a 
part of.454 In preparing the ground for a semiotic analysis of the role of language, 
Krauss touches upon traditionalist issues that lie at the heart of Cubist 
experimentation. For instance, collage is now read as a formal resolution of 
Renaissance illusionism, in that it proposes alternatives to the sensual perception of a 
work: touching, instead of, or in addition to, seeing. But more importantly, collage 
rules out the possibility of illusionism through its flat representation of objects, given 
that an emphasised two-dimensionality prevents the illusionary evocation of three-
dimensions. In her discussion, Krauss unravels the function of language in Picasso 
acting in “the absence of [its] referents”.455 That is, we witness the transition of 
painting from an iconic representational system to a symbolic system;456 a system that 
Hegel claims to be highly problematic in its distortion of meaning. However, Krauss 
tends to describe Picasso’s Analytic stage in Hegelian terms of limited abstraction. In 
fact, Krauss suggests that the prominence of the figure in Picasso’s Analytic painting 
was a result of Picasso’s effort to prevent it from totally dissolving into abstraction, 
thus saving some remaining traces of humanism in portraiture.457 
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When Krauss discusses the issue of vision she returns to Platonic dualist 
positions. Krauss claims that Picasso refused to accept that our inability to perceive 
depth visually, should prevent it from being dealt with in painting. Furthermore, 
Picasso was a true believer in the romantic notion of ‘artistic genius’, which draws 
exclusively on Plato’s concept of an artistic vision capable of penetrating appearances 
(depth) and systems (cosmic order) in search for truth. In this context, Krauss views 
Braque’s Analytic works as driven by an effort to merge touch and sight; Picasso on 
the other hand, sought to keep these sensory functions separate. In Krauss’ analysis 
there is a suspicious parallelism between the physicality of touch and metaphysicality 
(or the immaterially of vision), which stems from the lack of need to physically engage 
with what our eyes are directed to.458 As a result, Braque comes across as anti-dualist 
in his effort to unite the two senses, and Picasso appears as a dualist who insists in 
keeping them apart.  
In the influential essay ‘Kahnweiler’s Lesson’, Bois aims to validate a semiotic 
reading of Cubism by an exploration of the role of African art, particularly of the 
Grebo Mask.459 Bois draws heavily from Kahnweiler’s writing, where he identifies the 
only attempt in early writing on Cubism to identify the function of the sign in 
Cubism. The first issue Bois touches on is the role of the mask, which he regards as 
the inspirational force behind Cubism’s exploration of representational modes. In 
doing so, Bois argues that the mask’s formal influence can be divided in two 
categories: “morphological” and “structural”.460 Picasso’s initial interest in African art, 
Bois writes, was of a “morphological-expressionist” nature: what Picasso found in 
their “deform[ed] anatomical proportions” was inspiration for advancing the figurative 
abstraction in his own work. Moreover, Bois distinguishes between “psychological 
inexpressiveness” and “antiexpressionism”, to argue in an anti-dualist manner, that 
Picasso’s experimental “deformation” of the mask signifies “a refusal of psychological 
depth”.461 Indeed, Bois argues that Picasso was uninterested in addressing human 
subjectivity at this stage of his career. 
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Bois claims that Picasso’s interest in African art reflects the drive to “plastic 
metaphorisation” at the core of Cubism, elsewhere seen in the employment of texture-
giving decorative tools.462 Elaborating his argument in Saussurian terms, Bois 
maintains that Cubism’s abstract methodology – revived from the ‘hermetism’ of the 
late Analytic stage through Picasso’s rediscovery of African art in 1912 – focuses on 
the sign’s “arbitrary” nature. Furthermore, Bois revisits Saussure’s clarification that 
“the arbitrary involves not the link between the sign and its referent but that between 
the signifier and the signified in the interior stage”, a position that helped Saussure to 
distinguish ‘referentiality’ from ‘signification’. By extension, Bois explains how, in 
semiotic and linguistic terms, the notion of a “linguistic sign’s relative motivation” 
should not be misinterpreted as a negation of the arbitrariness of the sign. Conversely, 
what relative motivation does is to explicate limitations in a system of values. When 
Bois applies this model to a reading of Picasso’s work he views his papier collés’s 
“reduction of his plastic system to a handful of signs” as the source of “multiple 
readings”. Alternatively put, reductively abstracted forms that are often seen as noses 
can, at other times, be seen as mouths; or syntheses of forms can be viewed either as a 
face or a guitar.  
To sum up, Bois views the process of synthesis of late Cubism as the extension 
of painting into real space, as the result of the incorporation of real materials such as 
newspaper cuttings into the space of art. Notions of co-existence extend in the 
“infinite” combination of arbitrary and non-substantial signs, as found in African art. 
It is this that underlines Picasso’s interest in abstract reductiveness. However, as Bois 
crucially identifies, what the Grebo mask did above all was to help Picasso realise that 
what matters is not a sign’s “morphology” but its “function, its value within a system”. 
From Bois’ analysis we can surmise that where Analytic Cubism was devoted to an 
exploration of the sign’s function, Synthetic Cubism sought to employ it 
constructively. In addition, the transition from compositional exploration (function of 
sign in system) to inventive abstraction (employment of sign in system) is parallel to 
the evolution of the dualist portrait from pre-modern representational concerns with 
compositional issues (location of sign/subject within pictorial whole), to modernist 
formal abstraction (inventive and often reductive employment of sign/subject). 
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The most important breakthrough of this abstract methodology – initially 
deformative and eventually reductive –is that acute imitation is no longer the driving 
force behind painting’s discourse. With regard to the sensitive, illusionist issue of 
chiaroscuro, Bois argues that Picasso’s employment of it is the exact opposite to 
Rembrandt’s: Picasso amplifies contrasts, instead of harmoniously reducing them. 
Picasso’s gradual desire to diminish any traces of illusionism is also reflected in his 
application of multiple lighting sources, and viewing points. According to Bois, 
Kahnweiler’s notion of ‘piercing of the closed form’, which took place in Cadaqués, is 
the moment that Picasso discovered an alternative purpose for chiaroscuro, other than 
defining the shape of objects or figures.463 Yet, Picasso did not manage to fully escape 
the remnants of traditionalism. As he stated in a conversation with Kahnweiler, 
Cubism is laden with indications of objects in perspective; and all that the 
superimposed planes ever did was to replace this. Ironically, Picasso holds the multiple 
representation of objects responsible for misleading readings of the works as void of 
perspective.464 If this is the case, then we can assume that Picasso was largely sceptical 
of the overbearing critical implications of Cubism, in light of its failure to fully escape 
all the conventions of realism.  
Picasso expressed further second thoughts about Analytic Cubism in another 
conversation he had with Kahnweiler in 1933 in his studio at Rue de la Boétie.465 This 
time Picasso is dismissive of Analytic Cubism’s “materialism”, by which he refers to 
the retaining of the traditionalist “imitation of material form”. It could also be argued 
that the representation of an object from multiple viewing points emphasises such 
imitative intent. Picasso’s demeaning of descriptive materialism is not a prioritisation 
of the immaterial (as in the soulful), but rather a preference for “intellectual means of 
expression”. Moreover, it has been recently revealed that Braque, and also Gris were 
responsible for the early defences of Analytic Cubism as a form of expressing 
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‘essential’ and ‘conceptual’ realities through the variable presentation of an object’s 
sides, and not Picasso.466  
This reading of Cubism’s methodology is undermined by yet another 
conflictual co-existence of the forces of classicism and dualism. The pictorial devices 
of the perspective and static viewing points are maximised for the sake of an essential 
reality, which fail by being limited to material appearances; the result might be 
abstract, but it is only due to the visually confusing outcome of ‘variable viewing’. In 
Hegelian terms, classicism’s influence in Analytic Cubism is to limit abstraction 
through mimesis. As Bois successfully argues, Picasso was to disapprove of Analytic 
Cubism due to its inability to fully escape mimetic structures. Yet, Picasso did not 
detest illusionism per se, but “the condition of illusionism”.467 That is, a perception of 
signs that disregards their material reality, in favour of their transparency. Contrary to 
his later thoughts on Analytic Cubism, Picasso was particularly pleased with the 
achievements of the Synthetic stage. In fact, Picasso revealed to Kahnweiler in 1948 
how much he regretted abandoning the Synthetic creative period to return to oil 
painting.468 Perhaps, Picasso’s approval of the Synthetic stage is driven, in Krauss’ 
terms, by collage’s substitution of “luminosity”, “transparency”, and “obliquity” for the 
illusionist chiaroscuro and light of Analytic Cubism.469 But are not these universal, 
and transparent aesthetic qualities the very same that Bois claims that Picasso disliked 
in the condition of illusionism?  
Bois returns to the Grebo Mask to unravel the reasons behind his recent claims 
for the mask’s explicative role in revealing the function of the sign within a system. 
Drawing once more from the writings of Kahnweiler, Bois argues that the mask’s 
morphology elucidates a semiotic/scriptural path towards a “liberation” from 
illusionism. Moreover, Kahnweiler adopts a process of thought similar to that of ‘non-
objective’ art to maintain that such signs act as “emblems for the external world, not 
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mirrors”.470 However, Bois argues that there are limits to the use of signs, particularly 
in their function within a given system: in order for them to remain readable they 
need to be inventive within boundaries set by the system’s rules. Once again we are 
faced with an indication of limited abstraction that seems to follow Hegelian aesthetic 
thought. In fact, Bois takes the initiative to set the limits himself by claiming that it 
was never the Cubists’ intention to achieve full abstraction, therefore they could not 
afford to fully abstract the figure.471 
What is at question in this chapter is not figurative painting per se but 
portraiture, hence, the earlier distinction between paintings titled as portraits and 
those simply as figure of x or y. Moreover, the focus of our discussion should be 
directed towards the limits to abstraction imposed by the humanist, mimetic demands 
of portraiture, appropriate for the visual identification of a subject, in spite of a 
process of naming. If we approach the issue from a semiotic perspective we should 
examine the role of the dualist physiognomy, which as Rubin identified, assisted 
Picasso in isolating shapes (Analytic) in the process of turning them into signs 
(Synthetic). The advanced semiotic experimentation of Synthetic Cubism underlines 
the distorting effects of partial physiognomic signification, which results in a multiple 
reading of a sign.472 Overall, Bois’ understanding of Cubism is as a form of a structural 
methodology that seeks to “dissect” signs from systems only to come to “re-associate”, 
or “articulate” them according to certain rules that would prevent random results.473 In 
dualist terms, the early stage of this semiotic methodology seems to mirror the 
Cartesian notion of objectification. And once a ‘scientific’ understanding of the 
objectified sign in this case is achieved, then it can be rationally, and instrumentally 
controlled.  
An issue that is largely overseen by semiotic analyses, is the requirement of 
rules as integral to the nature and function of a system. Despite the fact that we are 
unaware of whether Braque and Picasso were keen on a painting practice dictated by 
rules, and limited within a system, it is clearly the case that the avant-garde was 
opposed to modes of restrained creative exploration. Hence, the avant-garde’s disdain 
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towards traditional aesthetics, and commissioned portraiture, as a result, as I have 
explained, of the imposed limits of the mimetic demands. Bearing in mind Picasso’s 
scepticism about the employment of multiple viewing points and light sources – he 
disregarded them as alternatives to single-point perspective – it seems unlikely that he 
would resort to a strategy of ‘replacing’ again – that is, replacing traditional rules for 
semiotic ones. Supporters of semiotics could possibly argue for the existence of a 
system as integral to any structural phenomenon, yet, they only have to approach the 
moment of Abstract Expressionism to understand that in art everything is possible. 
Perhaps Picasso was sympathetic towards structural rules, but if he was then he shared 
the same passion that drove Descartes to compromise his Method. Semiotic readings 
of Cubism are laden with basic dualist characteristics. First, they presuppose the 
existence of a system compiled by signs with specific roles, which mirrors Plato’s 
notion of rationally locating our place in the cosmic order. Secondly, the view of 
Cubism’s internal development as an exploration of the function of the sign within a 
pictorial system (Analytic), followed by its creative employment (Synthetic) within the 
same system, resembles the Cartesian method of scientific objectification for the 
purpose of instrumental control. 
 
 
Clark & Rubin’s Cubism 
 
For Clark, the problem with semiotic accounts of Cubism lies in their 
concentration on “particulars”.474 By extension, a semiotic approach is seen to be 
inaccurate as a consequence of the way a selection of pictorial features might not be 
the focus of the creator.475 Clark is also sceptical of a reading of Cubism as a 
‘language’, although he admits that “it looks as one”.476 Yet, Clark detects and accepts 
the existence of a “totality”, whose act of organisation is seen as Cubism’s heritage to 
modernism.477 Contrary to semiotic claims, Clark challenges the view of a “non-
imitative whole” as created by “local acts of illusionism” (interplay of light and 
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multiple viewing points).478 Instead, Clark values the role of the grid, which by 
functioning as a compositional device “becomes a guarantor of totality”.479 In doing so, 
the grid fails to become part of the “perception it totalises”, by acting as a “membrane” 
torn between the compositional ‘outside’ and the formalist ‘inside’. Yet, the 
diagramming and “geometricisation”, integral to the fabrication of the grid gradually 
replaced illusionist techniques.  
As we have seen an additional problem of semiotic accounts lies in the 
presupposed imposition of rules, which encourages a Hegelian reading of Cubism’s 
abstract intentions as self-limited. Clark, on the other hand views Cubism’s constant 
drive towards “ambiguity” and “ambition for obscurity” as testimony of a modern art 
that “found its subject-matter in itself”.480 That is, through a critical, and unlimited 
exploration of representational issues, firstly by demonstrating the failures of 
illusionism, and as such the subsequent downgrading of depiction or “reference” as no 
longer as important.481 Thus, Clark’s understanding of Cubism implies the 
suppression of the work’s subject, whose only purpose is to serve as a means of critical 
reflection on the art’s own structures. Accordingly, Clark agrees with Bois and Krauss 
in viewing the role of African art in the early stages of Cubism as a form of 
methodological objectification: “an aid to understanding illusionism, not disposing 
it”.482 Yet, Clark distances his account from dualist notions when he unravels the 
breakthroughs achieved in Horta, during the summer of 1909. In doing so, he claims 
that the pictorial exploration of forms from multiple viewing points is an attempt to 
address illusionism through a resolution of the question of presence associated with 
‘salience’ by replacing it with ‘convexity’. Accordingly, the illusion of presence, for 
Clark, depends on the absence of the non-visible, that is, the formal aspects that are 
not visible from a static viewpoint. By treating the body as map, Clark claims that 
Picasso implies that  “things have no other [metaphysical] sides”.483 
Surprisingly, Rubin opens his analysis of Picasso’s portrait practice with claims 
of an anti-dualist nature. Drawing on the whole of Picasso’s portraiture, Rubin 
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identifies a “passion of [figurative] metamorphosis”,484 viewed as rejection of a notion 
of the self as immutable. However, the methodology behind the model of 
representation that Rubin proposes, consists of a combination of Plato’s notion of 
artistic vision and the Renaissance concept of the artist projecting his or her self onto 
their art: “he [Picasso] would distribute different aspects of their personalities and his 
own changing feelings toward them”.485 In line with the general view, Cubist 
portraiture is regarded as “objective” as opposed to the more “subjective” late surrealist 
and expressionist works. This is so, Rubin writes, because Picasso was fundamentally 
concerned with personal issues of formalist self-expression and not with the 
representation of his subjects’ physical image or character. Self-expression is used here 
in its literal sense; Rubin refers to Marius de Zayas’ reflections on a 1910 interview by 
Picasso, particularly his claim that “the picture [for Picasso] should be the pictorial 
equivalent of the emotion produced by the subject”.486 Thus, Rubin’s position differs 
from Clark’s, in that where the latter argues for an aesthetic exploration internal to 
Cubism that reduced the subject to the means of an experiment, the former claims 
that Picasso was still concerned with the subject, but instead of incorporating the 
subject’s own self-projection he communicated his own.  
Such pictorial emphasis on psychological content – in terms of the artist’s 
representation of his own subjectivity as well as that of his subjects’ – is for the first 
time concretised in modernism as a consequence of the artists’ freedom to choose 
their subjects. In doing so, in Picasso’s works we witness the emergence of friends, 
family, and lovers in place of the familiar patrons and commissioners. Hence, the 
painters’ personal familiarity with their subjects is what enables this psychological 
reading; familiarity in a sense provides the conditions for formalist experimentation 
and the release of the artists’ responsive feelings. To sum up, Picasso’s portrait 
methodology is an amalgamation of artistic and personal concerns, which result in the 
abstract transformation of his subjects. Moreover, the very fact that such portraits 
were not commissioned reconfigures the right-to-honour from the exemplary to the 
everyday. 
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Rubin claims in agreement with most of the early Cubist theory that the 
critical moment in Picasso’s work involves a shift from representational to the 
conceptual. Touching upon the issue of ‘naming’, previously discussed by Krauss, 
Rubin regards the Portrait of Gertrude Stein (1905-06) as posing an important 
question concerning the centrality of mimetic representation (in this instance 
substituted by a process of naming) in the identification of a portrait’s subject.487 
Brilliant seems to contest such a view by arguing that the lack of faithful resemblance 
in Stein’s portrait should not be perceived as Picasso’s disinterest in addressing her 
subjectivity. Instead, Brilliant argues that this portrait’s rigid rendering of Stein’s facial 
features, which is the result of more than eighty sittings and a study of Iberian 
sculpture, derives from Picasso’s intention to represent Stein’s “psyche…concretely”.488 
What follows from this view is that Picasso finds the means for manipulating the 
representation of Stein’s physical appearance in order to satisfactorily incorporate an 
impression of her character. Thus, for the creation of this portrait Picasso’s 
subjectivity was at the service of communicating Stein’s. 
Discussing the Analytic portraits of Picasso’s dealers as an “anomaly” in the 
course of Cubism’s development, (Clovis Sagot, Wilhelm Uhde, Ambroise Vollard, 
and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler) Rubin raises two important questions: firstly, it is 
peculiar that Picasso turned to portraiture – a genre with the burden of mimesis – at a 
moment that he was reaching pure abstraction, and secondly, it is surprising that all 
these subject are men – considering the painter’s desire to paint women, usually his 
lovers. Admittedly, the second question is answered with certain naivety simply 
because Rubin associates the “impersonal”, “conceptual” and “speculative character” of 
Cubism with Spanish male qualities.489 Answering the first question, however, will 
require a more extensive discussion. Rubin is quick to rule out professional, career-
driven motives as the only ones behind the execution of these portraits, yet as we will 
see, they played a far bigger role, with detrimental aesthetic side effects. What he 
proposes in return is that Picasso needed sitters that would be patient and 
understanding enough to endure lengthy sittings, as well as subjects distinct enough 
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that their identities would not dissolve into a process of generalisation of forms and 
colours.490  
Astonishingly, Rubin neglects the fact that in the same volume Pierre Daix 
successfully proves that Picasso painted these portraits from memory and 
photographs, and not from actual sittings.491 This is a very significant point, as 
Picasso’s preference to execute portraits from photographs shows a level of disinterest 
in human exchange, since Picasso is not employing sittings in order to familiarise 
himself with his subjects. Moreover, such a choice would suggest that Picasso was 
primarily concerned with issues internal to his art and not with the mimetic interests 
of his sitters. Regarding, the distinctiveness of these individuals, we simply have to 
wonder how many people outside the early 20th-century Parisian art-world would 
recognise these dealers. In this respect, perhaps it would be more appropriate to 
choose a more popular figure. Let us say for example, the 1920’s equivalent of Marilyn 
Monroe, or Jackie O. Furthermore, Rubin attributes the variable level of abstraction 
of these portraits – with Vollard’s being the most realistic, followed by the more 
abstract portraits of Uhde and Kahnweiler – to the professional status of each dealer. 
Accordingly, Rubin builds on the false claim of lengthy sittings to argue that Picasso 
could demand more sittings from Uhde and Kahnweiler because they depended on 
him, and not vice versa, as was the case with Vollard.492   
Contrary to Rubin, Michael C. Fitzgerald attributes more value to economic 
and professional motives in Picasso’s choice of portrait subjects. In fact, as Fitzgerald 
reveals, from the beginning of his career Picasso was aware of the importance of art-
world figures and he often employed his art for “the cultivation of those who might 
develop his reputation”.493 Prior to the Cubist portraits, Picasso had executed, and 
donated to the sitters, portraits of Pedro Manach (his early agent), Gustave Coquiot 
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(a critic that praised Picasso), and Ambroise Vollard (who hosted a show of Picasso’s 
post-impressionist work). And let us not forger the portraits that he painted of the 
Steins: besides Gertrude, Picasso painted the portraits of Leo Stein and Michael 
Stein’s son, Allan in 1906.  
Furthermore, Picasso was in constant competition with his contemporaries, 
especially with Matisse. In the same month that Matisse achieved financial security by 
signing an advantageous contract with Bernheim-June (September 1909), Picasso 
moved from Bateau Lavoir to a more prestigious apartment with a separate studio on 
the boulevard de Clichy, a move that was probably driven by an effort to upgrade his 
public and artistic image, since he was still lacking a regular dealer. What followed in 
the new premises was the execution of the famous portraits of art dealers: Clovis 
Sagot (1909), Ambroise Vollard (1910), Wilhelm Uhde (1910), and Daniel-Henry 
Kahnweiler (1910).494  
 
 
The Portraits of Sagot, Vollard, Uhde and Kahnweiler 
 
Let us examine each portrait individually in terms of a level of progressive 
abstraction and a reduction of realism, and in relation to Picasso’s professional 
relationship with each of his sitters. As we will see the gestural motivation behind 
each work can be roughly divided in two categories: rewarding – thanking a dealer for 
the staging of a show, or a successful sale – and promoting – luring a dealer into a 
potential professional collaboration. 
The Portrait of Clovis Sagot is the most realist of all, however without negating 
abstraction altogether. According to Daix, Picasso intentions behind this portrait were 
to produce a “combination” of realist and abstract tendencies. In doing so, the 
‘organic’ curves of Sagot’s figure are contradicted by straight lines of clothing. Picasso 
sought to achieve a certain level of Cubist “descriptive analysis” and a level of pictorial 
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realism, by resorting to a Cézannesque treatment of the figure. The influence of 
Cézanne in this early Cubist work is reflected in the treatment of Sagot’s jacket and 
particularly his face, in addition to the portrait’s overall impression of a 19th-century 
figure.495 Bearing in mind that Sagot was Picasso’s most consistent dealer at the time 
helps explain why this is the first portrait of the series. Picasso’s decision to paint 
Sagot’s portrait following successful deals grants to the execution of the work a 
rewarding gestural attribute.496 If this is the case, its level of realism is not necessarily 
driven by a desire to please Sagot’s mimetic expectations. It could simply be the 
outcome of Cubism’s development. Yet, when we view Sagot’s portrait next to that of 
Manuel Pallarés (late spring 1909) it is quite obvious that where Pallarés’ portrait is 
overtaken by abstraction – a careful geometric and fragmented rendering – Sagot’s 
portrait is a clear return to realism – mimetic identification – in spite of traces of 
Cubist abstraction.  
As a dealer, Vollard was more successful than Sagot, and all the other dealers 
in Picasso’s Cubist portraits. Despite the fact he had acquired a significant number of 
paintings, Picasso had not managed to achieve a commitment from him, similar to 
the one that Matisse attained from his recent contract with Bernheim-Jeune.497 
Therefore, it is conceivable that the character of this work is an attempt at self-
promotion through a demonstration of skills and as such his work’s commercial 
prospects. The Portrait of Ambroise Vollard shares the level of realism found in Sagot’s, 
and as Vollard has stated, his resemblance in the portrait was even identified by 
children.498 Rubin detects a conflictual co-existence in Vollard’s portrait visualised by 
an effect of illusionistic realism within Cubism’s fragmentally abstract rendering.499 
Illusionism functions in this portrait, as well as in the others, as a force that produces 
a Hegelian limited abstraction; one that aspires to prevent the total abolition of the 
sitter’s subjectivity by retaining a satisfactory level of physiognomic identification.  
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The resemblance between Vollard and Sagot’s portraits is due to the 
compromised level of abstraction for the sake of visual identification. Daix argues that 
in executing this portrait Picasso intended to justify to Vollard “the validity of the 
progress of his Cubism…by emphasising its ability to characterise”, as he did with the 
portrait of Stein.500 Yet, it could be argued that Stein’s portrait achieved 
characterisation through her pose, and by Stein’s choice of attire. Conversely, the 
sense of realism in Vollard’s portrait is located in the treatment of his face. The 
treatment of Stein’s face, inspired by the aesthetics of primitive masks (which has 
been the subject of numerous discussions) is by no means realistic. In fact, even Daix 
recognises in the same text that “the sudden, unexpected painting-out of Gertrude’s 
face no doubt had to do with Picasso’s decision to distance his portrait from that first 
illusionistic and somewhat idealising conception of it”.501 Then, why would Picasso 
take steps backwards? Was Picasso’s desire to impress Vollard stronger than what it 
was four years previously with Stein, or a few months ago with Sagot? Or, does the 
variable limited level of abstraction in each of these portraits correspond to the 
professional status of each dealer, and the nature of Picasso’s expectations of them? 
Vollard’s portrait was almost immediately followed by the Portrait of Wilhelm 
Uhde. For this work Picasso saw fit to resort to a Cézannesque treatment of the face 
once again, a fragmentation manifested by the interplay of planes, which is stronger 
here than in Vollard’s portrait. Despite its realist similarities with the portraits of 
Sagot and Vollard, Uhde’s portrait is the first to host a pictorial innovation that was to 
haunt the rest of Picasso’s portraiture, especially his post-World War II production: 
where as one eye is in frontal view, the other is in profile.502 When compared to Sagot 
and Vollard’s portraits this attribute, as well as the stronger fragmentation of Uhde’s 
face, produces a stronger sense of abstraction; yet, one that does not rule out the level 
of realism that is required for the visual identification of Uhde. The series of events 
that preceded and followed its execution suggest that with this portrait Picasso was 
aiming both to reward Uhde for numerous dealings, and possibly attract more 
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professional gains. Even though Uhde had been purchasing Picasso's art since 1905, a 
short while after the completion of his portrait he organised a show of Picasso’s work 
at the Galerie Notre Dame des Champs.503 Another coincidence? 
By far, the most abstract and innovative work of this series is the Portrait of 
Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler. Once again, the levels of abstraction and realism in this 
portrait seem to be parallel with the subject’s professional status, and to Picasso’s 
expectations of, or reliance on, Kahnweiler. Compared to the other three Kahnweiler 
had far less experience and range of trading activities. Uhde introduced him to Picasso 
in the summer of 1907, and apparently his purchases from Picasso had peaked around 
the time of his portrayal in 1910. Hasty to justify the motives behind the production 
of Kahnweiler’s portrait, and of the rest, as financial, Fitzgerald ignores the abundant 
evidence that proves that they were not painted from life. So, he suggests that Picasso 
used the sittings to “interview” these dealers in search for the one that would provide 
him with a contract similar to the one that Matisse had recently signed with 
Bernheim-Jeune.504 Perhaps, Kahnweiler’s lack of significant professional experience, 
and status in the art-world is what allowed Picasso to expand the limits of Cubist 
abstraction. The almost illusionist treatment of the faces in the previous portraits is 
now largely absent. Instead the impression of the subject is provided by a combination 
of structural fragmentation and peripheral references, acting as signs, which Daix 
regards as the outcome of the exploration of figurative representation that took place a 
few months earlier in Cadaqués.505 Or, as Cottington argues, what happened in 
Cadaqués was that Picasso set the limits of formal abstraction with the intention of 
preventing a total abandoning of iconicity altogether in order to avoid “risking 
complete indecipherability”;506 a certain compromise that was proven to be ideal for 
his Cubist portraiture. 
What stops these signs from dissolving into the generic and the universal is 
the fact Picasso was careful to construct them as much as possible from Kahnweiler’s 
own features; his quif, his nose, his eyes, his clothes, and even his characteristic sitting 
pose with crossed legs are all clearly recognisable. In this respect, the employment of 
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the sign in Kahnweiler’s portrait is an early indication of its discursively dominant role 
in the Synthetic stage. However, mimetic expectations, despite their minimal status in 
this case, stop the sign from acting in the arbitrary ways that Bois and Krauss’ describe 
in their semiotic analyses of late Cubism; even though it does act within a system. For 
Daix, this system, or rather “aesthetic whole”, is the outcome of a process that in its 
isolation of “analytic references” seems to rely on a Cartesian mode of objectification 
of facial features, followed by the instrumental employment of its results. Even Daix 
finds it difficult to avoid romantic terminology in his reading of the instrumental 
appropriation of signs within a unified “apparition”, reinforced as it is by the lack of 
marks that limit the abstraction of the sitter, as is the case in the other portraits.507 If 
we draw from the opening quote, even Picasso views the process of abstraction as 
indebted to realism, which, if we are to consider it from a dualist perspective, proposes 
a subservience of the soul to the body, and not vice versa. Alternatively, we would 
need a body to state the soul’s predominance over the body, and through this prove its 
existence – no body, then no representation of the soul at its expense.  What is 
demanded for this level of inter-dependence is the immateriality of the soul, which, 
caught in an easy preconception of its superiority over the body, materialises at the 
expense of the physical by instrumentally abstracting it.  Moreover, objectification 
plays a crucial part in the process of viewing too, as the identification of the subject 
requires a “decoding” of the signs’ references. Finally, the nature of the portrait’s 
abstraction should not fool us into underemphasising the conventional aspects of this 
portrait. The sitting pose, the compositional cropping of the body into a three-quarter 
pose, the focal attention to the face in addition to the inventive isolation of 
physiognomic characteristics clearly reflect traditional illusionist pictorial tactics, 
which were also, as I have stressed, the means by which 17th-century Dutch 
portraiture attempted to visualise dualist concerns. 
The level of realism in the portraits of Sagot, Vollard, and Uhde is clearly an 
outcome of the prevalence, or survival of traditional aesthetics within a modernist art 
that was driven by abstraction. A prevalence that could be due to the fact that these 
works were executed during the early days of Cubism, when the style had not 
managed to resolve or to seriously consider figurative representational issues. Or, 
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Picasso simply sidetracked already achieved breakthroughs; perhaps, because the 
moment of their realisation forced Picasso to understand that mimetic demands or 
expectations cannot co-exist with the avant-garde rhetoric of limitless pictorial 
experimentation driven by abstraction. Particularly, when the subjects of these 
portraits relied on a particular form of representation for demonstrating their 
authenticity and social stature.508 In other words, by executing these portraits Picasso 
might have become aware that the concerns (artistic) of his own subjectivity interfered 
with the concerns (resemblance) of his sitter’s subjectivity, with a strong potential to 
subsume them. There is, however, the possibility that his decisions in favouring the 
concerns of one subjectivity or the other was both influenced by issues internal to his 
art and by his business relationship with his subjects. 
As I mentioned earlier, the methodology behind the evocation of likeness in 
Picasso’s Cubist portrait of Kahnweiler has been widely attributed to his caricaturist 
skills of isolating physiognomic traits. 509 Clark goes as far as to praise these 
“indicators” as Picasso’s best Cubist improvisations.510 As we have seen in chapter 1, 
caricature is infused with dualism, and is inter-related with physiognomy. In addition, 
we should not let the theoretical appraisal of Picasso’s employment of a methodology 
central to physiognomy (isolation of an individual’s characteristic facial features) trick 
us into overlooking the impact of Picasso’s practical decision to limit the expressive, or 
abstractive development of his own found breakthroughs. In satisfying the mimetic 
demands imposed by his subjects’ viewing expectations Picasso resorted to a 
fundamentally traditional pictorial device, since a total negation of physiognomic 
identification would strip the works of any remaining humanism. In doing so, the 
pictorial elements of dualist physiognomy clash with the apparent anti-dualist 
treatment of the subject, by scrutinising the materiality of the figure. 
Daix regards the Cubist portrait as the moment that portraiture ceased being 
naturalistic. In turn, Picasso’s new methodology regards the portrait as the “sum of all 
that…[his] plastic imagination can extract and transform from the model”.511 Daix’s 
account needs to be unravelled. First, the quantity of the portrait’s “sum” is dependant 
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on how much Picasso’s imagination can “extract” from the subject, which could be 
according to his impression, his reading of the person, and even his mood of the time 
(all of which presuppose Plato’s notion of artistic pure vision – capable of such 
functions). Second, if the final creation is a product of his “plastic imagination”, of 
which the sum is a result of those abilities, then, as his post-World War II portraits of 
his partners’ show, it is destined to be constructed far from the real. This reality is 
sensory, as it refers to a naturalistic representation of the figure. In dualist terms, a 
true representation of reality requires a clear remarking of the soul’s superiority over, 
and instrumentalisation of, the body. In other words, the means by which an 
impression of a person’s inner being affects his or her representation (where their 
body is abstracted at the expense of visualising their superior-to-the-body soul). The 
soul’s effects and affects on the body are then made universally visible by artists, who 
record their vision according to their individual mental processing of them.  
As it was deduced from the semiotic accounts I discussed the arbitrary and 
universal nature of the sign limits the possibilities of portrayal. In their effort to prove 
that Picasso managed to overcome such problems, scholars like Daix, incorporate a 
discussion of portraiture works that were not intended to be portraits in the first place. 
In doing so, Daix praises Picasso’s employment of “peripheral information” in works 
such as Girl from Arles, 1912, and Female Nude, 1912 – where Daix takes the J’ aime 
Eva as an extension to the title in order to present it as a portrait and not as a generic 
figure – thereby achieving a form of ‘real’ portraiture as opposed to illusionist 
models.512 Yet, the formalist reduction of Synthetic Cubism did not allow for the 
creation of portraits, as a result of the universal sign’s inability to represent the specific 
details needed for the visual identification of a person.513 Nevertheless, it has to be 
noted that Picasso did produce a single papier collé portrait, that of his close friend and 
faithful supporter Guillaume Apollinaire. Executed in 1913, it adorned the cover of 
Apollinaire’s first important book, Alcools. What makes this work a portrait is not the 
sense of illusionism that assists in the visual identification of Apollinaire, but the 
process of naming that Krauss claims as integral to Synthetic Cubism. Even though, 
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Krauss discusses this process in her unravelling of the sign’s process of signification, it 
should not stop us from applying it to the simpler act of perceiving a system of signs – 
that of the visual representation of specific individuals. The papier collé portrait of 
Apollinaire is the moment when portraiture negates all traces of naturalism, and with 
it the framework of humanism, which remained variably present in all the Analytic 
portraits. Yet, such an unconventional process was not met with general appreciation 
by critics with the exception of Apollinaire, who supported Picasso’s artistic decisions 
and directions unquestionably.  
It is quite obvious by now that there is good evidence to suggest that Picasso 
was willing to satisfy the various mimetic expectations, or demands, of the subjects of 
his Analytic portraits. So, Picasso’s choice of subjects of this period follow the 
expectations of visual identification.514 If Rubin claimed that pre-modernist 
portraiture was “boring” because it was obedient to patronage, then how are these 
portraits any different in terms of their subjects? In the light of modern social and 
economic changes the dealer, agent, or gallerist now replaces the patron in providing 
an income for the artist. If Picasso was to choose his close friends and associates he 
would not have to compromise the advances of his art, simply because they would 
respect his artistic freedom, given that they were its strongest advocates. However, 
these compromises with conventional portraiture were not necessarily the outcome of 
fulfilled demands, expressed by his sitters, but rather the result of Picasso’s intention 
to please. So, exactly how independent was Picasso’s creativity when it was dictated by 
a desire to please expectations that contradicted his experimental intentions? 
 
 
Esprit du Commerce: The Turn to Neo-Classicism 
 
From this perspective it seems that Picasso’s next stylistic move, his turn to 
Neoclassicism, was driven by a desire to satisfy mimetic demands in his portraiture 
through a purely illusionist form of art. Of course, the common scholarly position 
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regarding this unexpected and contradictory stylistic evolution is ambiguous, even 
though there are extensive accounts of the career benefits of this move. As Daix 
claims, there are indications of realism in Picasso’s Cubist explorations in the second 
half of 1913 and early 1914.515 However, we cannot possibly accept that this move was 
driven by an intention to introduce classicism into Cubism, since this notion of 
realism is what compromised Analytic Cubist abstraction in a Hegelian manner; and 
Picasso was not so keen about it. In other words, to accept Daix’s position is to accept 
Picasso as a half-hearted avant-gardist, one who prioritises the subjective interests and 
concerns of figures in the art-world (paralleling the distorting interferences of pre-
modern patrons and commissioners). Almost every scholar admits that there is no 
satisfactory explanation as to why Picasso suddenly abandoned Cubism. First, let us 
examine the historical conditions under which Picasso made his stylistic turn in.  
In 1914, André Level formed a consortium of curators, dealers, and collectors 
for investing a significant sum of money in purchasing contemporary art, which would 
then be resold at events that took the form of exhibitions, leading to auctions of the 
works. The first sale took place at La Peau de l’ Ours, which was so successful that the 
consortium was named after it. This event provided Picasso with the chance to re-
familiarise himself with his early works from Blue and Red period. Furthermore, his 
Family of Saltimbanques achieved the biggest sale (12,650 francs, twelve times what 
Level had bought it for from Picasso in 1908), which might have encouraged Picasso 
to see financial benefits from a prospective re-turn to illusionism, be it either his early 
proto-Impressionism or Neoclassicism. At the same time, Picasso’s re-engagement 
with 19th-century masters, such as Renoir (through recent retrospective exhibitions in 
mid-1920s) combined with the recent market achievement of his early work, might 
have provided him with a workable alternative to Cubism, which was under heavy 
criticism.516 Drawing mostly from the work of Metzinger and Gleizes, critics accused 
Cubism of being outdated, and most pointedly as ahistoric and unpatriotic, since it 
ignored the current hostile European situation. The recent exhibitions and promotion 
of French great masters reflected the post-World War I trend of the “call to order” as 
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Jean Cocteau put it in 1926,517 that turned artistic attention to the revival of previously 
rejected traditional, mostly Mediterranean 19th-century artists.518 
Kenneth Silver discusses a series of published attacks against Cubism both in 
the form of essays and cartoons. In those, Cubism and modern art are portrayed as a 
predominantly Germanic, standing in contrast to the classicism of French 
patriotism.519 French xenophobia and fear that the large numbers of foreign artists 
now based in Paris would dominate the French art scene is reflected in Deputy 
Breton’s complaint about the inclusion of Cubists in the Grand Palais exhibition in 
1912. As Cottington identifies, Breton ethnic and cultural objections led him to count 
the exact number of foreign artists’ works in the show as well as to identify any 
members of the jury that were of foreign descent.520 Unfortunately, Breton’s 
xenophobia was shared by the majority of the press and government officials. 
Although the Fine Arts minister Léon Bérard would publicly deny any tactics of 
artistic discrimination he was privately pressuring the president of the Salon 
d’Autonome, Frantz Jourdain, to modify the rules with the purpose of preventing a 
future domination of the Salon by foreigners, as a condition for the Salon’s continued 
access to the Grand Palais.521  
Picasso’s only artistic response to the war was the still-life painting Still Life 
with Cards, Glasses, and a Bottle of Rum (1914-1915), which has come to be known as 
Vive la France. What distinguishes this work from others of this period is the 
inscription “vive la” accompanied by a pair of French flags on a whitecap at the lower 
left of the painting. However, as Silver identifies this was not as a significant gesture 
as Matisse’s Piano Lesson (1916), for instance (which signifies a clear impact of the 
war on Matisse), as there was no thematic change to what Picasso was producing 
during the previous year.522 In addition, Picasso’s combination of French patriotism 
with Cubism was not well received, considering the French hostility towards the style; 
perhaps this is the reason why Picasso never attempted this conflation again. The fact 
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that Picasso refused to take the path of the Salon Cubists – a combination of Cubism 
and Classicism – implies that there were deeper reasons for his stylistic choices; 
reasons which are separate from a defence of French patriotism.523 
To claim that Picasso resorted to Neoclassicism simply as a result of a 
revisiting of his early Impressionist work is somewhat off target, then, since 
Neoclassicism was a significantly older style. Bearing in mind Picasso’s acute business 
mind, however, it would be hard to deny that the prospective financial opportunities 
played a part in his adoption of a more realist style, especially when his income was 
reduced significantly in 1914 (to 15% of the previous year’s).524 Although, it is quite 
true that Picasso wanted to distance himself from the declining Salon Cubists 
(Metzinger, Gleizes, Severini, etc.), he continued to experiment with Cubism, in 
private, until the end of the 1910s.525 Until the mid-1920s, when Picasso fully devoted 
himself to a Neoclassicist practice, he devised the style of each of his works according 
to their genre. Accordingly, he resorted to Cubism for still-lives and to Neoclassicism 
for portraits.526 Is not this a clear indication of Picasso’s realisation of the mimetic 
demands imposed by portraits executed for the viewing satisfaction of their sitters? 
Even Picasso rejected in a statement that his variable application of styles reflects 
distinct stylistic phases. Instead, they act as appropriate choices based on his 
expressive intentions: Cubism for his expressive concerns and Neoclassicism for 
satisfying the mimetic expectations of his subjects,527 and the patriotic references to 
classicism demanded by the general French public and critics alike.528 
At the outset of his financial crisis of 1914, Picasso decided to employ his 
drawing skills to produce sketched portraits of his few remaining supporters; Georges 
Braque, André Derain, and Guillaume Apollinaire were enlisted; Kahnweiler was not 
allowed into France due to his German citizenship. The classicism of this period is 
signified above all by the Aristotelian employment of idealised physiognomy, that is, 
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Picasso corrected the bodily and facial imperfections of his sitters.529 In addition, and 
in contradiction to the methodology behind early Cubist portraiture these were 
actually drawn from life, and not from memory or photographs. The first of these is a 
portrait of his old friend from Bateau Lavoir, Max Jacob, drawn in January 1915. The 
second sketched portrait is of Vollard, done in August 1915, the third of the dealer, 
all of which were done in periods of professional ‘crisis’  – this time he crisis being the 
absence of his devoted dealer and friend Kahnweiler. Vollard’s portrait was followed 
by Léonce Rosenberg’s (late 1915), who poses in front of Harlequin, bought by 
Rosenberg in November of the same year. By the time of his portrait Rosenberg was 
on his way to replacing Kahnweiler, since Vollard was not so keen, especially at this 
point, to become Picasso’s main representative.530 Fitzgerald recognises the fact that 
this portrait acts as a “celebration” of the sale;531 perhaps the term ‘reward’ would be 
more appropriate, given Picasso’s instrumental utilisation of his portraiture for 
professional purposes. It has to be noted, however, that Rosenberg was fond of 
Cubism and not of realism, and that he compromised his aesthetic taste by 
commercially supporting Picasso’s recent turn.  
In 1914, the commercial success of the Family of Saltimbaques in the Peau de l’ 
Ours encouraged Picasso to draw the Portrait of André Level.532  Picasso’s commercial 
ambitions certainly influenced his decision in the same year to send a selection of 
Neoclassical works to the prominent dealers Paul Rosenberg (specialising in 19th-
century French art) and Georges Wildenstein (dedicated to Old Masters), in an effort 
to present his work in the context of the French tradition. Following their approval of 
Picasso’s new work, they decided to further test the painter by commissioning 
portraits of their wives and children, which he executed in 1918 with certain success, 
and with a debt to Ingres. The results of Picasso’s collaborative relationship with Paul 
Rosenberg from 1918 to 1939 is responsible for the creation of Picasso’s popular 
image. Picasso acknowledges Rosenberg’s huge investments in his work by drawing a 
portrait of the dealer in the winter of 1918-1919. From then on, Rosenberg was quite 
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successful in promoting Picasso on both sides of the Atlantic, leading to the 
organisation of hugely popular retrospective shows in major institutions, to name a 
few: Galeries Petit, Paris 1932; Kunsthaus, Zurich 1932; Wadsworth Athenaeum, 
Hartford 1934; Museum of Modern Art, New York 1939-1940; and Art Institute, 
Chicago 1939-1940. In 1920, Picasso also recognised Berthe Weill’s contribution to 
the avant-garde through showing new talent – it is suggested that she was also the 
first French dealer to sell Picasso’s work533 – by drawing a portrait of the dealer.  
Picasso and Rosenberg were aware of the press’ influence on public opinion, 
and made sure to develop good relationships with important writers and critics. 
Besides gifting artworks and entertaining critics Picasso also drew the portraits of 
some of them.534 The first of those is the Portrait of Jean Cocteau, 1916, which Picasso 
drew while Cocteau was at the front, fearing of his survival. In the absence of 
Apollinaire Picasso developed an especially close relationship with Pierre Reverdy, 
who Picasso supported publicly – by encouraging the purchase of his manuscripts – 
and privately – by drawing not one, but at least two portraits of the author during the 
winter of 1921, and providing illustrations for his Cravates de Chanvre. Let us not 
forget that, as we have seen in the examination of early writings on Cubism, Reverdy 
was supportive of Cubism during the wartime in his journal Nord-Sud. And when 
Picasso turned to Neoclassicism, Reverdy praised his choice and mastery of tradition 
despite his previous support of abstract art.535 
The critic and theorist that studied Apollinaire’s tactics most closely and 
sought to establish a similar relationship for himself with Picasso, during the 1920’s, 
was André Breton. Breton first met Picasso in 1918 through Apollinaire, and later in 
1921 by arranging significant sales for the couturier Jacques Doucet, while acting as 
his librarian. A few years later Picasso would accept the opportunity to produce the 
setting for the theatrical play and ballet Mercure, which was to divide the critics, and 
particularly the Dadaists, who were mostly opposed to Picasso’s traditional 
Neoclassicism. At the premier of the play, while Picasso was being booed for his 
participation, Breton took the double opportunity to distinguish his new movement 
(Surrealism) from Dada and to claim that Picasso was their quintessential artist, by 
                                                
533 Fitzgerald, Making Modernism, p. 26. 
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staging such a passionate and vociferous support for the artist that the police had to 
intervene.536 Even though Breton was never keen on Picasso’s Neoclassicism he never 
disavowed it publicly. His main critical support focused on Picasso’s early ‘surrealist’ 
work that draws heavily from Manet and Renoir, such as the Lovers.  
What Breton was really good at was his ability to create scandals. Similar to 
the Mercure incident, in 1923 Picasso was dismissed, along other artists such as André 
Gilde, Francis Picabia, and Marcel Duchamp, by Pierre Massot during a Dada event, 
called Soirée du Coeur à barbe. This time Breton excelled himself by resorting to 
violence, as he walked up onto the stage and broke Massot’s right arm by hitting him 
with his cane, while Robert Desnos and Benjamin Peret restrained Massot. Judging 
from Breton’s awareness of artworld affairs, we can assume that his request for a 
portrait from Picasso was highly calculated. Breton asked Picasso for a portrait for his 
impending publication Clair de terre, following his latest public demonstration of 
support. In fact, he was so desperate for a portrait that he even stated in a letter to 
Picasso that he was willing to compromise with anything that could pass as a portrait 
of him, as long as it did not contain eyes, a nose, a mouth, and ears.537 Eventually 
Picasso drew Breton’s, non-abstract, portrait in 1924, which featured in the opening 
pages of Clair de terre.  
Picasso’s willingness to utilize his practice, and skills for the cultivation of 
patronage reached its peak during his acquaintance with Eugenia Errazuriz, who was 
the person that introduced Picasso to Paul Rosenberg and Georges Wildenstein, and 
Diaghilev, Mercure’s director.538 During the war, in the summer of 1918, Errazuriz 
invited Picasso and Olga Koklova to spent their honeymoon at her villa, La 
Mimiseraie, near Biarritz. As a gesture of gratitude towards his host Picasso decorated 
a room of the villa, but most importantly he drew portraits of Errazuriz’s high-society 
friends, as well as of their wives and, occasionally children. True to his Neoclassicism, 
Picasso revisited the Ingresque style of his other drawn portraits of the time, but also 
made sure to emphasise the social status of his subjects. At the end of their stay 
Picasso presented Errazuriz with an additional sketchbook filled with similar 
drawings. All in all, Picasso’s compliance with Errazuriz’s expectations and eagerness 
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to loose control over his choice of subjects is identical to the sacrifices that artists had 
to go through prior to modernism. It is quite extraordinary that Picasso executed 
these works, especially when he was fully aware of the limitations imposed by 
commissions,539 but most importantly, while he was simultaneously initiating the 
expressive and abstract exploration of the human figure in paintings of his partners.  
 
 
Surrealism & Expressionism 
 
Picasso’s late portraits of his partners are undoubtedly dualist due to their level 
of abstraction, which proposes a superior inner being that alters the perception of the 
subject’s body. Rubin associates Picasso’s late portraiture with dualism by reading the 
employment of the Surrealist invention of biomorphic form (in Jean Arp, Miró, 
Tanguy, and Masson) as an “indirect” allusion to the “internality of the human 
body”.540 Moreover, Rubin argues that the metaphysicality of the biomorphic form is a 
reaction against the Cubist grid’s apparent anti-dualist “inorganic”, and organisational 
structural approach that focuses only on the materiality of the body. For instance, 
biomorphism dominates the portraits of Marie-Thérèse Walter, where we also 
witness an intensified revisiting of the combined profile and frontal facial view that 
was first applied in Uhde’s Cubist portrait. In Walter’s portraits this division of the 
face is expanded through strong light and dark contrasts, which Robert Rosenblum 
views as a “formula from which Picasso could extract endless variations on the 
dialogue between external and internal aspects of the human body and mind”.541 In 
addition, in The Mirror, (1932) and Girl Before a Mirror, (1932) Picasso uses a cheval 
glass mirror, the word for which in both French and Spanish is psychéa and psyquis, 
which must have played a role in his choice of this type of mirror. 
                                                
539 Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, ‘Entretiens avec Picasso’, Quandrum, no. 2 (Brussels, November 1956), 
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541 Robert Rosenblum, ‘Picasso’s Blond Muse: The Reign of Marie-Thérèse Walter’, in Rubin, Picasso 
and Portraiture, pp. 336-383; p. 340. 
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The split or divided face remains in the portraits of Dora Maar, where the 
profile view in the late portraits of 1938 evolves into a “spirit” profile, as a way of 
accommodating Maar’s psychological instability (that is, as perceived by Picasso). The 
majority of these works are sexually infused with the occasional Surrealist erotic 
accessories, such as gloves and hats. Picasso’s metaphorical incorporation of 
symbolism expanded to insects such as spiders (Dora Maar Seated in a Wicker Chair, 
1938), which, in addition to backgrounds rendered in prison-bar like stripes (Dora 
Maar Seated, 1937), refer to Maar’s madness and confinement.542 
Even though the dark palette and psychological-double profile of Maar’s 
portraits extend to those of Françoise Gilot, the level of symbolism in some of these 
portraits is stronger and shifts from props and objects to a symbolic rendering of the 
figure, as in the famous treatment of Gilot as a flower in 1946. As Fitzgerald claims 
most of the works that had Gilot as its subject, but were not titled as portraits, were 
mostly driven by Picasso’s aesthetic concerns of that period. But those that were 
portraits combined Picasso’s “conception of the individual…with the personal and 
aesthetic issues that then drove his art”.543 Finally, the portraits of Jacqueline Roque, 
which is the largest single group of all Picasso’s portraits, seem to accommodate a 
combination of Picasso’s various invented styles throughout the whole of his career. 
For instance, Rubin identifies in the Neoclassical charcoal drawing Jacqueline with 
Folded Legs, (1954) certain aspects borrowed from the 1906 early Cubist explorative 
portraits of Fernande Olivier.544 According to Rubin, references to Cubism and 
particularly to Primitivism are expanded in Jacqueline with Flowers, (1954) where once 
again Picasso resorts to the combine frontal and profile facial views that relates to 
those of Les Demoiselles. If there is one stylistic invention in these portraits then it 
would have to be the development of the facial split. For instance, in Jacqueline Seating 
with Kabul, (1962) one profile is facing backwards or “inwards”. What could be 
perceived as a visual preference of inner being is the fact that the inward profile in 
Jacqueline Seating, (1954) is rendered brighter than the outward one. 
                                                
542 Brigitte Léal, ‘For Charming Dora: Portraits of Dora Maar’, in Rubin, Picasso and Portraiture, pp. 
383-407. 
543 Michael Fitzgerald, ‘A Triangle of Ambitions: Art, Politics, and Family During the Postwar Years 
with Françoise Gilot’, in Rubin, Picasso and Portraiture, pp. 404-445; p. 422.  
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*  *  * 
 
 
Modernism’s impact on the development of portraiture, and specifically of the 
dualist model is based on the expansion of the early dualist compositional reductive 
abstraction to formalist abstraction. According to recent theorisations, Cubism 
achieved abstraction, but not through a methodology derived from metaphysical 
concerns. Instead, Cubism is unique among avant-garde movements in resolving the 
drive for expressive freedom by focusing on the materiality of its depicted subjects 
rather than their would-be metaphysical status. It did so, by approaching the human 
figure from an organisational perspective that sought to produce a multivalent mode 
of representation, achieved from superimposed planes derived from multiple 
perspectives. Thus, Analytic Cubism achieved a process of abstraction by magnifying 
the outcome of traditional pictorial devices. When it came to the representation of a 
portrait sitter, such methodology was found to be problematic due to conventional 
expectations of visual identification, limiting the drive to abstraction. Picasso’s Cubist 
portraits of his dealers underline this clash between unbounded abstraction and the 
expectations of visual identification posed by traditional portraiture. Unfortunately, in 
Picasso the outcome of this clash of subjectivities in portraiture, was the suppression 
of abstraction. Braque, on the other hand chose not to portray specific individuals, at 
all, aware of the mimetic constraints that could potentially limit expressive and 
experimental attitudes.  
During the period of Analytic Cubism Picasso resolved such concerns by 
resorting to his caricature skills. However, as we have seen, the practice of caricature 
drawing is derived from illusionist and dualist physiognomic treatises. This is 
borrowing from a practice that is bound up with realism; hence, it is no surprise that 
the avant-garde regarded it as the most contagious aesthetic position of classicism. 
From the modernist perspective, realism produces a notion of the artist who no more 
than mechanically reproduces nature, diminishing spirituality. As a result the 
compromised and limited level of abstraction of the Analytic Cubist portraits reflect a 
Hegelian model of human spirituality by retaining visual indications of the human 
figure. This problem is further explored in Synthetic Cubism through the reduction 
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or transformation of shapes into signs. However, the arbitrariness of the sign limited 
the possibility for individual identification, which was achieved instead through a 
process of naming. This was the moment that portraiture was freed from conventional 
visual perceptual restrictions by substituting pictorial references for indexical ones. 
Yet, Picasso must have felt that the public, and particularly his business 
affiliates were not ready to appreciate such a radical approach to the most 
conventional of all genres. It was the same fear that forced Picasso to compromise the 
abstraction of the Analytic portraits, and astonishingly give up his most successful 
enterprise to turn to an inherently traditional and illusionist mode of portraiture in his 
Neoclassical period. Elaborating on Picasso’s own statements, Rubin argues, “Picasso 
evidently considered some form of ‘realism’ to be the appropriate style for…images 
done as gestures and meant for pubic consumption”.545 So, considering the 
compromises that Picasso entertained in his Cubist and Neoclassical portraiture, why 
is he still regarded as a painter that pushed the limits of this genre? The critique that I 
advance in this chapter is that the conventional works (Neoclassical) reduce the overall 
quality of Picasso’s legacy, since it is quite evident that he refused to stand his ground 
and support the development and independence of his practice for the sake of 
professional support. Yet, if we follow his example and separate these two broad 
creative paths – classicist realism and dualist abstraction – we will perhaps realise that 
the advances could not have been realised if there were not two choices available. In 
other words, the moment of Cubism forced Picasso to understand that mimetic 
demands posed by the common need for visual identification considerably restrain 
pictorial advances, forcing the artist to decide whether he or she will prioritise the 
concerns of their subjectivity over the expectations of their sitters’ subjectivity. Hence, 
Picasso divided his portrait practice into a traditional (neo) classical mode – in order 
to satisfy the taste and expectations of his supporters – and into an extremely abstract 
and expressionist type, allowing himself the freedom to experiment. It is quite 
extraordinary that the would-be champion of modernism did not value his practice 
enough to consider it capable of achieving commercial success without feeling he had 
to serve the demands and expectations of his patrons. 
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The Turning of a Blind (Third) Eye: 
The Critique of the Honorific in Radical Forms of Contemporary Portraiture  
 
 
 
 
I like to point to situations in which 
 we can see the myths of ideology 
 contradicted by our actual experience.546 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a long philosophical tradition aiming at the neutralisation of art’s 
socio-political effect, starting with the writings of Plato and stretching to those of 
Kant and Schopenhauer. Accordingly, Plato disregards the arts for their focus on 
mere appearances and their inability to escape the communication of external ideas; 
Kant claims that the universal nature of our aesthetic judgments necessarily distances 
art from everyday concerns and interests; and Schopenhauer argues that art is 
ineffective on its impact on the causal order of the world due its ability to detach us 
from everyday life, and help us, more profitably, to contemplate internal states of 
consciousness. In a straightforward reaction to classicist and romantic notions the 
modernists consistently address social issues in their work. From the revolution of 
1848 to World War 1 and the Russian revolution modernist artistic form opens itself 
up to the shocks, traumas and reifications of the capitalist reordering of social 
experience. It is no surprise therefore, that this social/artistic form dialectic undergoes 
further – and radical  - transformations after World War II, in a period when the 
formal challenges of early modernism, are being rethought under a capitalism now 
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dominated by the electronic image. The significance of the political and cultural 
events that took place during the 1960s, then, did not go unnoticed by artists and 
intellectuals. The ‘cleansing’ wars of the right in Asia (Vietnam) and colonial struggle 
generally, were met with social revolts that took on a particular cultural form (the 
counter-cultural peace movement in the U.S.A. and the extraordinary cultural-
political displacements of May ’68 in France). Caught in the midst of these massive 
changes art adopted various ‘cathartic’ attitudes aiming at a radical reconfiguration of 
its own nature, in a generalized critique of the intense aestheticism of the preceding 
high modernism. In other words, on a formal level, what was fought for was a 
renewed sense of balance between content and appearance, object and subject that 
seemed to have gotten lost in the intense formalism of Abstract Expressionism and 
much abstract art of the period. As a result of these social pressures from below, art 
forced itself into a process of corrective self-criticism. For instance, Pop art redirected 
the public’s attention to everyday objects as the basis for a re-appreciation of their 
neglected ‘beauty’, in an attempt to remove high modernist distinctions between high 
cultural and popular culture; Minimalism stripped art of its modernist obsession with 
aesthetic judgement in order to highlight the physical and affective relationship 
between viewer and artwork; and Conceptual art simultaneously prioritised the role of 
the idea in the production process of art and radically reconfigured conventional 
notions of art’s appearance and presentation in response to art’s post-war gallery 
commercialization. By the end of the 1960’s, then, artists began to turn to the social 
domain, and as such a large group of artists would abandon the gallery and employ 
their work as the means to engage with feminist, anti-racist, and other political 
activist strategies.  
 In this light the 1960’s were an era of theoretical ‘pluralism’, where a linear 
art-historical model began to appear ineffective as a result of artists’ self-criticism and 
self-philosophisation.547 Such a process adopts a self-reflective method that borrows 
both from Platonic (external) and Cartesian (internal) self-reflectivity. That is, 
conventional art reached its end the moment that art became its own philosophy, or 
rather became self-consciously aware of its own historical, cognitive and ontological 
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identity. Once this process was established, the development of art became broadly 
socially conscious in how it positioned itself in the world, while at the same time 
artists found themselves to be relatively free of the imposture of stylistic constraints. 
In this turmoil and transformation portraiture seems to be the only traditional genre 
of art that remained unaffected, although its traditional forms of bourgeois patronage 
had diminished.548 It is possible to argue that one of the reasons for its survival, 
therefore, is the way in which the representation of the self transcends the honorific, 
as part of a continuous philosophic, scientific, and popular inquiry into human nature. 
Thus humans inability to resolve the question of being is precisely what allows for the 
portrait to be constantly reconfigured philosophically and culturally across each era; 
that is the traditional portrait endures, precisely because its audience wants to see the 
historicization of being reflected in its most intimate site: the face. Yet, if the mimesis 
of portraiture continues to endure, since the late sixties portraiture has not been 
restricted to the familiar conflict between tradition (classicism) and innovation (e.g., 
abstraction), which has defined modernism and the humanism of the face, but, rather, 
has attempted to set itself free from this dialectic altogether.  
Whereas the first Chapter looked at the emergence of the dualist portrait 
format (compositional reduction of full figure to bust) and aspects of collaboration in 
pre-modern workshops and the second chapter examined the stylistic reconfiguration 
of the dualist portrait (from realism to abstraction) in connection with the clash of 
subjectivities in portraiture (new modern individualistic artistic subjectivity clashes 
with the desires of the historically dominant subjectivity of patron and commissioner) 
this  chapter will pay attention to the critique and demise of the dualist portrait and 
examine the impact of new collaborative practices, and the deflation of singular 
authorship on the development of portraiture. It will do so by looking at the work of 
Andy Warhol, Art & Language and Mary Kelly, in particular, all of whose work is 
united by the use of allegory and its principles of fragmentation, appropriation, 
superimposition and the openness to meaning. These allegorical principles pose as 
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alternatives to notions of originality, singularity, and immutability that are constitutive 
of dualist artistic models.  
On this basis, the increasing employment of allegorical modes in artistic 
practices since the late sixties will be traced in order to analyze the increasing 
importance of non-resemblance in portraiture. As I have explained the sitter’s demand 
for visual identification is grounded in the classical honorific notion of portraiture, 
and has been the driving force behind portraiture’s historical (pantheon of exemplars) 
and the contemporary (mass media) valorization of celebrity. At the same time the 
tendency of the modernist artist to honour his or her own subjectivity through the 
articulation of their unique style has produced a clash of subjectivities between artist 
and sitter. Allegory, however, carries the potential to deflate the notion of the 
honorific, and resolve the modernist clash of subjectivities, by producing a form of 
portraiture that actually evades the imposture of resemblance through the subtraction 
of appearances. Not surprisingly, then, this lack of visual identification with the 
subject excludes the possibility of idealising external appearance.  
Warhol’s practice is widely theorised in anti-dualist terms, mostly due to the 
fact that he distanced his practice from the expressive individualism of modernist 
approaches to art. Accordingly, Warhol’s employment of readymade photographic 
images – mechanically reproduced through screen-printing – and their subsequent 
presentation in a serial manner adds to the impersonal character of his practice. 
Indeed, his serial model of portraiture is seen as a response to the genre’s obsession 
with singularity, inspired by Platonic and Cartesian notions of individuality. 
Accordingly, the collective character of the Factory’s production rejects high 
modernist models of artistic labour that take pride in sole authorship. Yet, his (later) 
desire and success in producing a brand name for himself is at odds with the 
impersonal character of his work. Likewise, the gradual transformation of the Factory 
into a modern day office-based business with Warhol acting as the manager (the head 
of a creative body), questions our perception of the nature of collaboration behind the 
production of his work.  
 Conceptual Art expands the critical legacy of the readymade, inherited 
via, Dada and avant-garde photography. As we discussed earlier, the Dadaists were 
exploring non-expressive, and often allegorical non-resemblance forms of portraiture 
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in the 1920’s. Moreover, in parallel, the rise of photography extended this critique of 
the conventional portrait. For instance, in an essay published in 1928 Alexander 
Rodchenko rejects the single painted portrait in favour of a sequential photographic 
format.549 In this respect Rodchenko is clearly aware of the problems of the modernist 
formation of the dualist portrait and its clash of subjectivities. Thus, he is particularly 
critical of the artist’s “individualisation” and the sitter’s “idealisation” of the painted 
portrait, which he argues can be easily avoided through the neutral character of the 
photographic snapshot.550 In an anti-dualist manner, Rodchenko discusses the ability 
of a sequential and serial portrait to represent the subject in its actual social totality – 
through the capturing of various moments of the sitter’s life – as opposed to the 
romantic, ‘eternal’ and, thus, inauthentic single painted image. On this basis, 
Conceptual art’s attempted dematerialisation of the art object is an attempt to rid art 
of those expressive materials that reinforce the notion of the autonomous artist and its 
fusion of humanist and Cartesian ideals. 
The various forms of collaborative Conceptual art practices will be reviewed 
here, therefore, in relation to Cartesian and non-Cartesian notions of authorship, 
particularly those that arise from recent theories of the mind and the philosophy of 
consciousness.551 These collaborative practices are of high importance to portraiture, 
since they provide an additional critical approach to portraiture’s reflection on the 
honorific. The foremost collaborative Conceptual art practice is that of Art & 
Language, whose seminal work Index (1972) poses as a self-portrait of the group. 
Although portraiture remains active throughout the final days of modernism, the 
production of discrete portraits is relatively scarce in Conceptual art; this makes Art & 
Language’s Index particularly interesting. The Index substitutes for figurative signs an 
archival structure based on the conversations and intellectual proceedings of the 
group. As a result the work replaces the conventional indexical appropriation of the 
body as a sign of the soul (a mechanism that draws from dualist hierarchical 
                                                
549 Alexander Rodchenko, ‘Against the Synthetic Portrait, for the Snapshot’, in Christopher Philips 
(ed.), Photography in the Modern Era (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art & Aperture, 
1989), pp. 238-242. 
550 Ibid, p. 239. 
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structures, where the body, as I have explained, serves the soul) with an indexical 
appropriation of the products of the group’s shared intellectual activities.  
These collective intellectual activities substitute for the solitary and introvert 
character of Cartesian method a process of inter-subjective interaction, thereby, 
directly acknowledging the significance of the social in the constitution of the self in 
the form of production and reception of the work itself.  Similarly the last study case of this 
Chapter is Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document (1973-78), which combines the 
intersubjective qualities and social character of the Index with the methodologies of 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a means of examining the impact of 
mothering on the formation of the self. Apart from being a diaristic account of the act 
of mothering, P.P.D. is at the same time a non-figurative portrait of Kelly’s child, and 
a non-figurative self-portrait of Kelly herself as mother and domestic labourer.   
 
 
Portraiture and Spectacle 
 
Before we discuss collaborative modes of portraiture, and the turn to allegory 
in conceptual practices generally, I want to look at those forms of honorific portraiture 
that reject expressive modernism, yet do not take the non-resemblance route of 
Conceptual art. In this the honorific undergoes a significant transformation that has a 
bearing on the wider anti-dualist thrust of art after the 1970s. An additional reason 
for portraiture’s survival is its continuing popularisation through its commercial 
application in the mass media, in which the portrait becomes a central part of the 
society of spectacle.  In this respect this new commercial domain for portraiture from 
the 1960s on has prompted a wave of artistic responses that seek to address the impact 
of its new public role and forms. Indeed, the expansion of commercial portraiture has 
lead to the substitution of “stereotypes” for “subjectivities”, where “a heterogeneous 
selection of masks stands in for individual identities”.552 The impenetrable, yet 
glamorous subjects in the portraits produced by artists such as Andy Warhol, Alex 
Katz, and Jeff Koons thus serve as familiar referents to these commercial portrait types 
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and the transformation of the subjective into trademark smiles and poses.553 
Consequently, the Aristotelian notion of idealisation returns to haunt the portraits of 
those artists who draw on this new realm of the visual; only this time the artists’ 
exemplary subjects originate from the glamorous world of show business and not from 
the mythological confines of religion and royalty. 
The mass media’s commodification of the portrait has further fortified the 
constructed impenetrability of the human subject in portraits intended for public 
consumption. Throughout history portraitists were competing on the grounds of their 
ability to represent their subjects’ inner being or character. However, artists such as 
those mentioned above as well as Chuck Close, Thomas Ruff, and Gerhard Richter 
deliberately abstain from communicating their impressions of their subjects’ interiority 
and character.554 Instead, artistic and individual expression is taken over by conceptual 
and procedural concerns.555 Contrary to the media-inspired portraits, these artists 
choose ordinary subjects depicted in neutral and inexpressive modes that escape 
idealisation. Moreover, the intense level of realism invested in both painted (Close) 
and photographed (Ruff) portraits could put to the test claims that photographic 
realism is truly able to capture a subject’s interiority, since even the highest level of 
faithful representation does not make the subject any less inaccessible.556 
Richter’s work is driven by an inquiry into the methodological inter-
relationship between painting and photography. In a Cartesian manner, he turns to 
photography for its “objective” and “credible vision”, as opposed to the “imperfect” 
and “circumscribed” impression of reality that is the product of our senses.557 Yet, 
Richter’s decision to paint after photographs, by copying them, is a rationalised 
process that eliminates the possibility of the emergence of an expressive personal style 
that might signify his subjectivity as an artist. In his portraits of others, Richter inverts 
the indexical character of photography and resorts to its ‘frozen time’ effects in order 
to transgress the supposed ‘timeless’ character of painted portraits. Indeed, Richter is 
opposed to anything metaphysical as well as to the sensational character of mass 
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media images that is often invoked with Pop art portraiture. In his highly realist 
portrait of his daughter Betty (1988), Richter expands his critique of the honorific by 
refusing to depict his subject in a frontal pose, thereby, negating the representation of 
the face as the key prerequisite of portraiture. The absence of the face in this portrait 
is often equated with an absence of the sitter’s spirit.558 Thus, in this work, Richter 
addresses both aspects of the honorific clash of subjectivities: his refusal to visually 
identify the sitter is combined with an inexpressive realist rendering. 
The move away from idealisation is further developed by another group of 
artists of whom the primary concern is to refrain from conformist and flattering 
portraits. In this, the regime of the stereotype is challenged by a revelatory and 
uncomfortable, physical appearance, the result of aging, illness, or distress. The work 
of Hannah Wilke, Jo Spence, Nan Goldin, and Alice Neel, in this sense, counters 
conventional and traditional portraiture (grounded in classicist notions of idealisation 
and the exemplary) though their courageous expression of their personal worlds or 
those of their subjects.559 In this, this group of artists goes against the vast idealisation 
of the body in the media, by willingly revealing what is inappropriate, ugly and 
unassimilable, and thus, emphatically non-exemplary. 
Goldin has repeatedly asserted that her intention is to document with 
unbending realism her life and those of her milieu - which consists mainly of ‘social 
rejects’ such as transsexuals, drag queens and drug addicts.560 The format of these 
portraits is far from the conventional all-encompassing single image. Instead, Goldin 
portrays her subjects through various photographic compilations of her subjects, 
which are appropriate, according to her, to the complex “representation of a person”.561 
Thus, the sequential model of portraiture that Goldin adapts (in addition to her 
methodological tendency to order and reorder her work in portrait albums), is anti-
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dualist, in so far as it adheres to a notion of the self that changes and adapts to social 
circumstances. This element of ‘change’ is what unites Goldin’s subject matter: 
changes of sex (male to female), changes in love lives, and change of ‘habits’ (her 
friends and her own struggle with drug addiction). In spite of the strong connection 
of her subjects’ identity with their social conditions, what is relatively absent from 
Goldin’s work are indications of her subjects’ professions; we only learn about them 
from Goldin’s interviews. The public’s interest in finding out these details of the lives 
of Goldin’s subjects verifies, then, the survival of the honorific aspect of portraiture. 
As a result, the honorific is the driving force behind the glamorisation of these 
subjects. That is, we have to consider the possibility that Goldin’s subjects could often 
over-perform or dramatise their ‘dysfunctionality’ in order to retain their inclusion in 
Goldin’s work.562 
As such, we need to acknowledge that with these artists who return to 
portraiture through photography the honorific has a dual function. On one hand, 
there is a drive – through the demands of resemblance – to record appearances and 
identities, but this is subject to a strong process of idealisation, captured in the 
subjects’ performative dramatisation of their personal circumstances. The result is that 
the honorific is characterised by a negation of its traditional affirmative role. This 
breakdown is further developed in the fragmentary and discursive practices of allegory.      
 
 
Allegory’s Return 
 
Allegory’s ability to produce multiple and varying meanings allows it to be an 
ideal mode for artists who wish to draw on the impact of cultural, social, and political 
circumstances in the formation of the identity of the individual.563 In many cases, 
allegorical portraits are void of a human figure, which is substituted by an assemblage 
of images or objects that act as an index of all those socio-cultural elements that shape 
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the formation of the self.564 The primary function of this model of allegorical 
portraiture is its confrontation with the dualist conception of the subject as a single 
immutable self. This is achieved through the introduction of a series of references that 
expand the possible meaning attached to the sitter. Artists such as Ilya Kabakov, 
Karen Kilimnik, and David Hammons employ allegory in their portraiture as a means 
for evoking multiple cultural references. 
It is commonly agreed that pre-18th-century allegory was generally used in 
reference to metaphysical issues, while in the 19th-century and throughout modernism 
allegory was used to address materialist issues. Classicist influence, particularly the 
Platonic notion of being-in-the-world can be traced in sacrilegious allegories, which 
are about the revelatory aspect of language: they reveal our purpose in the cosmos.565 
Conversely, in suprarealist allegories names and nouns are conceived as being as real as 
the abstract concepts they signify. In this connection Maureen Quilligan argues that 
the suprarealist attitude toward language is also the one that is often named as the 
“metaphysical”.566 The decline of the suprarealist attitude towards language in the 17th 
century is probably due to the rise of skepticism and scientific rationalism, which 
posed a serious threat to the continuation of allegorical practices. Moreover, Quilligan 
argues that “the loss of power in language” can be traced in the religious shift from 
Catholic to Protestant sacramentalism.567  
A similar view is shared by Michel Foucault who claims that language 
changed from being ‘interpretational’ in the 16th century to ‘representational’ in the 
17th century.568 Specifically, Foucault argues that the open system of similitude was 
replaced by strict symbolism for the needs of science.569 Foucault bases this shift on 
the Renaissance sympathy towards resemblance that influenced the development of 
language as representational and symbolic. As a result, language experienced a loss of 
spirituality through the loss of an enigmatic element, since it came to be used in a 
symbolic way as mathematics. In full agreement with Foucault, Quilligan maintains 
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that during the Enlightenment “words lost the battle to things and language 
disappeared as a potent force for shaping man’s sense of his cosmos”.570 However, 
during the 20th century language regained “its previous power as the privileged device 
for discovering truth, be it the truth of an individual’s psyche, or the truth of man’s 
intellectual and spiritual universe”.571 Foucault and Quilligan’s distinctions between 
interpretational and representational forms of language and their relation to 
metaphysics will play an essential part in my analysis of Art & Language’s Index and 
Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document. 
No discussion on allegory could afford to exclude Walter Benjamin’s views on 
the subject.572 Allegory’s fascination with historical reference, the fragmentary and the 
imperfect encourages Benjamin to identify the ruin as the allegorical emblem par 
excellence. Benjamin’s theory of allegory and montage is based on Marx’s notion of the 
commodity fetish infused with a sense of melancholic reminiscence. Accordingly, 
allegory employs historical and cultural emblems in order to return them as 
commodities. Duchamp’s readymades, for instance, invert Benjamin’s methodology 
by reconfiguring commodities as emblems, a tradition that extends into Pop Art. For 
Benjamin the desire for political practice (through allegory) stems from a form 
melancholic contemplation. In his view capitalism’s transformation of objects into 
commodities encourages a perception of the physical world as invalid, which is due to 
their division between use and exchange value only for the latter to prevail. Once this 
division is in place and exchange value has overcome use value in importance 
individuals are perplexed by the social effects of capitalist market values. According to 
Benjamin Buchloh, Benjamin claims that allegory is employed in the readymade in 
order to: 
  
…protest against [the object’s] devaluation to the status of commodity by devaluating 
it a second time in allegorical practice. In the splintering of signifier and signified, the 
allegorist subjects the sign to the same division of functions that the object has 
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undergone in its transformation into a commodity. The repetition of the original act 
of depletion and the new attribution of meaning redeems the object.573  
 
According to Buchloh, Benjamin’s theory of montage outlines a historical critique of 
perception at the beginning of modernism: the industrial collective mode of 
production replaces or even rejects the bourgeois individualist model, since even the 
unique can now be reproduced (readymade). The allegorical gesture of Duchamp’s 
readymades transforms the commodity into an emblem (Benjamin on Baudelaire), 
negating the actual construction of the sign (the traditional separation of processes 
and materials) and reveals the production dynamics of the work while at the same 
time emphasising the contextual conditions under which it was conceptually 
conceived.574 Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q., for instance, brings forth the principle of 
appropriation through a process of confiscation. 
 
 
Allegory & Anti-Dualism 
 
For Benjamin, there is an inherently allegorical nature in the practice of 
montage, which is achieved through the re-contextualisation of familiar images.575 
Accordingly, all allegorical principles are best exemplified in montage: appropriation 
and depletion of meaning, dialectical juxtaposition of fragments and separation of 
signifier and signified.576 Allegory’s anti-dualist nature derives, therefore, precisely 
from its methods of confiscation, superimposition, fragmentation, and 
decentralisation.577 Whereas confiscation and superimposition resist the notion of the 
Cartesian subject as producer of original knowledge, fragmentation and 
decentralisation put to the test dualist notions of immutability, subjective unity and 
hierarchical order. An additional important function of allegory is that of a “reverse 
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historical mirror”,578 where extensive use of the sense of the past is stimulated by 
implicit or explicit allusion to a literary – or to an artistic – earlier period. Hence, the 
past becomes a source of explanation of a relevant present.579 
In Buchloh’s view Pop Art is ridden with conflictual coexistences, as it 
reconciles and masters “the conflict between individual practice and collective 
production, between the mass-produced imagery of low culture and the icon of 
individuation that each painting constitutes”.580 For instance, Rauschenberg’s work is 
held to be predominantly allegorical in its adoption of the principles of confiscation, 
appropriation, superimposition, leading to an anti-dualist merging of “production 
procedure (gesture), expression, and sign (representation) [which] seem to have 
become materially and semantically congruent”.581 In Conceptual art allegorical 
procedures are located in the critical revisiting of the readymade tradition and in the 
use of text. The works of Michael Asher, Marcel Broodthaers, Daniel Buren, Dan 
Graham, Hans Haacke, and Lawrence Weiner employ allegorical methods to 
interrogate the conditions that define and constitute the pictorial sign. For instance, 
in Broodthaers’ edition of Stéphan Mallarmé’s Un coup dés jamais n’abolira le hazard 
we witness the application of Benjamin’s notion of allegorical appropriation and 
montage. Similar to Rauschenberg, Broodthaers “operated in scriptural 
configurations” by substituting black stripes for Mallarmé’s actual text with the 
original preface, thus, the original work was “depleted of its semantic and lexical 
information”.582 In another instance, the allegorical qualities of Hans Haacke’s work 
are revealed to be embedded in his constant attempts to reinstate suppressed cultural 
elements into the domain of cultural institutions.583 Asher’s work is constructed in the 
allegorical appropriation of historical contexts and situations in response to cultural 
issues located in institutional contexts. In this the viewer is forced to become aware of 
the ideological conditions behind the production of a work of art through his 
allegorical analysis.584 In regard to post-conceptual practices Owens claims that the 
diverse strategies of post-modern art – such as appropriation, site specificity, 
                                                
578 Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures’, p. 48. 
579 Gay Clifford, The Transformations of Allegory (London & Boston: Routledge, 1974), p. 97. 
580 Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures’, p. 46. 
581 Ibid, p. 46. 
582 Ibid, p. 47. 
583 Ibid, p. 48. 
584 Ibid, p. 51. 
 
194 
impermanence, accumulation, discursivity, and hybridisation – are embedded in 
allegory.585  
A surviving question of portraiture is whether the body can stand as an 
allegorical metaphor for the soul? If so, can the body be allegorically appropriated, 
either through classicist idealisation or modernist abstraction, in order to 
accommodate a successful communication of the soul?  To consider such a dualist 
hypothesis would be to subject allegory to an intense process of generalisation, similar 
to Heidegger’s claim that all aesthetic thought is driven by allegory: “The work of art 
is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other that the mere thing 
itself is, allo agoreuei. The work makes public something other that itself; it manifests 
something other; it is an allegory.”586 Alternatively, to accept such instrumentalisation 
of the body is to relegate and limit its process of production of meaning to nothing 
more than that of the symbolic. On a similar note, Owens argues that allegory is not 
to be subordinated to the symbol, since symbolism presupposes a hermeneutic union 
between appearance and essence, in so far as the symbol acts as a “synecdoche” (a part 
representing a whole).587 
Owens counters numerous modernist theoretic attempts (Goethe, Heidegger, 
Boas, Borges) to frame allegorical meaning as ‘added’ meaning. This is an indication, 
he argues that there is a “permanent strategy of Western art theory which excludes 
from the work everything which challenges its determination as the unity of ‘form’ 
and ‘content’.”588 Moreover, Owens maintains that the reason that allegory is treated 
as added-meaning is the fact that it “encodes two meanings in one form”.589 In other 
words, (from a Cartesian perspective) allegory allows for more than one essence to be 
hosted by a single body, thus it produces a schizophrenic model of meaning (schizo-
meaning). Yet, if allegory were to be reduced to a form of symbolism, it would be 
quite convenient for subscribers to dualism, since the union between appearance and 
essence is set within a hierarchical structure with meaning or essence at its apex. In 
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symbolism it is often the appearance that is instrumentalised by the essence, hence the 
dualist hierarchical structure.  
Allegorical metaphors and structures are particularly important to the genre of 
portraiture as they derive from a particular “non-mimetic choice of subject matter”,590 
which is imbedded in the etymology of the original Greek term: ὰλλος (allos) = other 
+ αγορεὺει (agoreuei) = to speak. Considering the problematic, if not subordinate 
status of the body in the representation of a human being – as we have seen 
historically the body is often instrumentalised, idealized, appropriated for the sake of 
representing a human subject’s inner being – the introduction of a non-resemblance 
based pictorial method frees the body from the soul’s representational control. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2 Picasso almost achieved this breakthrough in his Cubist 
figurative works, initially through a form of painterly abstraction that developed 
thorough the employment of strategies of montage and collage (Analytic to Synthetic 
Cubism). Yet, Picasso compromised the application of these advances in the portraits 
of his dealers and associates, through his subordination to the mimetic expectations of 
his sitters. The employment of methods of allegorical non-resemblance frees the 
artist, therefore, from the burden of these expectations, since the rejection of mimesis 
removes the topic of debate altogether (level of abstraction/realism). However, this 
can only be achieved through a concurrent negation of those forms of artistic 
expressive that validate the uniqueness of the artist’s authorship. Importantly, then, 
such forms of allegorical non-resemblance pose ways out of the problems created by 
portraiture’s honorific norms and standards. 
 Conversely, allegory seems to abide by dualist ideals as it is usually employed 
for looking beyond the specific and the particular in order to focus on the general. As 
Gay Clifford notices, the principal aims of an allegorist cannot be originality and 
subjectivity but abstractions and universals.591 In addition, modern allegorical works 
add to their dualist character by tending to put in place a thematic hierarchy that 
prioritises characters of “divine or semi-divine natures”.592 As we have seen in Chapter 
1 dualism imposes a strong hierarchical structure with subjective and metaphysical 
phenomena at the top. On the other hand, the production of meaning in allegory 
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inverts the conventional hermeneutic structure where the artist presents the public 
with a closed system, the meaning of which the spectator or reader is then tasked with 
retrieving. Due to its inherent polysemy an allegorical piece of work is participatory in 
its production of meaning, inviting viewers to produce their own meaning by utilizing 
their critical abilities and knowledge, in an attempt to decipher “hieroglyphs” or 
decode “rebus[es] composed of concrete  images”.593  
It is this multiplicity of meaning, deriving from a multiplicity of perceptions 
that resists a dualistic static and fixed singular production of original meaning. 
Quilligan puts forth an interesting argument where the reader’s revisions of meaning 
are sequential. The sequential revision forces the reader to become aware of the 
temporal structure involved in the production of meaning: “each work provides a 
conscious portrait of the reader in the act of reading”.594 The production of self-
consciousness is achieved by “decentering the reader’s interest” from the text to his or 
her production of meaning.595 Thus, self-consciousness is achieved through our own 
production of meaning. In addition, allegorical multiplicity of meaning deriving from 
variable individual readings further encourages pluralism,596 and the questioning of the 
singularity of the Cartesian subject. More importantly, the audience’s participation in 
the production of meaning adds a third level of subjectivity to this process, in addition 
to those of the artist and sitter. And this is something that is increasingly apparent in 
this new generation of work. With the new discursive modes of art, we witness the 
emergence of a collaborative three-part network that replaces the modernist bipolar 
antagonism between the subjectivities of the artist and his or her subjects, a network 
that is analogous to Rockwell’s model: brain (artist) – body (sitter) – world 
(audience).597 
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Andy Warhol 
 
Looking at the key characteristics of Warhol’s practice, it is possible to see 
how it stands in close, yet critical, relation to Cartesian subjectivity. The rejection of 
Abstract Expressionism’s celebratory tone of human spirituality, the intense repetition 
of the artwork, and the mechanics of collective art production attack the assimilation 
of Cartesian perspectives on authorship into modernist practice. In this respect 
Warhol’s principal aesthetic strategies (which combine mechanically reproduced 
readymade imagery with serial grid composition) derive from allegorical methods of 
confiscation, fragmentation and seriality.598 However, a closer examination of these 
aspects of Warhol’s practice bring to the surface a number of conflictual notions, 
which, above all, confirm that artistic practices rarely incorporate a single ideological 
position and theme. Let us examine these issues with the assistance of key writers on 
Warhol. 
Famously in 1963 Warhol adopted a profoundly anti-dualist language to 
declare his opposition to the New York School’s modernist expressive heroism, 
proudly declaring that “…everybody should be a machine” and that “somebody should 
be able to do all [his] paintings for [him]”.599 According to Buchloh, Warhol would 
overcome his fellow artists in “challenging the traditional assumptions about the 
uniqueness, authenticity, and authorship of the pictorial object”.600 By criticising 
modernism’s eminent characteristics, Warhol promotes an anti-dualist version of 
portraiture, ridding art of all those aspects that would celebrate the uniqueness of an 
individual, both the subject of the portrait and the producer. Warhol’s declaration that 
his art stops at the surface of things is precisely therefore anti-dualist, in so far as he 
desires to abolish celebrations of spirituality both in modes of artistic labour (his 
desire to become a machine) and in modes of interpretation (his denial of the notion 
of hidden or inner truth, and as such his insistence on meaning lying on the surface of 
things). His decision to work with readymade impersonal photographic images denies 
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a place for the clear authorial voice (albeit that later Warhol becomes a revered 
authorial voice in his attack on authorship).601 
The use of readymade imagery is perceived by Buchloh to be a form of  
“depersonalised mechanisation” – with all the non-authorial anti-dualist tendencies 
that such reading entails - which he traces back to its initial employment in the later 
stages of Cubism and to a fully developed tradition by New York Neo-Dada (Robert 
Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns).602 Even though Warhol at first felt reluctant to fully 
commit to such forms of production, by 1966 he was unreservedly defending his 
preference for silkscreen technique against criticisms of such techniques being 
“inartistic” and “fraudulent”, declaring that, “mechanical means are today”.603  
In Buchloh’s view “Warhol’s image design…extinguishes all poetic resources 
and prohibits the viewer’s free association of the pictorial elements, instead putting in 
its place the experience of a confrontational restriction.”604 As a consequence Warhol’s 
images become ‘hermetic’, as they no longer produce meaning and narration (like 
Rauschenberg’s syntactic image assemblages). Could this be an alternative approach to 
portraiture, where the artist consciously refuses to employ, and subsequently 
communicate, the ‘freely expressive’ results produced by ‘pure artistic vision’ (Plato-
modernism)? If so, what then is the role of the artist-author in producing a portrait 
based on minimum expressive involvement by the artist? Indeed, the paint that 
Warhol applies manually on his silkscreen prints in such a ‘vapid’ manner is 
disconnected from gestural expression and formal depiction, further emphasising the 
mechanical nature of his practice. The implementation of these two features 
exemplifies his absolute disinterest in (Platonic) modernist heroic models of 
portraiture. In these terms it is possible to consider Warhol’s distancing from 
conventional expressive modes of production as a critique of the honorific strategies of 
portraiture, particularly those modernist forms of portraiture that involve the 
subjectivity of the artist. 
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Another key feature of Warhol’s work is seriality, which is attributed to his 
former employment as a commercial designer. Buchloh relates the serial and grid 
composition and arrangement display of objects with “the very ‘nature’ of commodity 
in all its aspects: its object status, its design, and its display”.605 How does seriality then 
affect the form of portraiture in Warhol’s practice? If we follow Buchloh here, both 
the portrait – as a cultural form – and the subjects of the portraits (celebrities) are 
perceived as commodities. This is a significant change of direction for portraiture, as 
the traditional approach would be to identify the particularities of the subject in order 
to emphasise their singularity as a subject. Warhol, however, eschews such 
‘individuality’, portraying a given subject in a repetitive manner, the multiple colour 
fields producing an anti-dualist version of multiple selves and personas. These various 
versions of the same subject underline a non-static understanding of being. Thus 
through the employment of seriality Warhol’s stages an additional critique of 
conventional portraiture: the single ‘timeless’ painted image, in accordance with the 
immutable nature of the dualist subject, is dissolved.606 
Like Richter, Warhol turned to photography, often taking Polaroid stills of 
his subjects. However, for the portraits of Marilyn Monroe Warhol did not resort to a 
personal interpretation of his subject by creating new images but instead used a well-
established and famous marketing image (a black & white still from film Niagara, 
1953). Although this is contrary to the majority of Warhol’s portraits, it is typical of 
his portraits of celebrities of this period, such as those of Elvis Presley, Liz Taylor, 
and Jackie Onassis. Such a decision is a sign of Warhol’s disinterest in his sitters’ 
subjectivities. Thus the lack of the use of sitting sessions equates with a lack of 
investment in the idealising demands of the honorific, considering the fact that these 
portraits were initiated by Warhol and were not commissioned by clients nor the 
subjects’ themselves. Warhol’s refusal to communicate aspects of these subjects' 
personalities is in tune with his perception of celebrities as impenetrable public 
personas. Hence Warhol’s ‘respect’ for Monroe’s public image (by using a readymade 
photograph), was necessary, in Benjamin’s terms, in order to reconfigure a 
commodified image into a cultural emblem. 
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There is, however, a stark difference between Monroe’s portraits and those of 
Jackie Onassis: where the portraits of Monroe are of the same public image only 
rendered in variable colours, the portraits of Jackie Onassis incorporate a mixture of 
four distinct public and private photographs in the same panel. In this way Warhol 
attempts to produce an image of Jackie Onassis not based on her impenetrable public 
personality, but one that attempts to break through her public mask and portray her as 
an ordinary human being, emotionally shattered by her husband’s assassination.607 
Thus, the intense seriality, and the aesthetics of graphic design and advertising, of 
Marilyn’s portraits aim at revealing the “commercialisation” of the human body in 
modern western societies, which goes hand in hand with the construction of a social, 
public mask.608  
The allegorical use of ready-made imagery and the insistence on popular 
image stereotypes has encouraged Richard Brilliant to claim that Warhol’s portraits of 
Marilyn Monroe are about “image-making rather than portraiture” since the work 
focuses on the mechanism of “popular representation…and not the person 
represented”.609 Brilliant suggests that, as a result, the merging of Monroe’s ‘artificial’ 
public personality with the commodification of her public image refuse any insight 
into her personality. Nevertheless, we are not left without a personality, however 
‘artificial’ that personality might be.  
As we have seen the problematic nature of the type of portraiture that is 
intended for public consumption has been in place since the Hellenistic times and 
remained active up until the early days of modernism (if not until today in many 
commissioned works). Consequently, we need to view Warhol’s Marilyns in a broader 
historical context in order to realise that this work does not simply mirror 
contemporary pictorial trends of popular magazine culture, but does its best to bring 
to our attention the age-old mechanics of public image-making, and, hence, question 
the ability of the artist to mirror the ‘true self’ of the portraits’ subject. In other words, 
Warhol’s portraits distance the viewer from any sense of empathy with the 
particularities of a given subject; instead, they force the viewer to become aware of the 
mediating social context from which the subject draws its significance. This sense of 
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the absence of Monroe’s interiority is the outcome of Warhol’s anti-dualist 
methodology (serial reproduction of an inexpressively appropriated readymade image). 
In this way, Warhol advances the one-sided critique of the honorific that is found in 
Alex Katz’s suppression of his sitters’ subjectivity, by refraining from honouring his 
own subjectivity as an artist as well, that is, through rejecting a mode of art making 
that celebrates artistic individuality. Therefore, in these portraits we witness the 
complete dissolution of the dualist clash of subjectivities in portraiture.610  
Conversely, if we are to follow Brilliant’s argument, then the seriality and 
multiplicity of Warhol’s Marilyn (as proposed by the various renderings of colours) 
might not be evidence of the anti-dualist proposition of a mutable self that it would 
seem. On the contrary, the use of the exact picture for every variation, without 
altering the composition and the scenery, is a sly assertion that the self is actually 
immutable, and that we only mistake it as the opposite because we exaggerate the 
importance of appearance. Similarly, Rosalind Krauss argues that Warhol’s 
employment of seriality differs from that of Carl Andre or Donald Judd in that he 
does not repeat the same unit in a single form. Instead Warhol insists on “the fact of 
difference within the same”, stretching from the different flavours of Campbell soup 
to the various public ‘faces’ of Liz, Marilyn, Jackie O, etc.611 If this is the case, then 
Warhol is revisiting the old dualist discontent towards the prevalence of appearance 
(body) over content (soul). By working with a celebrity-subject Warhol focuses on the 
commercialised “perpetually vanishing Self” by drawing on the dualist divide between 
a true and often private image of a person and his or her constructed public image.612 
Or rather, by working with a ‘public’ image of Monroe, Warhol is subtly creating a 
dualist distinction between a private and public self.  
 Warhol’s three portraits of female celebrities in this period all invoke Death. 
Liz Taylor’s portraits, which seem to borrow from the Marilyns, have their origins in 
a Daily News story in 1962, reporting a life-threatening illness Taylor contracted 
during the shooting of Cleopatra. Jackie Onassis’ portraits are taken from the funeral 
of her first husband (John F. Kennedy). Thomas Crow presents a pseudo-humanist 
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account of early Warhol focusing on the notion of Death that seems to influence and 
unite Warhol’s choices of subject matter from 1961 to 1965. Accordingly, Crow 
claims that during his early work Warhol “dramati[sed] the breakdown of commodity 
exchange…[since] the mass produced image as the bearer of desires was exposed in its 
inadequacy by the reality of suffering and death.”613 The fact that Warhol decided to 
start his work on the Monroe portraits only within weeks of the actress’ death in 
August 1962 allows for an element of mourning in these portraits. Yet, what prevents 
an anti-dualist reading of all portraits of Monroe is Warhol’s Gold Marilyn Monroe, 
where her face is situated against the golden background of an icon: a pictorial device 
that since the dawn of Christianity served as the traditional symbol for the 
demarcation of an eternal non-physical world.  
 Similar aspects of a somewhat ‘religious’ universality are rooted in Warhol’s 
fondness of celebrity-subjects, which according to Hal Foster is driven by his desire to 
capture the mass subject,614 a desire that eventually led Warhol to adopt the skull in 
his Skulls (1976) as the “most economical image” for this purpose.615 Drawing from 
Warhol’s own statements Foster argues that Warhol’s primary concern was far from 
simply representing disaster and death. Rather, these notions are employed in 
Warhol’s practice by mimicking the way mass media produce mass subjectivity-in-
death as an effect of reporting on major catastrophes. This is not the first instance of 
skulls or skeletons as artistic subjects; as we have seen in the first chapter there is 
whole tradition in place that spans the second half of the 16th century to the end of 
the 17th century, in which we see the depiction of skulls and human skeletons in 
paintings of anatomy lessons of the time. Accordingly these works where divided 
under two formats: cognitio sui (to know thy self) and cognitio dei (to know thy God). 
If we are to follow Foster’s position, then Warhol’s employment of the skull seems 
not only to refer to, but also encourage, a form of cognitio sui. However, he does so 
from a dualist perspective, by claiming that the eroding effects of the constructed mass 
image stretches beyond our attire and appearance, to affect our actual bodies and its 
contents too. Thus, the only unaffected aspects of our selves are our skeletons. 
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Warhol’s practice in the 1960s clearly demonstrates the need for artists to 
respond to the structures and forms of post-war capitalist reorganisation. His 
internalisation of mass production and mass consumption, as the terrain on which art 
defines its modernity, produces a sharp rejection of “romantic notions of heroic 
resistance and transcendental critique”.616 In this, Warhol’s work represents a key stage 
in that coming together of mass culture and high art that took place during the second 
half of the 20th century, leading to the assimilation of “high art into the sphere of 
culture industry”.617 Warhol’s decision to set up a workshop for the mass production 
for his art (Factory) by mechanical means (silkscreen printmaking, video) reflects his 
investment ideologically in this new social and cultural dynamic; and, as such, his 
desire to see his work mass-produced and widely disseminated.618 But despite the 
similarities between Warhol’s Factory and the collaborative ethics of Rembrandt’s 
studio practice, Warhol kept a firm hand over authorship. 
As Caroline Jones reveals, in spite of its technological and modern 
associations, the Factory was based on an early 19th-century workshop model of the 
factory, where workers were invested with relative freedom of creativity while being 
under the management and direction of a superior, rather than on the 20th-century 
factory and its assembly lines, where human labourers were subordinate to, or 
interchangable with, machines.619 Consequently the Factory’s mode of labour and 
Warhol’s mode of creativity within it were far from mechanistic, as it is mistakenly 
held to be the case from some of his declarations and his chosen media (silkscreen 
printing). As Emile de Antonio, one of his assistants, would later state, none of the 
painting could be produced without the authorial voice of Warhol, who was the “the 
primum mobile…He was the spirit of it”.620 Warhol had in fact established a creative 
line of production in which a minimum contribution on his part was counterbalanced 
with intense management control, which has led Jones to read his machinist 
declarations as secretly a desire for others to be machines, and as such, do his bidding. 
The mechanical means that Warhol chose for the production of his work allowed for 
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undetected contributions from his assistants, as opposed to the distinguishable stylistic 
and rendering differences between Rembrandt and his assistants (and it is precisely 
these differences in style which led to the de-attribution of a significant percentage of 
Rembrandt’s work). In other words, it is a lot easier to copy or produce original 
Marilyns, as opposed to imitating work produced by Rembrandt’s own hand, or any 
other great master’s hand. Moreover, the impersonal and inexpressive character of 
screen-printing is extremely convenient for imposing a modern system of 
management that is hostile towards the idea of allowing employees to make decisions 
that would affect the final product. Once the element of decision-making is removed 
from the process of creation the assistant is nothing more than a artistic-surrogate 
that carries forward orders, nothing more than a technician who does as it is told.   
Warhol’s filmmaking further questions his relation to conventional modes of 
authorship while it reflects his general approach to art making. He would often 
loosely instruct the participators or actors then set the camera to record and walk off 
to attend other business.621 In spite of this lack of participation, or presence, on the 
set, Warhol was still running things in absentia, as he would never leave the Factory 
during shootings and would frequently return to the set to further instruct 
participators and actors.622 Thus Warhol’s role in the Factory’s production system was 
that of a ‘spirit’, the ‘disembodied’ manager of assistants. Which easily leads to the 
claim that Warhol was – to paraphrase Gilbert Ryle – the ‘ghost in the machine’, the 
head that oversees the Factory’s mechanic body. The fact that Warhol refused his 
assistants payments or royalties623 reinforced the level of authority that he imposed on 
the Factory’s creative production; he was keen to let others contribute and participate 
in the production of his work but not in a truly collaborative manner. In this respect, 
Warhol missed out on an opportunity to expand his critique of the honorific. 
Following Valerie Solanas’ attempt to murder Warhol in 1968 the Factory 
ceased operating as Jones says as, “a primary source for the performative aspect of the 
technological sublime”.624 Post-1974 the Factory shifts from, a premises engaged in 
physically producing art, to a business centre from which Warhol managed various 
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projects. The Factory’s initial loose assembly line gradually turned into a hierarchical 
structure, with filmmakers Paul Morrissey and Fred Hughes placed at the top of the 
hierarchy. Inevitably the new layout of the latest Factory was based on a corporeal 
layout consisting of distinct spatial and power relations. This confirms the argument 
that Warhol had always intended to be the head of his enterprise, which masqueraded 
in its earlier phase as a collaborative venture, presenting pseudo-shared activity as 
freedom to his assistants. The fact that the Factory kept on managing the Warhol 
industry for two years after his death, also reveals close similarities between Warhol 
and Rembrandt’s branding of his own name, allowing it to be employed by others 
after his death.625 
To understand Warhol’s form of management we have to briefly return to 
Solanas’ shooting, which was the outcome of her growing unease with Warhol’s style 
of management. This involved gender role manipulation of assistants, and as Solanas 
claimed, the establishing of legal claims by Warhol over her work and the work of 
others who worked in the Factory.626 Solanas’ attempt to decapitate the head of the 
Factory derives from her view of Warhol’s management style as an amplified 
manifestation of the System,627 which, for her was exemplary of the general 
authoritarianism of Warhol towards his assistants. Solanas shooting had a massive 
impact on Warhol, who from then on refrained from presenting himself as the boss of 
the Factory, or the head of Andy Warhol Enterprises.628 As a result, the inexpressive 
art and modes of labour that occurred during 1962-1968 – crucial to the critical forms 
of his portraiture – began to fade away. 
In contrast to Rembrandt, however, Warhol was not keen on signing his work 
or work that had been produced by others on his behalf. When he was signing his 
work he would not ask his assistants to duplicate his signature, as Rembrandt did.629 
Jones reveals that as Kahnweiler did for Picasso, Warhol’s gallerist Ivan Karp titled 
most of his works for marketing and display purposes, which should allow us to 
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allocate Karp a role as one of Warhol’s assistants, and as such, a crucial part in the 
authorship of the works.630 Astonishingly, prior to creating a signature stamp of 
typeset letters his mother used to hand sign his early work.631 Therefore, and in light 
of the mass consumerist tactics that he employed Warhol was certainly not against the 
branding that comes along with an artistic signature, but he did detest the humanist 
characteristics of its expressiveness, derived from the individualistic and unique 
character of a signature. This form of artistic branding modelled around modern 
businesses had to be appropriated around a form of impersonal and collective 
productivity, consisting of a mechanistic body that was guided by a managing head. 
As a result, collaboration and collectivism in Warhol’s practice was limited to a form 
of participation within a preset production line. And therefore, in the final analysis, it 
neither truly deflated notions of singular authorship (given his style of management) 
and it certainly did not escape the confines of Cartesian subjectivity, since a managing 
head was still controlling a mechanical body. In this respect, Warhol missed out on an 
even more radical form of portraiture; one that resists notions of the honorific 
through the assimilation of singular artistic subjectivities into a genuine collective 
subjectivity and collaborative practice.  
 
 
Conceptual Art & the Cartesian Tradition 
 
Charles Green identifies a clear difference between “collaborations that 
are…simply mergers of two [or more] “hands” into one” such as those that took place 
in Rembrandt’s studio and Warhol’s Factory, and “collaborations that manipulate the 
concept of signature style itself”, which is often the case in Conceptual Art 
collaborations.632 This is a crucial point, since the latter type is the one that represents 
an authentic substitute for the Cartesian model of individual artistic subjectivity. 
Moreover, the majority of conceptual artists’ methodology was based on a form of 
planning-strategy specific to given artistic and cultural problems, as opposed to relying 
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on the expressive manipulation of a given medium.633 The combination of these 
concerns with the abandonment of the studio as a platform for making art marks a 
clear distance on the part of Conceptual artist from the Cartesian model of solitary, 
‘introverted’ artistic subjectivity. The Conceptual artists’ methodological preference 
for research counters the traditional model of artistic labour shaped around 
expectations of intuition and creative enlightenment.634 Suffice it to say, collaboration 
in Conceptual art reconfigures the subjectivity of artistic identity from individual to 
multiple. The outcome, would seem therefore, to be a straightforward rejection of the 
dualist model of knowledge produced by an introvert individual. However, not all 
collaborative Conceptual Art practices are governed by such intentions. 
For instance, Joseph Kosuth’s mode of artistic collaboration is framed around a 
“delegation of manufacture”, which above all should be seen as “necessary to his defeat 
of painting” and not as an attempt to dilute individual modes of authorship.635 His 
insistence on creating work with text, particularly in the early works, was driven by his 
desire to refrain from establishing a personal style in the modernist sense. Instead of 
intuitive heroic painting Kosuth resorted to impersonal research-based text works that 
often appeared in newspapers. Therefore, the physical act of producing Kosuth’s text-
works was down to the newspapers’ employees. Kosuth, among other Conceptualists 
is an archetypical case of what Carl Andre refers to as ‘the post-studio artist’.636 As 
Scott Burton explains in the catalogue for Live in Your Head: 
 
Carl Andre has used the term “post-studio artist” to describe himself and others who 
do not actually make their own art but have it fabricated. The phrase is equally 
applicable to artists like Serra and LeWitt, who make their own pieces though not 
always in their studios, as well as to Kosuth and Weiner, who may use typewriters and 
telephones, but eliminate the production of objects entirely.637 
 
                                                
633 Ibid, p. 30-31. 
634 Ibid, p. ix-xi. 
635 Ibid, p. 3. 
636 Carl Andre, Cuts: Texts 1959-2004, James Meyer (intr. & ed.) (Cambridge & London: MIT Press, 
2005), p. 44. 
637 Scott Burton, ‘Notes on the New’, in Harald Szeemann, curator and ed., When Attitudes Become 
Form: Works-Concepts-Processes-Situations-Information: Live in your Head, exhibition catalogue (Bern: 
Kunsthalle, 1969), unpaginated. 
 
208 
Carl Andre talks about the fact that his “things are made by machine” and that “they 
were never hand-worked” apart from the moment that he “handles” them in order to 
“take them off the stack and put them on the floor”.638 In summary, Andre, Kosuth 
and the majority of the early Conceptual artists were highly concerned with the 
“elimination of a certain type of overinflated subjectivity signified by an artist’s 
personal touch”639 by resorting to a type of art “in which the hand does not enter into 
the production of the materials of which it is made”.640 Green clarifies that this model 
of ‘long-distance’ production aimed at the elimination of the individual artistic hand 
that leads to the establishment of a unique personal style, “rather than [being] a result 
of technical requirements, convenience or simple indifference to the handmade.”641 
Therefore, Kosuth’s redirection of artistic labour into the management of the labour 
of assistants and employees was mostly an outcome of his dislike of modernist 
painting’s inherent demonstration of an individual, personal, and unique style; what 
Kosuth found particularly problematic was the expression of the conventional artistic 
“I”.642 However, like Warhol, Kosuth never credited his assistants or participants as 
co-authors. Ironically, Kosuth’s preference for, and persistence in, the use of text has 
played its part in establishing a personal style, despite it being a non-conventional and 
non-expressive form of making art.  
  During the early days of Conceptual art there was a conscious negation of 
definition and categorisation, which goes against the Cartesian obsession with self-
knowledge as the means for self-mastery.643 Yet, certain of Conceptual art’s methods 
and attitudes are clearly dualistic: the prioritisation of the immaterial concept/idea 
over the material object, and the preference of the near immaterial language over 
visuality brings to mind Descartes’ rejection of the senses for verbally articulated 
thought. For instance, Seth Siegelaub establishes a dualist distinction between 
primary and secondary information in order to argue that art (and particularly 
                                                
638 Andre, Cuts, p. 44. 
639 Green, The Third Hand, p. 10. 
640 Andre, Cuts, p. 44. 
641 Green, The Third Hand, p. 11. 
642 Ibid, p. 22. 
643 Harald Szeeman identifies this phenomenon in his introductory essay in the catalogue of When 
Attitudes Become Form where he lists a plethora of names and definitions that many attempted to attach 
to Conceptual art, to name a few: “Anti-Form”, Micro-Emotive Art”, “Possible-Art”, “Impossible-
Art”, etc. See, “About the Exhibition”, English translation published in Live in Your Head: When 
Attitudes Become Form (London: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1969), n.p. 
 
209 
Conceptual) “does not any longer depend upon its physical presence”.644 On the other 
hand, there are contrasting views such as those of Robert Morris, who consistently 
argued against the problematic modernist separation of the physical and the 
relational.645 On this subject, Peter Osborne asks whether “the aesthetic [or material] 
dimension of the object [can] be wholly disregarded in the drive towards 
‘propositional’ [immaterial/conceptual] content”, and, more to the point, whether “the 
philosophical meaning of the work [can] actually be wholly abstracted from its 
material means”? 646 Conversely, the ephemeral, serial, non-autonomous 
(participatory), and non-static nature of the majority of Conceptual artworks is 
anything but loyal to Cartesian notions of eternal and immutable nature.  
Let us examine these two strains of Conceptual art. Sol LeWitt’s ‘Paragraphs 
on Conceptual Art’ are composed in an undisputed dualist tone. First, his effort to 
advocate a conceptual art practice leads to an extreme and absolute separation between 
idea and object, where the material is denigrated.647 Second, he perceives Conceptual 
art production as “intuitive” and “mystical”, rather than rationalistic and theoretic.648 
Yet, in a surprising turn, LeWitt seems to propose a solution to the (dualist) problem 
of ‘autonomous minds’ by arguing that “a work of art may be understood as a conductor 
from the artist’s mind to the viewer’s”.649 In a similar dualist tone to LeWitt Kosuth 
argues that in Conceptual art, “objects are conceptually irrelevant to the condition of 
art”.650 Accordingly, and as Osborne argues, Kosuth’s early ‘definitional’ works “aim to 
demonstrate the independence of conceptual content from signifying form”.651 For 
Kosuth, when material art objects are presented in an artistic context they become “a 
kind of proposition” within the framework of “art’s language”,652 rather than objects of 
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aesthetic or cultural significance.653 Yet, Kosuth, like Art & Language, was in favour 
of linguistic philosophy, which, as the successor to empiricism, is primarily anti-
metaphysical. In addition, and despite Kosuth’s immaterial declarations his work 
never achieves an elimination of the aesthetic, whereas he often attempts to “regulate 
the play between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘conceptual’ terms”.654 In other words, although 
Kosuth fails to escape the reliance of art’s production of meaning on material form, 
yet he does his best to ensure that the specifics of form/material do not interfere with 
the production of meaning.  
In addition, and as Alison Green notices, Harald Szeeman’s show When 
Attitudes Become Form clearly focuses on process-based art and “on the subjective 
character” of artworks.655 Harald Szeeman’s interest in residual modernist artistic 
ideals stands out even more when we view his reading of Conceptual art in 
comparison to Benjamin Buchloh’s 1990 seminal essay on Conceptual Art.656 The 
topic of contest is the use of language, and where Buchloh views the employment of 
language in Conceptual art as a direct response and rejection of artistic 
“transcendence” in modernist terms – “by means of traditional studio skills and 
privileged modes of experience”657 – Szeeman, driven by his idealist interest in 
‘subjectivity’, attempts to return the use of language to the realm of meditation - that 
which cannot be articulated but only experienced.658 As we look more and more at the 
early days of Conceptual art we witness two opposing strands: one that is filled with 
residual modernist and dualist ideals, and an analytic and anti-dualist one. Artists 
such as Sol LeWitt and writers such as Harald Szeeman comprise the first group; the 
second group consist of artists and writers such as Art & Language.659 Yet, what 
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Szeeman misses out altogether is that for an Idea to live in the head requires a 
material source of intellectual stimulation, in the same sense that a subject or a self 
requires a (material) brain, body, and world (network theory) for its emergence and 
subsequent existence. 
Although some Conceptual artists endorsed the notion of revealing mystic 
truths, others aimed at revealing the truth behind the myth of mystic events in order 
to question the validity of a belief in metaphysics as such. Robert Barry’s Gas Piece – 
which was first shown in When Attitudes Become Form, and emitted from the rooftop 
of the Kunsthalle in Bern – and Terry Atkinson and Michael Baldwin’s Air-
Conditioning Show, consist of invisible artworks, which can be traced and explained in 
scientific terms. To make the gesture more extreme Barry’s piece was not mentioned 
anywhere in the show apart from the catalogue. Atkinson and Baldwin’s invisible 
show is an early indication of Art & Language’s intention to strip the process of art 
making of any expressive conditions that might be perceived as a celebration of 
human spirituality, (demonstrated by the adoption of a bureaucratic and cartographic 
means of representation). Barry’s ‘Gas’ and ‘Radiation’ pieces could easily qualify as 
visually dematerialised artworks, as they were unable to be seen in the manner of 
traditional art. Yet, they should not be treated or solely “understood as an idea”, as 
Anne Rorimer argues.660 Art & Language and Barry’s work are highly successful in 
demystifying the primal notion that anything ‘invisible’ is immaterial, spiritual, and 
ethereal. Thus, by creating seemingly immaterial works consisting of a chemical 
substance such as a gas, Barry employs science to resolve the effects of superstition. In 
a similar tone, Atkinson and Baldwin’s Air Conditioning Show further expose the 
improbability of dematerialisation in art, as defined by Lucy Lippard and John 
Chandler.661 
The fundamental purpose behind the pursuit of dematerialisation was to 
prevent art, in the form of objects, from undergoing a process of “commodification” 
and “commercialisation” and eventually enable the production of a form of art that 
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would resist the deleterious effects of the art world’s market values.662 However, the 
undeniable commercial success of Conceptual artists has rightfully lead Lippard to 
accurately describe the subsequent failure of dematerialisation in this respect.663 Yet, 
what Lippard and Chandler miss in their early account of Conceptual Art in The 
Dematerialisation of the Art Object is that through this process of dematerialisation 
Conceptual Art succeeded in proving the falsity of such a notion in relation to 
metaphysics. Ironically, Lippard’s reading of Conceptual Art seems to share an awful 
lot with Cartesianism, particularly in the importance that it allocates to the distrustful 
senses. As Atkinson clarifies in his response to Lippard’s essay, Conceptual Art’s 
reconsideration of the visual was in fact both a rejection of modernist artistic ideals 
and the means for revealing the impossibility of dematerialisation in objective terms, 
while highlighting that such results were only possible through the creation of 
situations and events.664 In a similar tone, Johanna Drucker argues that the distinction 
between idea and material and/or object in Conceptual art “emphasises the 
transformative role for the process by which idea becomes material form.”665 
Conversely, this collaborative, and not conflictual, process is analogous to Rockwell’s 
network theory, where the mind is the result of a cooperational process between the 
brain, the body, and the world. Even Harald Szeemann implies this fact in the title of 
his curated exhibition When Attitudes Become Form, but he fails to expand on the 
philosophical implications of this phrase in the catalogue essay. Thus, 
dematerialisation in Conceptual art takes the form of an event, one that relies on a 
collaborative networking (interactive, participatory, collaborative) and not on 
conflictual models that were predominantly active in modernist practices (artist vs. 
subject, form vs. colour, object vs. idea). This analogy between Conceptual art’s 
methodology and network theory derived from neuroscience can also be traced in Ian 
Burn’s assertions that the artistic tendencies of the 1960’s gave “more weight to the 
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conception of the work [brain], the process by which it was produced [body], its 
context of display [world].666 
To a certain extent, Conceptual art’s renegotiation of the nature of art and the 
viewers’ relationship, was inherited from Minimalism’s explorations of seriality, 
physicality, and the engaged viewing experience. The work of Carl Andre and Robert 
Morris in particular challenged the (modernist and dualist) notion of the autonomous 
art-object by establishing a participatory relationship between the viewer and the 
artwork, while highlighting the cultural and contextual significance of institutions in 
the viewing process.667 Minimalism’s major contribution to the development of art, as 
argued by Rosalind Krauss, was to shift the production of meaning from the interior 
of a work of art (an exemplary dualist conception) to an external, relational process.668 
Such a conception aims at the crux of modernism and dualism, where the viewer is 
invited to search and reveal a visually concealed meaning such as the artist’s intention 
or personality; a process that is analogous to Descartes method for understanding 
being. And as Richard J. Williams notices, in a manner that seems to unintentionally 
echo Rockwell’s network theory, “if the human world is reinterpreted in terms of 
relationships between many in public, rather than the recovery of the inner life of 
individuals, then there is no room for the conventional humanist subject position 
taken by the artist”.669 
Art & Language’s Index and Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document are good 
examples of how Conceptual art’s relational aspects can be successfully incorporated 
into radical forms of portraiture. However, the non-authorial, inexpressive, serial, and 
relational aspects of Conceptual art subjected portraiture to fundamental crisis, since 
these strategies allowed no space for the honorific conventions of the traditional 
portrait. A rare example of proto-Conceptual art portraiture is Robert Morris’ I-Box, 
a wooden box in the shape of the letter ‘I’ concealing a photograph of Morris. True to 
old traditions of figurative portraiture the works balances between dualist and anti-
dualist models. Despite the strong metaphorical reference to Cartesian dualism, where 
                                                
666 Burn, ‘The Sixties’, p. 53. 
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the material box (body) carries the essence of the portrait (picture of Morris), the 
work renegotiates traditional dualist pictorial forms by showing a full-figured 
photograph of Morris standing naked with no ornaments, symbols, riddles or 
metaphors for his inner being. Moreover, Morris wittingly provides the subjective ‘I’ 
with material content, which is none other than his body, thereby, suggesting a 
materialist conception of the self. If Morris’ picture alone were to be viewed in 
relation to the pictorial formats discussed in the first Chapter – that is, cropped 
formats, which highlight the head/brain where the mind is believed to be located, and 
full-figured formats, which attribute equal value to the body and the brain – we could 
easily surmise that its format is anything but dualist. Morris’ anti-dualist take on art is 
articulated in his declaration that his work aims at the “rotting sack of humanism”, 
and the “unity of a subject” both manifested in art primarily through the 
establishment of a personal style.670  
A plethora of analytic Conceptual artists sought to resolve the problem of 
personal signature or style by resorting to impersonal means for producing art. For 
instance, Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden’s collaborative methods of writing philosophical 
texts as a reflection on their works serve as a rejection of “self-expressive, individual 
artistic identity”.671 In relation to Descartes’ Method, Green argues that in order to 
“replace customary visual object constructs with arguments about art”672 Ian Burn 
thought it was necessary to “denigrate the primacy of the visual (and to question its 
special link with knowledge)”.673 As we have seen, the backbone of Descartes’ method 
for achieving self-knowledge was, first and foremost, to disassociate the senses, 
specifically vision, from the production of self-knowledge. However, Burn argues that 
Conceptual art sought to reconcile the dualist division established by formalism’s 
abandonment of the “responsibility for ideas”; the artist produces the art and the critic 
provides the ideas.674 Thus, and in opposition to the misconceived perception of 
absolute dematerialisation, Conceptual art aimed at the eventual reuniting of material 
and idea by exploring the relationship of ideas to materials and processes. Modernist 
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preoccupation with formalist issues tilted the balance in favour of formalist 
experimentation resulting in a neglect of the intellectual properties of a work of art.675 
The scholarly and “hybrid” work of Ian Burn’s collaboration with Mel Ramsden – 
who contrary to Kosuth acknowledged and credited additional participators and 
collaborators as authors – is a clear indication of the abandonment of an 
“autonomous” Cartesian subject “in favour of a more heterogeneous conception of the 
author” through the construction of an “impersonal…neutral authorial voice”.676 
If we follow Buchloh’s reading of Conceptual Art as the art of 
“administration”, which presupposes some form of management in terms of the artist 
“administering labour and production”,677 then the significant question is: how does 
this form of administration differ from those adopted by Rembrandt and Warhol in 
their studios? What definitely distinguishes Warhol and Rembrandt from Conceptual 
art is that the former emphasised a certain aspect of directive control in the 
management of their works’ production, as opposed to the establishment of a 
collaborative process with studio assistants. Yet, as we have seen in the case of Kosuth, 
collaboration in Conceptual art is not in itself a guarantee of collective authorship, 
when forms of management are employed in order to enforce a “separation of mental 
or intellectual work from manual work”.678 Despite Kosuth’s collaborative practice 
conventional models of singular authorship remain intact.  Moreover, this form of 
separation puts in place a hierarchy in favour of mental activities, which is reminiscent 
of dualism’s disregard for the bodily, the material, and the mechanic. This distinction 
is even evident in those works that are quite open in terms of making and authorship, 
such as Lawrence Weiner’s conceptualist propositions. Indeed, Weiner’s work risks 
becoming an illustration of what Burn describes as the ‘commodification of ideas’ in 
modern society,679 and a prime example of what Sarah Charlesworth views as an 
instance of “ultimate consumerism”, where “ideas become the property of the 
inventor, and as such are no further use to the community once claimed”;680 John 
                                                
675 Peter Osborne argues that the rejection of the visual in Conceptual art was driven by modernism’s 
problematic obsession with shaping and defining art-experience as purely aesthetic. See, ‘Conceptual 
Art and/as Philosophy’, p. 48.  
676 Green, The Third Hand, pp. 34, 46. 
677Buchloh, ‘Conceptual Art, 1962-1969’, p. 140. 
678 Burn, ‘The Sixties’, p. 63. 
679 Ian Burn, ‘The Sixties’, p. 64. 
680 Sarah Charlesworth, ‘A Declaration of Dependence’, The Fox, 1:1 (1975), pp. 1-7. 
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Baldessari’s series of ‘Commissioned Paintings’ proves this very fact. (In 1969 
Baldessari commissioned a series of paintings based on polaroids he had taken, from a 
number of amateur, yet technically proficient painters. Even though Baldessari 
acknowledged each hired painter with a caption on each of the paintings, he claimed 
full authorship of the work). 
Thus, we can summarise as follows: artist or studio management has 
developed from a situation best represented by Rembrandt’s workshop, in which the 
studio master guaranteed a level of artistic autonomy to studio assistants in the 
production of work, to Warhol’s remodelling, in the Factory, of the modern office 
business in which the master (manager) restricts individual decision making on the 
part of assistants through the subordination of artistic creativity to mechanical 
reproducibility, and to the post-studio studio of Conceptual art where the artistic 
production is completely external to the activity of the singular, expressive artist, and 
might take the form of directions or plans given over the phone.  
 
 
Art & Language 
 
Charles Green views Art & Language as “both a group of artists and an 
enterprise”, which “defined itself in fluid, contingent terms rather than as a collective 
with identifiable members working at a particular place and time.”681 Green draws his 
argument from Michael Baldwin’s statement in an interview that members of Art & 
Language did not act as authors of their work but “as agents in a practice that 
produced it,”682 thereby, putting in place a truly collaborative practice that removes any 
trace or attribution of individual authorship. Art & Language’s revision of Cartesian 
subjectivity does not stop at the substitution of individual artistic subjectivity with a 
collective subjective agency. Describing his work with Ian Burn, Mel Ramsden notes 
Art & Language’s indifference towards a model of ‘the subject as producer of original 
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knowledge’ by preferring “community” to “authenticity”.683 Yet, the addition of new 
members and the development of the group’s dynamics during the early 1970’s led 
Roger Cutworth’s to comment in 1971 on the “division of roles” in Art & Language, 
which suggest a corporate structure, where, according to Cutworth, Charles Harrison 
was the acting manager.684 But how does Art & Language’s collaborative art 
production relate to Warhol’s managerial model and to the mechanics of the Factory? 
Harrison does not hesitate to admit his position as ‘manager’ of Art & 
Language, even though he attempts to define his role according to his ‘employment’ 
in the journal, thus preferring the description of “general editor”,685 which needless to 
say still leaves in place a certain hierarchy that relegates the ethics of equality inherent 
to the notion of collaboration. Harrison’s clarification of his role in the group comes 
as a surprise since he is perfectly aware of Art & Language’s deflation of authorship 
through unattributed collaboration; at one point he is cautious of “an egalitarian 
attribution of tasks”.686 Thus, his insistence on distinguishing the contribution of 
several members of Art & Language in the making of the Index – the most 
collaborative work of the group – is somewhat puzzling. For instance, he names 
Michael Baldwin as the initiator of the indexing system and Philip Pilkington and 
David Rushton as the ones that researched the logic of indexes. The rest of the group, 
according to Harrison’s derogative dismissal, “read texts, pasted paper and talked to 
curators”.687 This is highly problematic. Harrison’s attempt to reveal the specific 
contributions of the group’s members is driven by desire to clarify the ‘true’ authors of 
the Index within modernist terms, which results in the attribution of honorific 
characteristics to specific individuals. As a result Harrison’s detailed account poses a 
barrier to Art & Language’s successful critique of the honorific logic of singular 
authorship through their merging of individual subjectivities into a collective artistic 
agency. 
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The first version of the Index was shown in Documenta 5, at Kassel Germany 
in 1972. The Index provided Art & Language with the opportunity to fully assert 
their position of ‘writing as art’ and thus mark the group’s rejection of the expressive 
mode of art making. Generally, an index carries all the characteristics of a modernist 
work of art: it is an autonomous, closed system of references that relate to a source of 
meaning that is internal to it. As Harrison carefully notices, in linguistic terms the 
“principles of consistency which apply here [Index] are rational rather than 
grammatical”.688 However, the Index’s methodological appropriation substitutes 
collective intellectual activity in the form of research and discussion for modernist 
individual expression. Harrison defines this when he asserts that the Index refuses to 
dictate a premeditated meaning decided by its authors. Instead, it exposes the process 
of an open production of meaning both in terms of what and who is producing it, all 
of which is dependent on a “network of relations” as opposed to closed modernist 
systems.689 
The distance taken from an aesthetic, formalist art through the production of 
a text-based work, that is perceived as void of stylistic expression (thus void of 
individualism) risks the danger, as Michael Baldwin has identified, of being 
aestheticised in ways that would allow the emergence of a style.690 If this happened 
then ‘writing as art’ would simply pose as an alternative to expressive forms of art in 
communicating the individualism and uniqueness of the author(s). As such the 
critique of individualism becomes identifiable with the Cartesian concept of the 
subject as the immutable producer of original knowledge. Artists who tend to adhere 
to, and consistently repeat, their alternative non-individualist method for making art 
(such as Buren, Kawara, and Kosuth), fall into this category and fail to escape the 
confines of Cartesian subjectivity. Art & Language’s Index though captures something 
different: the successful incorporation of the viewers in the production of meaning, 
making it a perfect example for illustrating Quilligan’s argument concerning the 
emergence of the viewers’ self-consciousness as a result of the process of deciphering 
meaning from coded language. This particular generation of consciousness – which 
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could also pose as an instance of self-portraiture – is achieved through the 
representational qualities of language, and not through the employment of its 
interpretational (metaphysical) properties. As we have seen, both Foucault and 
Quilligan claim that when language becomes mathematics (representational) it 
becomes inadequate for addressing metaphysical issues due to a lack of spirituality 
(through a loss of its enigmatic element). Thus, the Index’s employment of language’s 
representational qualities assists in substituting collective intellectual activity for 
individual metaphysical exploration as the means by which we reach a state of self-
consciousness. By remaining open to unlimited collaboration in the process of the 
generation of meaning the Index brings forth a relational model that blocks the 
humanist (and dualist) tone of most modernist art – where the artist dictates his or 
her view of the world in his own personal way, in turn laying claim to his or her own 
uniqueness. The Index is particularly successful in this respect by employing the 
allegorical devices of fragmentation and dialectical juxtaposition, which prevents the 
work from being a static entity. Moreover, the requirement for the viewers’ 
participation puts in place a collaborative model for producing art that is analogous to 
Rockwell’s network theory:  the interconnection of brain (artist) + body (physical body 
of work) + world (audience). It is this adaptability that enables the Index to present its 
viewers with an intellectual platform for the creation of their own self-portraits, so to 
speak, in the act of an emerging self-consciousness.   
Perhaps the Index is not “the summary work of Conceptual Art” 691 but by 
being the summary of Art & Language’s immense contribution to Conceptual art it 
can certainly pose as a self-portrait of the group,692 a portrait that is produced through 
the group’s meticulous archiving of their intellectual activities instead of being a fixed 
picturesque representation of the group’s members. By doing so, the Index-as-a-
portrait emphasises the group’s conscious decision to substitute intuitive and 
expressive methods for making art out of shared research and conversation. In this 
sense the nature of collaborative practices is fundamentally anti-dualist in its rejection 
of the sole production of knowledge and authorship, and Art & Language achieve this 
in the Index in the best possible way by diluting any trace or attribution of its 
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composite authors (despite Harrison’s managerial habit of crediting contributors) and 
by inviting further collaboration in the act of production of meaning. As a result, the 
Index challenges the dualist model of the heroic, introvert, solitary individual by being 
a non-figural, non-static, non-expressive portrait of the intellectual (research) and 
collective means (conversation, debates) by which Art & Language produced art. 
More importantly the encouragement for viewers to participate in the production of 
meaning allows for an unlimited expansion of the subjectivities involved in the 
production of this portrait. In this it opposes itself sharply to the fixed triadic structure 
involved in modernist portraiture: the sitter, the artist-interpretant, and the observer-
interpretant. 
Following the completion of the Index the members of Art & Language were 
drawn into an internal debate based on whether the group should return to the studio 
in order to reengage with the production of art objects or to retain their focus on a 
philosophical investigation of art through a research-based methodology. At the end 
of these debates and after the dissolution of the cross Atlantic collaboration, the group 
consisted of three remaining members (Michael Baldwin, Mel Ramsden, and Charles 
Harrison). Upon their return to the studio Art & Language engaged directly with the 
genre of portraiture in the Portrait of V.I. Lenin in the Style of Jackson Pollock (1980). 
Prior to the execution of the work its title was an “ironic proposal for an impossible 
picture”,693 a joke infused with allegorical properties.  
The portraits produced for this project reflect Art & Language’ attempts to 
achieve the impossible: to adopt a highly unique modernist style almost impossible to 
replicate in order to paint Lenin’s portrait: Pollock’s Abstract Expressionism. In this 
respect the group was also faced with internal ideological conflicts, in their effort to 
unify the opposing ideological worlds of Pollock and Lenin. Allegorical principles 
come into play in the work’s demand that the audience be both familiar with Pollock’s 
signature style and its ideological significance for post-war modernism and Lenin’s 
political contribution to revolutionary socialism; and, in turn therefore, the 
incompatibility between Lenin as a familiar icon of socialist realism and Pollock as a 
hero of modern individualism and formalist abstraction. Accordingly allegorical 
appropriation functions in Portrait of Lenin in a ‘designatory’ manner, analogous to 
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the way Michael Asher employs it in his institutional critiques. By bringing these 
contrasting ideological worlds together the work exposes these ideological 
dichotomies, in the allegorical form of a ‘collision’: “linear or painterly, Apollonian or 
Dionysiac, descriptive or expressive, plastic or decorative, figurative or abstract, 
effective or aesthetic, realist or empiricist, collective or individual, East or West.” 694 
Art & Language’s achievement in Portrait of Lenin is the way in which it 
overcomes the problem of conflictual subjectivities in modernist portraiture. In tune 
with their general critique of individual authorship Art & Language’s take on 
portraiture is a radical one. Firstly, the pictorial style of the painting is not the result 
of the group’s ‘creativity’, but Jackson Pollock’s. By adopting of the signs of a highly 
‘expressive’ artistic style (which had to be practiced intensely in order to be perfected) 
they provide a pointed rejection of the modernist Cartesian subject’s adherence to an 
unproblematic notion of originality and individual expression. Secondly, like the 
majority of Richter and Warhol’s subjects, Lenin (obviously) did not sit for the 
portrait; Lenin’s well-known pose is based on a photograph taken by another artist 
(Charangovitch). The vividness of Art & Language’s portrait, therefore, is not 
manifest through expressive gestures based on a consultation with the subject, but 
through the mediation of ideologically conflictual subjectivities. Where the Index 
deflates sole authorship by inviting external participation in the production of 
meaning, the Portrait of Lenin does so allegorically by appropriating Pollock’s style in 
order to recreate a kind of displaced, or uncanny version of Charangovitch’s iconic 
image of Lenin. As a result: brain (Art & Language) + body (artwork after Pollock & 
Charangovitch) + world (the readers’ understanding of these reference systems) 
combine to produce the artwork in the form a conjunction of ideas. 
Clifford argues that “the idea of transformation…expressed in 
metamorphosis… indicates a change in function”.695 What is transformed in this work 
is the nature of Lenin’s representation rendered through an ideological conflicting 
style, rather than the formal aspects of the portrait. Retaining the traditional bust 
format was a necessity rather than a choice, dictated by Charangovitch’s original 
image. Yet, the seemingly conventional methodological approach to the pictorial 
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problem of the Portrait of Lenin, which draws from old debates on appearance, 
stresses the survival of dualist issues. In many ways, the Portrait of Lenin’s 
methodological focus on appearance extends Warhol’s criticism of the social structures 
that encourage the commodification of the self through an artificial process of image 
making, to the commercialisation and idolisation of Lenin as a cultural emblem, 
similar to Warhol’s Mao. In other words, we witness an example of what Martha 
Rosler refers to in the opening quote of this Chapter: an artwork whose ideological 
mythology is put to the test by our experiences.   
 
 
Mary Kelly 
 
Perhaps the alternative and answer to dualism in portraiture might be found in 
the impersonality of scientific methodology. Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document is a 
perfect example of the substitution of methodologies (from expressive to theoretic), 
where the highly emotionally charged act of mothering is detached from emotions 
and becomes the vehicle for a scientific analysis of early childhood.696 Kelly initiated 
the production of P.P.D in 1973 with the birth of her child, recording the steps of the 
child’s growth during its first six years. The whole of the six sections examine the 
impact of mothering in the formation of Kelly’s, and by extension a woman’s (a 
mother’s) subjectivity. Instead of engaging in a Cartesian self-reflective process, Kelly 
turns to intersubjective interaction by focusing on key moments of her child’s 
development: the various stages of feeding, learning to speak, experiencing 
independence from the mother, expressing curiosity in sexuality, the gathering of 
objects which relate to loss (in relation to the mother as well as the child), and finally 
the child’s entry into broader social conditions through public education.  
Overall, the work consists of mounted specimens and labels, scientific 
diagrams and recorded research, statistical tables and various indexes, which in 
conjunction with the supporting commentaries “lend to the text the overtones of 
                                                
696 The exhibited work accompanied by commentary is also published in a form of a book: Mary Kelly, 
Post-Partum Document (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1985). 
 
223 
allegory”.697 Kelly intentionally employs the allegorical method of fragmentation (all 
items in the work are referred to as fragments) by juxtaposing extracts of conversations 
between her and her chid with images of samples, diagrams, etc. As a result she 
purposely minimises the possibility of the attribution of singular authorship, by 
refusing to independently categorise the items contributed by her child from those of 
hers. The creation of the diagrams and commentaries would have been impossible for 
Kelly to produce without the active contribution of her child. The stark contrasts with 
modernist studio practice are located in Kelly’s refusal to relegate her child’s 
subjectivity to that of a studio model. Although Kelly does process the gathered 
information internally – as a dualist artist would do – she does so with the impersonal 
means of science and research, not through intuition and individual expression; 
expression is replaced by calculation. This vital collaboration of subjectivities (mother 
and child), necessary for the production of the work provides another alternative 
model, capable of substituting the conflictual tendencies and hierarchical structures of 
dualist practices.  
Language plays an important role in this work, which is used in a referential 
and also impersonal scientific tone and form. Kelly, therefore, provides an additional 
representational use of language to those of the Index, one that, similarly, prevents 
language from becoming a means for metaphysical inquiry. In tune with the indexical 
character of the work, the mother – or rather the physical image of the mother – is 
represented textually and allegorically and never visually in terms of a biological body. 
Helen Molesworth argues that Kelly’s representational strategy was a response against 
the “prevailing problematic of woman as object of the gaze”.698 In doing so, Kelly 
expanded the somewhat impersonal and institutional application of Conceptual art’s 
textual approach to the feminine aspect of the domestic environment. Even though 
Kelly presents mothering as a form of socially denoted labour, she renders childcare 
outside social conditions. Molesworth notices that the P.P.D. “stages the relations 
between artistic and human creation as analogous, and by doing so interrogates the 
                                                
697 Gregory Ulmer, Grammatology In The Age Of Video (New York & London: Routledge, 1989), p. 
129-130. 
698 Helen Molesworth, ‘Cleaning Up in the 1970’s: The Work of Judy Chicago, Mary Kelly and Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles’, in Newman et al, Rewriting Conceptual Art, p. 110. 
 
224 
boundaries between public and private realms of experience.”699 As a result, Kelly 
tackles the private and introvert nature of the dualist subject by making public one of 
the most highly private domestic activities, that of raising a child. However, the non-
honorific strategies (allegorical non-resemblance) that Kelly employs prevent the 
glamorisation of the work’s subjects.  
Like Art & Language’s Index, the P.P.D.’s allegorical means of production 
expands the perception of the work by leaving it open to its viewers.700 This 
collaborative model of ‘inventing’ meaning, as opposed to ‘interpreting’, is what 
Gregory Ulmer terms  ‘euretic’.701 It could be argued, in fact, that euretics is the 
methodology inherent to the allegorical phenomenon that Quilligan identifies, where 
readers experience the emergence of their self-consciousness in the process of 
‘inventing’ and ‘making’ meaning, as opposed to retrieving one that is already inset 
and immutable (exegetic hermeneutics). Contrary to hermeneutics, euretics allow for 
artworks to operate as open systems overcoming the dualist closed nature of the 
majority of modernist works of art. In the P.P.D. Kelly employs a form of art that is 
produced through the convergence of “general culture” (mothering) and “academic 
knowledge” (Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory) for “the making of 
theory”.702  
The blending of theory and art in the P.P.D. is what makes it a ‘mystory’, 
where, in the context of euretics and not hermeneutics, the autobiographical is 
juxtaposed with the theoretical.703Accordingly, a mystory is comprised of a 
combination of private, public, and academic discipline-specific stories. Again we 
witness a collective artistic methodological structure that is analogous to Rockwell’s 
network theory. First, brain (private) + body (public) + world (academic) collaborate 
in the production of an artwork that takes the form of theory; and second, the 
production of theory is opened up to viewers, therefore, brain (Kelly) + body (P.P.D.) 
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+ world (viewers) work collectively in order for the artwork to manifest its euretic 
content.  
 
 
*  *  * 
 
 
Portraiture in these forms is very different from its ancient origins, and as 
such, has to be credited with an ability to adapt to both artists’ needs and subjects’ 
expectations. In this respect, as a category it is in constant negotiation with theories of 
human subjectivity, often sharing the same explorative drive of philosophy and 
science.  In its historical forms the portrait dealt primarily with the human figure, 
exploring the various ways by which it could be instrumentally employed for the 
representation of inner character, be it through realism or abstraction. This inherent 
hierarchical prioritisation is what has prevented figurative portraiture from producing 
a truly anti-dualist format. However, the adoption of allegorical modes in the late part 
of the 20th century provided an alternative pathway for portraiture, one that built on 
the creative possibilities made available through the displacement or negation of 
resemblance. In addition, the allegorical techniques of confiscation, fragmentation, 
superimposition and of collaborative (euretic) production of meaning allow an 
introduction of non-dualist creative methods into art.  
 An artist like Warhol adopted the impersonal principles of allegory in order to 
produce an artistic response to the humanist and dualist ideals of high modernism. At 
the same time such an approach promised a more adequate depiction of the late 
modern self. In this world of appearances the Marilyns’ focus on surface appearance 
serves as a reminder of the dualist argument of the eroding effects of public image 
making. In doing so, we witness the disappearance of both subjectivities: Warhol’s 
through the adoption of non-expressive forms, and Marilyn’s through the 
employment of an image for public consumption (hence its focus on a constructed 
appearance). Similarly, even though art production in the Factory appeared to be 
collaborative, Warhol’s obsession with modern forms of business management and his 
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unwillingness to share copyrights of the work prevent it from becoming the outcome 
of collective authorship. 
 Forms of collaboration were picked up by the majority of Conceptual artists 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s, who expanded early avant-garde forms of artistic 
surrogacy into socialised forms of collective production, aimed at the dissolution of 
the humanist and dualist types of art. Even though the intended dematerialisation of 
the art-object became a contested issue, Conceptual art’s definite success was to 
reassert the balance between practice & intellect, the balance that was lost due to 
modernism prioritisation of form, aesthetics and visuality over content, concept, and 
knowledge. Dematerialisation might serve as an extreme dualist enterprise (in its aim 
to diminish the materiality of art), yet such extreme measures were needed in order to 
correct the imbalance put in place by modernism’s formalism; a forced tilting of the 
scales. One of the things that art does best is to underline the interdependence of 
form & content, object & subject and stress the functional impossibility of these 
divisions. In this respect, it could be argued that Conceptual art’s intellectual 
demystification of art’s aesthetic experience704 is analogous to the philosophical and 
scientific demystification of Cartesian dualism. In this process Conceptual Art’s 
homeopathic approach to capitalism – the adoption of managerial techniques, the 
appropriation of individual labour into a production line, etc. – was not in fact 
successful; verified by the quick and easy commercial success of Conceptual artists. 
Yet, the collaborative forms of Conceptual art provide feasible alternatives to dualism 
by overcoming modes of sole authorship conveyed through unique and consistent 
styles. Moreover, the analogy of Conceptual art practices to more recent network 
theories (Rockwell) verifies the importance of anti-neural social interaction in the 
construction of the self. 
Prior to the Index the production of a non-figural group portrait (let alone 
self-portrait) was considered almost an impossibility, especially one based on collective 
intellectual activity rather than on the visual representation of interiority. The Index is 
particularly successful, therefore, in avoiding modernist heroisms of artistic initiatives 
based on intuitive inner readings of individual subjects (members of Art & Language). 
The viewers’ participation in the production of meaning enables the Index to expand 
                                                
704 Molesworth, ‘Cleaning Up in the 1970’s’, p. 118. 
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beyond the restrictions of the modernist closed system by presenting its viewers with 
an intellectual platform that can provide them with their own self-portraits. Thus, the 
Index does not offer a single, set, immutable meaning, but in opening up the 
production of meaning to its viewers invites them into the position of collaborators. 
This point summarises the utmost significance of the Index in relation to recent art-
making, and by extension to, the critique of the dualist subject; in addition to being 
the work of a collective group of artists and not of a single individual, it also 
encourages a further collaboration process by extending the generation of meaning 
outside the immediate producing group. Art & Language also provide another 
alternative for expanding the collaboration of subjectivities in their Portrait of Lenin, 
by adopting the unique style of Jackson Pollock in order to rework a photograph of 
Lenin taken by Charangovitch. The ‘restrained abstraction’ of Art & Language’s 
Portrait of Lenin is another instance of a stylistic compromise, like the ones that are 
found in Picasso’s Cubist portraits of his dealers. Yet, it is a necessary compromise 
without which the creation of the pictorial pun would be impossible. It is not a 
compromise rooted in a clash between their stylistic concerns and their subject’s 
desires but the staged result of contrasting ideological positions.  
Both the Index and P.P.D. employ art in a process of mutual learning. Where 
the Index focuses on the nature of art by examining its relation to theory, the P.P.D. 
looks at the nature of female subjectivity by analysing the impact of mothering in its 
formation. They both share the closed structures of archives, yet in their employment 
of allegorical processes of production of meaning they provide alternatives to the 
interpretative character of hermeneutics. As a result the works express similar themes 
to those analysed in contemporary concepts of the self: the portrait is a product of social 
interaction (as opposed to introversion), it takes the form of an ever-changing subjective 
event (as opposed to state of immutability), and it acknowledges the vital role of the material 
and social world in the creation of such phenomena. In this sense the object of inquiry, be 
it the nature of human being or the meaning of a work of art, is approached from the 
perspective of ‘making’ rather than ‘finding’ – which goes against the fundamental 
purpose of Cartesian method. If the self is constructed, constituted, then it could not 
possibly be static and immutable. 
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Vicious Circles 
Epilogue  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Back in 2003 I was in the city of Manchester for a day, showing my support to 
a good friend who was giving a lecture at the Cornerhouse. I arrived a couple of hours 
early in order to take advantage of the day out and see the town. On my way to the 
Cornerhouse I walked into Manchester Art Gallery coming across a touring show 
organised by Channel 4 called Self Portrait UK. The exhibition included a number of 
self-portraits by celebrities as well as up to a hundred works created by amateur or 
occasional artists for Channel 4’s project. Up to this day I was largely indifferent 
towards conventional portraits, which I used to consider as being the result of 
narcissism and self-valorisation, given their aesthetic and ideological subservience to 
the honorific mechanisms of celebrity. However, while I was skimming through the 
works with this preset opinion I came across a few portraits that forced me to question 
my recently acquired pseudo-intellectual arrogance – derived to a certain extent from 
the immaturity of my research skills. 
The most intellectually stimulating self-portraits were the ones created by A. 
P. Wilkinson, Suzy Mason, and Jenni Setchel. Wilkinson’s portrait was a minimalist 
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monochrome, nothing more than a framed blank black sheet of paper. The work was 
accompanied by Wilkinson’s statement: 
 
At your portrait competition I thought I’d have a go. But how to start my painting I 
really don’t know. The man said anyone can do it. But my paper’s blank, you’ll find as 
this is how I see myself. Because you see I’m blind. 
 
In its poetic sincerity Wilkinson’s statement conveys a brief account of the current 
popular perception of what is a portrait: a visual representation of external appearance. 
Yet, Wilkinson’s drive to overcome the restrictions of his physical impairment enabled 
him to produce a self-portrait as a form of protest against the visual heritage of 
modernism, by referring back, perhaps unintentionally, to its key avant-garde 
moments. Wilkinson’s non-figurative take on portraiture was extended even further 
by Mason’s contribution to the show, a self-portrait consisting of a framed 
supermarket receipt. This radical portrait avoided conventional means of 
representation by disassociating the portrayal of the self from the body through the 
employment of allegory. In doing so, the work redirected attention to the 
representation of the self as an active presence in the world, whose importance is 
largely dismissed by Cartesian method. The substitution of the figure with text was 
what caught my attention in Setchell’s self-portrait, which consisted of a selection of 
printed memories tactically organised in discreet envelopes labelled chronologically. 
Like Mason, Setchell turned to the domain of lived experience (as opposed to private 
introspection) in order to create her self-portrait, reflected in the act of archiving her 
most treasured memories. More significantly, Setchell’s self-portrait touches on an 
important question of consciousness (how the mind’s cognitive functions rely on 
external information) thereby, rejecting the customary Cartesian view of a competitive 
relationship between mind-body, inner-outer, subjective-objective.  
What these three works demonstrate, first and foremost, is that aspects of 
radical or alternative forms of portraiture have permeated popular perceptions of 
selfhood. What is also noteworthy is that this radicalism runs parallel with recent 
philosophical and medical advances in the theorisation of consciousness, the self and 
subjectivity. It was around the time of the show that the theory of Cellular Memory 
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emerged – organ cells bearing memory of personality traits – threatening to shake the 
very foundations of dualist notions of human nature and biological and medical 
understandings of the human body. Gary Schwartz, Linda Russek and Paul Pearsall, 
the leaders in this area of research, interviewed almost three hundred cases between 
them of transplant recipients who have experienced personality changes as a result of 
their surgical procedure.705 According to Swartz and Pearsall, when patients receive 
organ transplants often they will inherit traits of the donors’ personalities. This 
phenomenon is more likely to occur in cases of heart and lung transplants, due to the 
interconnected nature of these organs cells. The overwhelming endorsement of 
Cellular Memory by parapsychology, however, has threatened its scientific 
credibility.706 Yet, Candace Pert has approached the subject from a biological-
materialist perspective in an effort to clarify the medical and philosophical implication 
of this phenomenon. Prior to her research amino acid chains were known to exist 
solely in the brain. As a result of her research, though, she has discovered their 
existence in various parts of the body, particularly in the major organs such as the 
lungs and heart.707 The discovery of neuropeptides in all body tissues encouraged Pert 
to suggest that cellular receptors regulate the conscious or unconscious status of 
memories. This finding enforces the possibility of an existing network of physiological 
connections between memories, the brain and major organs, all of which participate in 
the emergence of consciousness. 
The concept of Cellular Memory, then, deals a second significant blow to 
dualist materialism (mind = brain), adding to recent neurological research that 
suggests the brain is more hormonal than neural,708 that is, both areas of research 
reject the concept of the brain as the body’s headquarters where all information is 
                                                
705 Gary E. Schwartz, Linda Russek and Paul Pearsall, ‘Changes in Heart Transplant Recipients That 
Parallel the Personalities of Their Donors,’ Journal of Near-Death Studies (vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 2002); 
there were 10 subjects interviewed in this original study, the numbers of subjects increased in their 
subsequent research. See also Paul Pearsall, The Heart's Code: Tapping the Wisdom and Power of Our 
Heart Energy (Portland: Broadway Books, 1998).  
706 See for instance Gary E. Schwartz, The Afterlife Experiments: Breakthrough Scientific Evidence of Life 
After Death (Simon & Schuster, 2003), and Gary E. Schwartz, William L. Simon, The G.O.D. 
Experiments: How Science Is Discovering God in Everything, Including Us (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2007). 
707 Candace B. Pert, Molecules of Emotion: The Science Behind Mind-Body Medicine (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1999). 
708 Richard Bergland, The Fabric of the Mind (New York: Viking, 1985). The work of Bergland and 
Pert is used extensively by W. Teed Rockwell in, Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Non-Dualist Alternative to 
the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Cambridge & London: The MIT Press, 2007). 
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directed through neurons to a central processor. Moreover, both of these research 
programmes support Rockwell’s network theory in so far as they allow for a theory of 
consciousness and self to emerge out of collaborative relations and not from 
hierarchical body/mind divisions. As we have seen for Rockwell, it is philosophically 
ignorant and scientifically impossible for a conscious mind to emerge without the 
presence and equal participation of the body; without the influence of the body the 
mind would have very little to reflect on. The majority of the cases recorded for the 
Cellular Memory research revolve around personal likes and dislikes (music taste, 
sexual and dietary preferences), all of which also underline Charles Taylor’s notion of 
the self as grounded in a collection of fluctuating personal preferences formed around 
social and cultural frameworks (and, therefore, in process, rather than a metaphysical 
entity with preset features and attributes). This distinction is proven by the physical 
and mental abilities of these people to adopt and accommodate new aspects of their 
selves.  
The idea of the mind as being dispersed throughout the body still remains 
quite far-fetched, mostly due to the influence of religious spirituality and Cartesian 
subjectivity on everyday folk philosophy. To further understand the level of impact of 
this kind of folk psychology on modern life we only have to look at the etymology of 
the word individual. The word consists of three parts: in-, -divide-, and –dual, all of 
which combine to emphasise the introspective and divisional character of dualism. 
However, this is not to imply that Descartes managed to come up with a devious way 
to infuse language with his philosophical concepts. Rather, by tracing the 
development of philosophical inquiry into human nature we are able to see that the 
dominant philosophical positions of each era are reflected in the prevailing popular 
terms for describing the human condition. For instance, the popular classicist 
Hellenic term ἀνθρωπος (anthropos) – a combination of ἀνω (up) and θρὠσκω (to 
see, to look, to gaze) – metaphorically encompasses Plato’s methodology for achieving 
self-mastery by finding our place or role in the cosmic order. The Roman term persona 
– deriving from the Etruscan word phersu (mask) – signifies the general recognition 
and open acceptance of the tendency to put on appearances or adopt codes that 
construct or idealise the presentation of character within a social context; a tendency 
that governs Hellenistic and Roman portraiture destined for public consumption. 
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Finally, the reasons for the popularisation of the term human during the Renaissance 
is mostly due to the ‘gentile’, ‘refined’, and ‘cultured’ connotations that lay in the 
original meaning of this Latin word, and to a certain extend its ability to mirror the 
cultural transition from the preceding dark conditions of the Middle Ages. 
During the Platonic era the approach of portraiture to the human subject was 
analogous to Plato’s methodology for achieving self-mastery; both were caught up in a 
search for universal and immutable values that promised to provide a sense of order to 
the seemingly chaotic aspects of the material world. The elements of truth and reason 
that lay at the core of Platonism manifested themselves in portraiture in the form of 
the realist, naturalist rendering of external appearance. As such, the body acts as a 
metaphor or the equivalent of the material world, which contains the truth of the 
person. Therefore, naturalistic rendering is demanded in order to leave the 
representation of the subject open for the viewer to project his or her feelings and 
judgements. In other words, the Platonic portrait strives for acute realism in order to 
allow for viewers to produce their own reading of the subject.  
 The differences between Platonic and Aristotelian positions are mirrored in 
their employment of physiognomy. Whereas Aristotelian classicism employs 
physiognomy in order to idealise character, dualist practices (both Platonic and 
Cartesian) employ physiognomy to read not just the character of the sitter but also the 
‘inner depths’ of their personality. This difference is of fundamental importance, since 
the construction of character implies a rejection of the self as an immutable entity. 
This transition in the arts signifies the succession of dualist Platonic thought by 
Aristotelian materialism. As a result, the inherent realism of Platonism – which 
applied physiognomy in order to read a subject in an analogous way to how Platonic 
subject reads the universe in the search for a life role – was enhanced with Aristotelian 
idealisation. Platonic physiognomy is in tune with the honorific character of classicist 
portraiture in laying bare the unique properties of the sitter. The resulting pantheon 
of portraiture would also serve as a collection of exemplary individuals bearing the 
universal values that would reflect the dominant values of the classical ethos. The 
classicist portrait’s balance between nature and individuality is, in this sense, a singular 
that refers to a universal. During the Hellenistic and Roman eras entry into this 
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pantheon was achieved through the idealisation of physiognomic traits aimed at the 
visual construction of exemplary charismas.  
In spite of Plato and Aristotle’s differences in their understanding of human 
nature their methodologies for self-mastery share a common ground. They both point 
to the importance of active being in the world as key to self-knowledge, although 
Plato treasures the universal values and Logic in the Cosmos whilst Aristotle is more 
appreciative of the specifics of earthly life. While Plato laid the foundations for the 
emergence of Christian spiritual dogma by putting forth a conception of the soul as 
immaterial, independent, eternal, immutable and in conflict with the material body, 
Aristotle provided the needed rationalism that would distinguish the new religion 
from its pagan competition. Thomas Aquinas’ reconciliation of Aristotle’s 
hylemorphism not only enforced a philosophical retraction from non-dualist notions 
of being – back to the Platonic dichotomy between body and soul – but by 
manipulating Aristotle’s unresolved question of the intellect Aquinas endowed the 
soul with a locus, or headquarters, in the biological body.  
Prior to Aquinas, it was physiognomic attention to the head alone that led to 
the compositional reduction of the portrait from life size to bust during the 
Hellenistic and Roman eras. In spite of this reduction the portrait retained its 
naturalism until the moment Christianity became the most popular religion. In many 
respects, Byzantine abstraction of the body is analogous to the modernist abstraction, 
in so far as it is the result of a dogmatic rejection of mimetic realism and not the 
outcome of underdeveloped artistic skills similar to Egyptian and Cycladic 
abstraction. Both of these instances of aesthetic reconfiguration aimed at bringing to 
the surface the inner truth or essence of human spirituality, and by extension that of 
nature (landscape) and objects (still life). Moreover, in both instances the search for 
immaterial truth and the distance from mimesis represent Platonic tendencies that 
were adopted in order to cleanse art of the mimetic obedience and idealisation of 
Aristotelian influence, while emphasising the spiritual nature of man. The 
compositional return to a full-format treatment of the figure signifies the Church’s 
Platonic foundations, which were augmented by Aquinas’ assignment of the brain as 
the locus of the soul, represented by the introduction of the pictorial device of halos. 
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In other words, Byzantine aesthetics is a successful reconsideration of art according to 
modified Platonic concepts of being, filtered through the criticism of mimesis in art.    
 At the dawn of the Renaissance with the cultural return to the classicist ethos, 
the arts abolished the generic abstraction of the Middle Ages only to strive for the 
astute realism of the ancient masters. Renaissance theorists such as Leon Batista 
Alberti and Giovanni Lomazzo promoted this return to naturalistic rendering, which 
they framed in Aristotelian terms. They, in particular, advocated portraiture’s 
potential for public image-making through physiognomy, by referring back to famous 
cases of successful collaborations between great leaders and their private artists, such 
as Alexander the Great and Apelles. The return to realism was accompanied by the 
gradual compositional reduction of portrait, from life-size to bust. The choice of 
format was invariably a matter of cost; the ruling and aristocratic classes would opt for 
life-size while the middle class would prefer the half-size or bust format. This 
renewed focus on the head, however, was not simply a consequence of physiognomic 
attention to the head – similar to Roman portraiture – but the result of the impact of 
Christian dogma, specifically its attribution of the brain as the soul’s bodily habitat. 
As such the initial development of the modern dualist portrait can be traced back to 
the work of Caravaggio, with his atmospheric attention to the face and head 
(chiaroscuro and light contrasts). In this respect, the basis for the dualist portrait did 
not emerge as an immediate response to Cartesian philosophy but more concretely as 
the product of Caravaggio’s incorporation of Aquinas’ Christianisation of Platonic 
dualism and the Aristotelian notion of the intellect.                                     
 The socio-political changes that took place in the Netherlands during the 17th 
century provided the appropriate conditions for the initial development of what would 
later become a fully-fledged middle class. This is an important point in portraiture’s 
history since it is the first time that a certain social group or class resorted to art in 
order to establish itself through visual means. In this respect, the Dutch burgers 
appropriated the format of the portrait to facilitate various class identity-traits that 
allowed them to distinguish themselves from the aristocracy. This represented a major 
alteration to the format of the portrait. The burghers desired an alternative to the life-
size, and often outdoor portraits of aristocrats, which signified the rule of land and 
hereditary rights of birth. In order to emphasise their conception of nobility (nobility 
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according to intellectual and practical skills) – aspects of the self that are constructed, 
learned and not inherited – the burgers developed a portrait format that was governed 
by the desire to produce private and personal images. These represented aspects of 
their identity in a realist manner, with a clear focus on the subject’s head, the centre of 
intellectual excellence.  
Yet, there were instances where wealthy burgers, and those burghers with 
aristocratic aspirations, would resort to ideologically contrasting pictorial styles in 
order to make their aspirations public. For instance, Aristotelian idealisation opens up 
the path for the visual construction of a subject’s personality through the employment 
of physiognomy, but it negates the sought-after representation of the burghers’ 
distinct appearance and ethical adherence to truth. This is best served through 
Platonic and Cartesian realism, appropriate for a physiognomic reading of the sitters’ 
inner being.  These various options were made available because the 17th century 
Netherlands became home to a plethora of pictorial styles that were analogous to the 
active and emerging notions of individuality (Aristotelian and Cartesian). These styles 
were active in the key urban centres of Utrecht, Haarlem and Amsterdam. Utrecht’s 
long tradition as a northern religious centre of Catholicism made it possible for the 
importation of Renaissance Italian masters’ styles, such as Caravaggio’s, that were 
particularly successful in emphasising the spiritual side of man by focusing on the 
head, through the use of compositional and atmospheric devices. The style of 
Haarlem painters shared none of Utrecht’s dualist tendencies, concentrating instead 
on the realistic depiction of the burgers’ appearance and class-specific attire, as a result 
of the city’s financial and cultural excellence. The classicist character of Haarlem’s 
portraiture is defined by the tendency to depict subjects in life-size in all their vitality, 
indeed often caught in the midst of activities; all of this being in tune with both 
Platonic and Aristotelian notions of self-mastery through active being in the world. 
Due to its cosmopolitan character and its equal emphasis on religious and economic 
matters Amsterdam produced a style that combined the dualist effects of Utrecht and 
the Aristotelian approach of Haarlem. This choice allowed for the portrait clients of 
Amsterdam to choose between styles, or even combine aspects of these styles.  
Rembrandt’s practice is ideal for understanding the conflictual co-existence of 
Aristotelian and Cartesian notions in Dutch art. Rembrandt’s preoccupation with the 
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face, and particularly his own, has prompted scholars to produce overly romantic 
accounts of Rembrandt as the foremost artist of human subjectivity from a dualist 
perspective. However, a closer look into his work would suggest the exact opposite. 
That is, Rembrandt was an astute professional who treated his workshop like a proper 
business aiming at pleasing the desires of his clients. The production of his self-
portraits was developed as a means for studying the performative and expressive 
possibilities of the human face, gestural appropriation, and attire in order to apply 
these in his portraits of others, and therefore not as evidence of the artistic equivalent 
of Cartesian self-explorative method. What has led to romantic readings of 
Rembrandt’s work is his dualist (compositional) attention to the head and the 
exaggerated application of Caravaggist chiaroscuro and light. Yet, Rembrandt 
employed these pictorial devices only to enhance the representation of feelings 
necessary for the works’ element of performativity; and as Descartes himself has 
argued feelings are too temporal, too ephemeral to justify the existence of an eternal 
and immutable soul.  
To further understand the level of artificiality invested in Rembrandt’s self-
portraits we only have to look at the results of the Rembrandt Research Project. Not 
only did Rembrandt utilise his self-portraits as the means by which he was to research 
expression and gesture, but he would encourage his assistants to produce works on his 
behalf and even portraits of himself that he would then trade as his own, or at least as 
products of his workshop. Contrary to the Renaissance workshop practices of Rubens 
and Raphael, Rembrandt would encourage his assistants to sign their work with 
Rembrandt’s name. In a way, this was Rembrandt’s means for establishing a ‘brand 
name’ at a time of entrepreneurial frenzy. The philosophical cost of this endeavour 
was his distance from a form of practice that corresponded to Cartesian notions of 
singular authorship, originality and uniqueness, based on self-reflection. Although 
Rembrandt’s studio ethics shatter this Cartesian notion of the subject as sole producer 
of knowledge, they do, however, conform to the wider role of Cartesianism in the 
culture, by putting in place a model of practice whose hierarchical structure is 
identical to the dualist conjunction of mind and soul. That is, Rembrandt was acting 
as the head of a working body. The signing of his students and assistants’ work as his 
own verifies that he was claiming authorship for these works, in the same way the 
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mind claims authorship for the right actions of the body. Moreover, his teaching and 
guidance of his pupils is analogous to the course of self-mastery to which the soul 
subjects the body, blinded by a desire to control and discipline its servant. 
This dualist model of artistic workshop-mechanics remains relatively active 
and influential until the moment of modernism. The longing for professional 
independence and expressive freedom led the modernist artist into a solitary and 
autonomous studio practice in order to protect his or her individualism from the 
effects of industrialisation. In this process the pre-modern dualist workshop structure 
was replaced by a studio practice that validated the key characteristics of Cartesian 
subjectivity (sole authorship, originality, introspection). Up until the moment of 
modernism art and portraiture’s reliance on commissions and patronage, restrained 
the free exploration of the human subject through portraiture. This professional status 
of the artist came with a price; the suppression of the subjectivity of the artist, who 
was considered as nothing more than a highly trained technician carrying out the 
demands of the state, church, and ruling class. The modernist artist sought to rid his 
or her practice of this professional subservience and its conformity with Cartesian 
dualism, since the commissioner or patron becomes the ‘mind’ that controls the 
artist’s material-‘bodily’ production. As such, in the process of gaining creative 
independence the modernist artist rejected three dualist structures in order to model 
his or her practice around the specifics of the Cartesian subject. Firstly, he sacrificed 
his secure position within a historically privileged artisanal culture for the sake of 
being the sole maker of his or her work; and secondly, he abolished the restrictive 
parameters of commissioned work that relegated the artist to the role of a controlled, 
skilled body; and thirdly the artist dissociated himself or herself from the conventional 
forms of pictorial resemblance.  The modernist portrait may have retained the 
compositional form of the pre-modern dualist portrait (attention to the head), but 
now, the artist presented his or her reading of the subject (communicating his or her 
truth of their subjects’ inner being) often leading to abstraction, as opposed to the pre-
modern realism (‘necessary’ for the viewer’s physiognomic reading of the subject’s 
character). Thereby modernist artists sought to abandon realism and mimesis 
(perceived as the surviving idealising remnants of Aristotelian idealisation), since the 
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legacy of realism was considered as deceptive and untrue, given the fact that it was 
often the idealised outcome of the patrons’ requests.  
The primary methodology that contributed to this dissociative process was the 
Platonic notion of artistic pure vision, which served the demands of modernist 
individuality by allowing the artist to advertise his or her uniqueness through their 
work’s production. This employment of an alternative, metaphysical form of vision 
reveals the dualist character of modernist abstraction, in so far as it is consistent with 
Descartes’ disbelief or distrust in the senses, particularly that of vision. Furthermore, 
modernist abstraction, at one level, represents an overblown Platonic realism of inner 
essence, that is, it represents a form of inner realism that bypasses external appearance 
for the true essence of the person, object, etc. It is due to this very fact that the 
modernist portrait stands as close as possible to a ‘pure’ dualism, in that, form is 
forced into a subservient relationship to essence since its representation is sacrificed 
for the representation of essence. At the same time, this Cartesian process of the inner 
filtering of external information emphasises the modernist tendency to find solace in 
the spiritual in the face of rapid industrialisation and intense urbanisation; to turn 
‘inside’ in response to the disappointments of the outside. In spite of its conformity 
with dualism – the metaphysical abilities of artist are employed in order to re-present 
the metaphysical qualities of sitter – the pictorial effects are highly subjective and 
dependent on the personal and artistic predilections of the artist. For this reason, the 
modernist dualist portrait fails to overcome the constructed effects of Aristotelian 
idealisation, in so far as the representation of the subject becomes idealized as a result 
of the creative or professional concerns of the artist.  
The process of the artist regaining creative control over his or her production 
of art has resulted in a clash of subjectivities between the artist and the sitter or 
commissioner of the work, due to the visual expectations of the sitter. This demand 
for some degree of resemblance from the sitter is the historically and culturally 
embedded effect of the classical honorific function of portraiture and the survival of 
portraiture as a pantheon of exemplary individuals. Such a demand manifests itself in 
the commissioner or sitter’s expectations to be recognised so as to enable viewers to 
apply a physiognomic reading, and therefore taken their place within the pantheon of 
esteemed individuals. Yet, if the honorific survived modernism, the creative and 
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professional decisions that were produced as a result of artistic independence radically 
reconfigured the social status of such a pantheon. Artists were now creating their own 
pantheons free of the ideological pressures of church and state, which eventually 
reduced this cultural mechanism from a selection of exemplars of humanist universal 
values to a means for public image making and self-promotion. In other words, by 
putting in place their pantheons modern artists became critical of how honour was 
appropriated by the state, religion, and the ruling class. This is another instance of a 
modernist rejection of Aristotelian values, since it was Hellenistic and Roman 
physiognomic idealisation that allowed for the universal pantheon to attain such 
historic power. Thus, the constitution of artist-led pantheons of portraiture 
guaranteed the abolition of external creative control while at the same time assisted in 
the formation of new modernist heroic personas, like Picasso. Indeed, the process of 
attribution of honour shifted from the sitter to the artist, as the sitter was now largely 
subservient to the artist’s approval. 
Cubism set out to resolve the problem of visual identification (in the process 
of achieving creative freedom) through the denaturalisation of the human figure, 
which began in the Analytic stage of Cubism as an overblown multivalent realism, 
then eventually moved into abstraction; the issue of the sitter’s identification was 
resolved in the Synthetic stage through the substitution of pictorial reference for the 
indexical. The abstraction of the figure would, inevitably, leave no room for the 
identification of the subject, thereby diminishing the possibility of incorporating the 
desires and interests of the sitter. Consequently, the clash of subjectivities in 
modernist portraiture is resolved through the suppression of the sitter’s subjectivity 
(resemblance). This suppression produces an obvious disappointment in the sitter, 
who, nevertheless, is solaced through the honour of being included in the artist’s 
pantheon. Yet, the value of such honour is significantly reduced when the artist is 
professionally dependent on the given sitter. 
Picasso found himself caught in just such a situation with the creation of the 
Cubist portraits of his dealers at the time. For these portraits Picasso withdrew from 
the extreme figurative abstraction of his Cubist explorations, pursued with Braque, in 
order to please the demands of his sitters (visual identification). It could be argued 
that this was a reasonable demand, especially since it did not incorporate a request for 
 
240 
idealisation. However, this retraction is of grave importance because it limited the 
application of the experimental potentials of Cubism and the creative independence of 
Picasso. Thus Picasso subsumed his subjectivity to that of his dealers by willingly 
assimilating his creative concerns to those of his sitters’ expectations. The fact that 
Picasso became aware of this problematic class of subjectivities derives from his later 
decision to stylistically divide the production of his portraits between those destined 
for promotional consumption (Neoclassic) and those that served his experimental 
drive (Expressionist). The significance of Picasso’s restriction of Cubism’s potential 
for the sake of satisfying his dealers becomes even greater when viewed in the broader 
historical context, and particularly, in relation to the aims of modernism. That is, the 
fact that this stylistic retraction manifested itself as a prioritisation of the sitter’s 
subjectivity forced Picasso to fall back into the pre-modern dualist structure of 
professional and creative subservience to patronage. In this way, the modernist 
mission of approaching dualism through monadic and independent forms of creativity 
(and not through structures of productive subservience (patronage / artist as head of 
workshop)) became impossible to achieve. 
The alternative to dualist abstraction and Aristotelian mimesis was provided 
by the avant-garde practice of the readymade, the emergence and subsequent 
development of which was contemporary with that of Cubism. The readymade offers 
artists first and foremost a method for making art that diminishes the Cartesian 
notion of singular authorship. The expressive, artisanal mode of making is replaced 
with a model of authorship-as-nomination. In this way, the significance of the 
readymade lies in its re-introduction of allegory into art following its early modernist 
abolition.  This indexical return of allegory not only presents an escape route out of 
idealisation, but also provides a non-abstract alternative to mimesis. In this way, 
allegorical modes of non-resemblance are able to produce a successful critique of the 
honorific function of portraiture. Moreover, the allegorical principles of fragmentation 
and decentralisation defy the absolute character of the dualist notions of immutability, 
subjective unity and hierarchical order. Accordingly, allegory’s fundamental critique of 
the singularity of the dualist subject lies in its attention to polysemic meaning, which 
in return not only encourages but also demands the viewers’ participation in the 
process of meaning production. Once engaged in this process, viewers are compelled 
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to employ their critical abilities and knowledge beyond the contextual confines of the 
work. As a result of this independent and euretic process of production of meaning, 
viewers become aware of their state of consciousness in the production of meaning. 709 
Finally this (euretic) process is guided by a cognitive model of a combinative reference 
(the construction of meaning from disparate sources), which is radically different from 
hermeneutics and the conflictual tendencies of dualism. Indeed allegory puts in place 
a network of relations that is analogous to W. Teed Rockwell’s model of 
consciousness: brain (artist) – body (sitter) – world (audience) all of which participate 
in the production of meaning. On this basis, the collaborative aspects of the 
allegorical production of meaning, enable a constructive alternative to the dualist 
pursuit of oppositional binaries. 
Key artists using allegory to work through, and with portraiture, are Andy 
Warhol, Art & Language and Mary Kelly. Allegory manifests itself in Warhol 
primarily through his fondness for working with mechanically reproduced readymade 
imagery. Like many of his Pop art peers Warhol revisited Dadaist strategies in 
response to the expressive tendencies of high modernist artists. In this light, the 
portraits of Marilyn Monroe are radical to the extent that he based them on a widely 
circulated image of Monroe instead of producing an original impression of his subject. 
At first, the repetitive manner in which Monroe is presented in the panels assert an 
anti-dualist account of the self, one that is multiple and mutable. However, by 
addressing the surface-image of Monroe’s appropriated persona for public 
consumption, Warhol revisits the dualist distrust of the untrue representational 
properties of public image making, whose origins can be traced back in Aristotelian 
idealisation. From this perspective the serial character of the work refers to the 
multiplicity of Monroe’s constructed public femininity, exposing the power of 
idealisation’s potential. Moreover, Warhol’s decision to work with a public image 
establishes a division between a private and a public self, which simply adds to the 
dualist character of the Monroe portrait. As a result we reach a paradoxical dissolution 
of the modernist clash of subjectivities through the combination of inexpressive means 
that deflate Warhol’s subjectivity as an artist, and Monroe’s mediated image, which 
denies the viewer insight into her personality. The difference between Monroe’s 
                                                
709 Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory, pp. 235-241, 254. 
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image and pre-modernist commissioned portraiture, then, is that Monroe did not 
have a say in this process (unlike the majority of Warhol’s subjects, Monroe, like the 
other celebrity subjects of Warhol’s portraiture of the time, did not sit for this 
portrait), thus her subjectivity was not asserted in a competitive dialogue with the 
author of the work. This distancing process from the subjectivities of both artist and 
subject assists the viewer in understanding how important the intended context of 
presentation is in the production of a public portrait. 
Warhol formed the Factory as a collaborative venture, where he acted as the 
head of the business controlling and overseeing a collective line of production. 
However, his preference for mechanical means in the making of his art forced his 
assistants’ creative interventions to remain invisible and allowed the work to be 
reproduced in great numbers without drawing on the skills of the individuals he 
employed; in contrast, Rembrandt’s work was based on the very personal and stylistic 
attributes of his assistants.  Truly collaborative works require the unique mark of 
individuals to become indistinguishable from one another in order for the work to be 
perceived as a collective outcome or a group effort, preventing the open attribution of 
certain aspects of the work to specific individuals.  Authorship of the work should be 
attributed equally to all collaborators, implemented through the establishment of 
artists’ collective agency. Yet, Warhol’s restriction of his assistants’ creative input 
through the endorsement of mechanical reproductive methods and his refusal to share 
authorship and copyright of the work, in the end distanced the labour of the Factory 
from those of truly collaborative practices.  Instead, we have the artistic reification of 
the ghost in the machine, with Warhol acting as the spirit or mind that controls a 
mechanical body, all in the name of his great desire to establish a modern day brand 
name for his practice. In these terms, Warhol’s practice remains consistent with 
Cartesian subjectivity by conforming to what Rockwell terms as dualist materialism, 
where metaphysics is reduced to a hierarchical network that relies on the instrumental 
relationship between its ‘parts’ and ‘headquarters’. 
The notion of singular authorship was successfully deflated by Conceptual art’s 
collaborative practices, such as those pursued by Art & Language, where authorship is 
attributed to all members of the group. Moreover, Art & Language’s employment of 
the studio for intellectual debates and research activities explicitly rejects the dualist 
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and modernist model of solitary studio practice that produces original knowledge 
based on ‘intuition’ and ‘formal innovation’. Art & Language’s seminal work Index 
extends their notion of collaboration into a critique of the clash of subjectivities, 
through the dissolution of modernist artistic subjectivity. The combination of 
allegorical principles and euretics encourages further collaboration by opening up the 
process of production of meaning beyond the immediate members of the group. As a 
result, this endless extension of meaning attacks both the closed nature of modernist 
art and of archives. Once the meaning of a work remains open and capable of 
accommodating a multitude of viewer responses, the dichotomies between object 
(artwork) and subject (meaning), artist (producer of knowledge) and viewer (perceiver 
of knowledge) are dissolved by a collective and cooperative approach. The network 
that is formed as a consequence of the viewers’ equal participation in the production 
of meaning is analogous to Rockwell’s network theory: brain (artist) + body (physical 
body of work) + world (audience) collaborate in the production of the actual work, 
which takes the form of an intellectual event that adapts to the specifics of each 
collaborator. As a result, this potential for a limitless number of participating viewers 
in the production of meaning opens up the range of possible subjectivities involved in 
the production of portraiture beyond the two involved in pre-modernist and 
modernist portraiture (artist-sitter).  
Art & Language revisited the problem of conflictual subjectivities in their 
Portrait of V. I. Lenin in the Style of Jackson Pollock. Where the Index deflates sole 
authorship by inviting external participation in the production of a ‘group portrait’, 
the Portrait of Lenin does so by allegorically appropriating Pollock’s style in order to 
recreate Charangovitch’s iconic image of Lenin. By adapting the subjectivities of 
Pollock and Charangovitch – manifested in the adoption of Pollock’s style and 
reworking of Charangovitch’s image of Lenin – the work proposes a dialogic 
exchange between the subjectivities of Art & Language and those of Pollock and 
Charangovitch, thus, providing a way out of the dualistic clash of subjectivities.  Of 
course, such a situation is intrinsically linked to the ironic realms of allegory, where 
the subjectivity of Lenin is employed for the purpose of creating a visual pun and not 
to provide a conventional portrait of Lenin. 
 
244 
Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document advances the inter-subjective character of 
Art & Language’s work by paying particular importance to the role of the sitter. This 
is the result of the work’s focus on mothering at the early stages of a child’s 
upbringing, which instantly presupposes a dialectic coexistence of mother and child’s 
subjectivities. Hence, the necessary collaboration of subjectivities – without which the 
work would serve as nothing more than an account of family-based conflicts – 
establishes another extended model of portraiture, capable of challenging the 
conflictual tendencies and hierarchical structures of dualist practices. The P.P.D. 
shares the Index’s euretic approach, now produced out of a combination of 
autobiography (mothering), academic theory (Lacanian psychoanalysis), and art 
(Conceptual art). The introduction of theory as an integral methodological aspect of 
the work puts in place a process where the private emerges through a theoretical filter 
before it becomes public and shared. This inevitably establishes a certain level of 
subjective neutrality, preventing Kelly from advertising her individuality through the 
tropes of unique expression. Again this is strikingly analogous to Rockwell’s network 
theory. Brain (private) + body (public) + world (academic) collaborate in the 
production of an artwork that takes the form of a theoretical engagement with the 
impact of mothering on the formation of Kelly’s relationship with her son and her 
son’s emerging subjectivity. Consequently, the P.P.D. offers a model of portraiture 
where the subject or sitter is not subordinated to the interests of the artist, and 
therefore, the artist does not attempt to impose his or her idiosyncrasies on the 
representation of the sitter. 
Commenting on the recent neuronal concepts of the mind that form the basis 
for the engineering science of Computer AI processing Greg Ulmer rightfully claims 
that they account only for the left part of brain, due to its “algorithmic features of 
analysis and linear sequence”.710 The development of dualist portraiture seems to have 
attempted to test both ‘sides’ of the brain: from the pre-modernist realism (Rational 
left side/Platonic reading of subject through physiognomy) to modern abstraction 
(expressive-right side/ Romantic impression of subject accessed through ‘inner 
vision’). As a result, up until the moment of post-1960’s portraiture the course of 
aesthetic development for the last four thousand years has been trapped in a vicious 
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circle between realism and abstraction. Starting from the abstract representations of 
Egyptian Pharaohs portraiture was then taken over by Classicist naturalism only to 
return to abstraction during the Byzantine era and the Middle Ages. At the dawn of 
the Renaissance and the cultural return to the classicist humanist ethos excellence in 
portraiture became intrinsically connected with realistic depiction. Yet, the modernist 
rejection of realism encouraged a full return to abstraction with portraiture offering 
extra challenges for formalist experimentation. Post-1960’s portraiture abandoned the 
expressive heroism of high modernism, adopting a research-based approach to the 
representation of the subject. Yet this realism is not to be identified with aesthetics 
and formalism, on the contrary it should be seen as a form of practice that is 
developed in tandem with heuristic demands of extra-artistic research.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to dissociate the representation of subjectivity 
in art from its traditional dualist conceptions. In doing so, whereas the first two 
Chapters trace the emergence of the dualist portrait, the second chapter looks at the 
methodological problems that arise from the honorific aspects of this format (clash of 
subjectivities). Accordingly, the last chapter provides an account of alternative 
approaches to the representation of human subjectivity, all of which presuppose a 
fundamental distancing from honorific notions.  As a consequence, such forms of 
portraiture require the artist to refrain from an individualistic promotion of his artistic 
uniqueness and abstain from dealing with or exploring the sitter’s self. As we have 
seen, one of the ways this can be achieved is through the employment of allegory, 
which allows for a non-expressive, non-resemblance-based form of portraiture. Yet, 
paradoxically, although allegorical portraits prevent the representational subservience 
of the body to the mind, they risk siding with dualism, in so far as their effects are 
achieved through a representation of the self independent of the body. On the other 
hand, the allegorical attributes of the readymade as well as the sequential character of 
recent forms of portraiture, represent a successful critique of the dualist notion of the 
subject as unique and immutable (singular, ‘timeless’). In this way, the use of 
readymade imagery, for instance, offers a middle ground between a certain level of 
resemblance and a refusal to deal with the representation of the body; the use of a 
found image frees the artist from a need to produce a ‘reading’ of his subject. Finally, 
when such tactics are adopted by collaborative practices, then we witness the absolute 
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dissolution of the dualist portrait through a critique of the honorific and of singular 
authorship, since individual subjectivities merge under a collective artistic agency. 
In this respect, portraiture has freed itself from its dogmatic restraints in order 
to adopt an explorative role equal to that of philosophy and science. It is astonishing 
how in the short course of the last fifty or so years portraiture has developed in critical 
range. Now that portraiture is also (mostly) free from the dictates of patronage and 
the creative vanity of artistic heroism it can focus on the exploration of subjectivity 
and the self from a non-dualist, non-humanist perspective. The benefits of this 
approach can be found in the radical amateur portraits that were discussed in the early 
section of this conclusion, which above all signify the advance and popularisation of 
contemporary artistic methodology. In the light of the recent and somewhat parallel 
development of the philosophy of mind and portraiture, the general perception of 
portraiture’s role should be freed from its historical burden of self-promotion and 
elevated into a critical genre of invaluable intellectual importance. 
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